



PHD

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Networks And Relationships In A Bangladesh Slum**

Khan, Iqbal Alam

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**STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL : NETWORKS AND RELATIONSHIPS IN A BANGLADESH  
SLUM**

submitted by Md. Iqbal Alam Khan  
for the degree of Ph.D.  
of the University of Bath  
2000

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*To My Mother, Razia Khan,  
and  
In Memory of My Father, Tabibur Rahman Khan*

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## Abstract

This thesis focuses on the strategies through which poor migrants in a Dhaka slum seek to secure their livelihoods. The main argument of the thesis is that in order to understand these strategies it is important to identify and analyse the multiple relationships in which the slum dwellers are involved. It is through relationships and networks that the poor create and recreate the type of social capital which allows them access to resources and helps to make their social, political and economic environments more predictable and secure. In the face of exclusion from urban service provision and a location largely outside the formal economy, the strategies of the poor mainly operate in the context of a system of informal rights.

In tracing different relationships and networks, the thesis identifies the important role played by a particular group of actors, the 'strong men' of the slum, or '*mastaans*'. Although *mastaans* are normally associated with violence and crime, the thesis shows how they also offer access to services, contacts and market opportunities that are essential to the survival prospects of slum dwellers. The *mastaans* play a critical role in the creation and maintenance of the system of informal rights. Ironically therefore, it is through *mastaans* that the urban poor develop and strengthen their social capital, while at the same time the *mastaans* co-opt that social capital for their own purposes.

The thesis offers both theoretical and empirical insights into both the wider process of urbanisation in Bangladesh, as well as the survival strategies of particular slum dwellers. Chapter two introduces the slum area where the fieldwork was carried out while chapters five, six and seven explore various aspects of the migration and survival strategies of the slum dwellers. The first chapter presents a critical review of the literature on the process of urbanisation, with particular reference to the Bangladesh context. Finally, chapters three and four describe the key methodological and theoretical issues that have guided the research.

The conclusion reflects on the main findings of the thesis and highlights some policy implications. These suggest that awareness of the significance of relationships and networks to slum livelihoods must occupy central place in any development intervention. Rather than seeking to effect the immediate exit of the poor from *mastaan* dominated structures, the emphasis should be on gradually building up alternative forms of social capital, critically under-girded by the establishment in the wider polity of formal rights for the slum dwellers.

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## INTRODUCTION

This thesis focuses on the responses of the urban poor to social transformation in the context of a slum in Dhaka, Bangladesh. In studying rural social transformation in Bangladesh, the structure of relationships has been prioritised by a number of authors (Wood 1994, McGregor 1991, Lewis *et al* 1996 and Devine 1999). A serious ethnography of the urban context, however, has as yet not been produced. This research contributes to two broad areas where present understanding is still very limited. First, it will address the research/knowledge gap which exists with regard to urban ethnography. Second, it will focus on the role of a particular set of actors in the lives of the urban poor, the 'strong men', or *mastaans*.

This research was carried out in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. This is today a mega city with more than 8 million inhabitants. When I first moved to Dhaka in September 1977 from Jessore, a district in the South-West of Bangladesh, I remember noting how much of the city was permanently or temporarily submerged under water. Things have changed radically since then - Dhaka is now a mega city with half of its total population living in poverty and half of its land area occupied by slum dwellers. Where there was once water, there now stand slums. The world of the urban poor in Bangladesh has not attracted academics, researchers and official planners but development activists. NGOs have been working for the urban poor since the late 1980s with either pilot projects or adaptations of rural development strategies. In 1995, realising the need for further understanding of the urban context, Proshika, one of the largest NGOs in Bangladesh undertook an Urban Livelihoods Study (ULS) in collaboration with the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the University of Bath, UK. One of the aims of the study was to impact on policy formulation processes so that development programmes designed for the urban poor can be anchored in a better informed and sound knowledge base. Thus, the ULS had a multi-disciplinary focus and combined both qualitative and quantitative approaches to investigation. I was responsible for the qualitative part of the ULS and this research is a further development of that investigation.

My research for this thesis has developed in a fairly unconventional way. It began with my experience in carrying out the ULS qualitative work. As I explored their stories with the *bustee* migrants, I found they repeatedly used a phrase in Bangla which reflects a

whole survival strategy. The phrase is '*line lagao*' which translates as 'make a connection' or 'contacts'. This thesis attempts to analyse the meaning and implications of this phrase.

When *bustee* dwellers use the phrase '*line lagao*', they refer to the importance of social relationships for their survival. *Bustee* dwellers enjoy few, if any, formal rights and neither the state nor the formal market offers them access to employment opportunities, welfare, urban services and so on. By saying '*line lagao*', the *bustee* dwellers indicate that where urban poverty and vulnerability prevail, the only survival option is to 'make connections' with people who can either provide the services both the state and market fail to deliver, or can facilitate access to the same services.

In tracing the connections or relationships which facilitate survival in the *bustees*, one particular set of actors figured prominently: the *mastaans*. The *mastaans* represent a contradiction. On the one hand they are the 'strong men' of the slums. They control the *bustees* through a 'culture of violence', exacting protection money and demanding total subordination. Outside of the *bustees* they therefore have an overwhelmingly negative image. Inside, however, they show themselves to be vital actors in the urban political economy. They are the intermediaries who negotiate and deliver important services for the urban poor, in particular shelter and employment. Far from being isolated strong individuals, together they constitute a structure which ensures service delivery in exchange for monopoly control over the *bustee*. To understand the livelihoods of the urban poor, it thus became clear that it was necessary to understand the *mastaan* structure. For it is this produces informal rights controls the codes of conduct which govern *bustee* economy and culture.

This thesis focuses on the sources of the *mastaan's* monopoly control over the *bustee*. Primary amongst these are the lack of formal rights and the absence of appropriate *bustee* social organisations. The lack of formal rights means that the *bustee* dwellers need intermediaries to provide them with access to the services they require. This provides the opportunity which the *mastaans* can exploit. At the same time recent migration from rural areas means an absence of the lineage based institutions that form an important link in village level social organisation and control. Again, the *mastaans* provide the missing link, linking the household with the wider community and taking responsibility for the

day to day running of the *bustee* and the people who reside therein. Looked at this way, it can be seen that the *mastaans* make the *bustee* economy and society functional.

The functions that the *mastaan* structure provides in the *bustee* context is a central concern of this research. However, the thesis does not aim to provide an ethnography of the *mastaans* as such. Rather, their significance is considered in the context of the *bustee* dwellers' need to 'make connections' in order to pursue their livelihoods. The central focus is thus on how the *bustee* migrants survive, and the concern with the *mastaans* arises in as much the structure of social relationships and individual behaviour in the *bustee* are embedded within the *mastaan* structure. Secondly, although this research cites rural examples to make the challenges of *bustee* society clearer, this research considers the construction of *bustee* community or society only rather than comparing it with rural traditional society.

As mentioned earlier, the strategy of '*line lagao*' refers to a deliberate attempt to develop contacts or networks in order to achieve specific aim. In order to understand the gamut of relationships involved under the informal rights produced by the *mastaan* structure, I make use of and build on the notion of social capital. This approach allows me to consider the *mastaan* structure in a wider perspective. Thus, the *mastaan* structure is considered not only as a criminal organisation but as an organisation which offers benefits to a number of actors which are required for their survival in an uncertain and insecure situation. The combination of these factors allows actors to create environments of relative predictability and trust.

In facilitating such environments of predictability and trust in the *bustee* community, the *mastaan* structure can be considered as producing a form of social capital that represents a 'public goods'. On the other hand, the type of social capital produced by such Mafia-type organisations is generally considered to be a 'public bads'. This thesis argues that there is a problem when the designation 'public bads' follows simply from generalised norms and the imposition of an external value judgement. In this thesis the *mastaans* cannot be said to be wholly good or bad. On the one hand the *mastaan* structure facilitates action producing informal rights where legal rights produced by state and market are absent, but on the other *mastaans* undertake much criminal activity. Therefore, from the conceptual point of view, the social capital produced by the criminals is considered as



'bad' but at the same time empirically it produces the most important resource for the survival of the *bustee* dwellers, and so must be considered as 'good'. This thesis, in examining the role of the *mastaan* structure in relation to the *bustee* dwellers' survival, highlights this tension and generates the question: how can 'public bads' be bad when the survival of others depends on them? In order to address this issue, the process of the creation of social capital and its use for survival in *bustee* context with regards to informal rights, is a major theme throughout this thesis.

The analysis of the *bustee mastaan* structure is complemented by an overview of the *mastaans* in the wider political economy of Bangladesh. Although this research focuses on the micro level of one *bustee*, the findings are relevant for other *bustee* contexts. I mentioned earlier that my research developed in an unconventional way. The research idea was first generated during fieldwork and the theoretical elaboration followed later. To a certain extent the experience of moving from fieldwork to analysis and concentration is reflected in the thesis structure. Chapters dealing with ethnography and theory are not separated as sharply as in conventional thesis structures. The thesis consists of seven main chapters, a conclusion and this introduction.

In the first chapter I attempt to provide an overview of the urbanization process and its consequences for poor people. I discuss this globally and then relate it to the context of Bangladesh. I focus on two major points. First, urbanisation has introduced a global social transformation since a large share of the world's population is now urban dwelling. The second point is that the urban social environment of Bangladesh reflects a situation in which the urban poor have become part of the modern urban economy. This urban economic system produces both opportunities and insecurities, uncertainties and risks for the poor since the economy operates or is regulated through a system of informal rights.

In the second chapter I illustrate some of the points discussed in the first chapter by introducing the slum or *bustee* where I carried out my fieldwork. I highlight three main issues: a) the problematic nature of social organisation, b) the nature of the urban cash economy and c) the prevalence of a 'culture of violence' in the *bustee*. First, two important levels of social organisation are absent in the *bustee*: *gusti* (kinship) and lineage based neighbourhoods. As *bustee* households leave their rural homes, they tend to become nuclear and leave behind them *gusti* and lineage based neighbourhoods, and the

associated aspects of their social life. Second, the *bustee* economy is extremely cash based and this influences *bustee* migrants' economic behaviour. Third, there is a new culture of violence prevalent in the *bustee*. Not surprisingly, *mataans* are involved in all three parts. The *mastaan* structure covers a range of coalitions and associations. They act: a) as agents who fulfill social functions; b) as intermediaries in the cash economy; and c) as actors who either use or threaten to use violence.

In the third chapter I attempt to show how the research was carried out. The research approximates the way *bustee* people live in that it focuses on sociology of everyday life. Such an approach cannot be fully organised in advance and does not limit itself to pre-developed research methodologies. This thesis is exploratory in nature. I begin with concrete life experiences and from there I move towards theory in order to inform and strengthen my analysis.

In the fourth chapter I analyse the concept of social capital as a resource encompassed within social relationships. This form of capital influences action and the environment in which it takes place. The concept of social capital has a growing number of applications and is normally used to denote effects that have positive outcomes. However, it is a highly contested concept and in this chapter I use my research observations to develop the concept in a pertinent way.

In chapter five, I make two main points. First, I argue that the decision to migrate is not only the product of push-pull factors. Pull factors may create exit options for migrants, but the decision to migrate depends upon entry options in the town. The demand for labour alone is not sufficient to explain migration. The decision to migrate is highly correlated with the quality and quantity of the social capital resources of the migrants. Second, migration actually takes place within networks developed on the basis of kin. The migration process itself creates an opportunity to confirm, extend and re-make kin-based networks. This is done primarily through developing relationships of fictive kinship. The ability to extend social networks is fundamental for those residing permanently in the *bustee*.

In the chapter six, I present how *bustee* migrants extend and re-make their social lives while settling down in the *bustee*. I argue that the space created by the absence of both family and lineage neighbourhoods (see chapter two) is filled by different coalitions, social ties and associations. The basis of these new relationships is friendship. What distin-

guishes rural from *bustee* contexts is that while in the former, kin based relationships are fundamental, in the latter non kin based relationship are prominent. The second argument I make is that the importance of the *mastaan* structure lies in its ability to produce multiplex relationships. The *mastaan* structure covers various coalitions and associations which create a strong structural foundation in the urban context. The ability to manipulate these relationships constitutes the basis of the *mastaans'* authority and power.

In the seventh chapter I attempt to show how *bustee* migrants use their social capital resources to create survival strategies. I argue that the survival of *bustee* households greatly depends upon their ability to produce social capital in the *bustee* context and to use this resource to gain access to other livelihood goods or outcomes.

In the conclusion, I re-state the main empirical findings of the thesis and discuss the theoretical and policy implications. From a theoretical perspective, I argue that social capital resources should be conceptualised as value neutral when they are required for survival. As far as policy implications are concerned, this research suggests that any development intervention in the slums needs to understand the relationships and networks that exist and are in use in the *bustee* livelihoods. Without creating the option for alternative social capital and environments with formal rights, any action requiring immediate exit of the *bustee* dwellers from the *mastaan* structure would not be either practicable or fair to the urban poor.

## Chapter One

# URBAN SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND URBAN LANDSCAPE IN BANGLADESH

### 1. Introduction

As urbanisation is a key characteristic of the present world, it invites academic debate, discussion, criticism and speculation since it reflects the contradictory combination of wealth and poverty. Urbanisation brings about social transformation by shifting a high proportion of the rural population into cities. A combination of a real increase in urban population and increased coverage of new areas by urban growth ensure that the global landscape is becoming an urbanised one, changing the global environmental landscape from green to grey (Stanley 1988). Although urbanisation is a worldwide phenomenon, Asia has the highest share of the global urban population and five countries i.e. China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh share two-thirds of the Asian urban population. Among these five, Bangladesh has so far experienced the lowest level of urbanization, even if it still has a high growth rate of urban population (Afsar 1995a). Dhaka, the capital city of Bangladesh, where I carried out my fieldwork, has become a mega city.

The main purpose of this chapter is to understand the social transformation that is taking place through urbanisation and the effect this has especially in the case of Bangladesh. This chapter will therefore incorporate both global and local dimensions of the urbanisation phenomenon.

### 2. Global Urban Social Transformation

Although urban social transformation is a global phenomenon, rapid urbanisation mostly takes place in developing countries where it is strongly related with the phenomenon of development. Modernization policies, designed to alleviate rural poverty, have been introduced throughout developing countries, and have been widely associated with the shift of labour from agriculture to industry, and of population from rural to urban locations. Urbanisation in developing countries is thus considered from the modernisation perspective a positive outcome. In my first approach to understanding the global

phenomenon of urbanisation, I intend looking at three interrelated points: i) development perspectives; ii) common features of urban social transformation; and iii) how its consequences are perceived.

### **2.1. Development Perspectives**

While urban poverty has received some attention in Latin America, it is only recently that its importance has been recognised by researchers and development planners in South Asia. Two main factors are responsible for this: a) the importance afforded to rural development, b) the negative tone of the early urban ethnographies, which associated the urban poor to a large degree with crime and social disorder.

The first factor relates to the emphasis given to rural development especially by modernisation paradigms. It was assumed after the colonial period that the problem of poverty in the South would be solved if the rural sector could be modernised. Within the modernisation paradigm there were contradictory approaches: on the one hand to enhance urbanisation and on the other to reallocate resources from the urban to the rural sector. Firstly, modernisation paradigms enhanced urbanisation by establishing the towns as centres of growth. At the same time, the introduction of the so-called 'green revolution' technology led to polarization in rural society, and so brought the rural poor into the city.

Secondly, this development paradigm was strongly complemented by arguments about resource allocation, to which Lipton's popular 'urban bias' theory has contributed. Lipton (1977) strongly argued that the main problem with the less developed countries is that the allocation of material resources, organisation and power is urban-based while the majority of the population lives in the rural areas. Furthermore, he argued that government taxation and expenditure policies mainly favour the urban population, the better off section of the population, causing national income inequalities. The 'urban bias' thesis thus argues for less resource allocation to the urban sector. This perspective was also supported by other theorists. For example, Hoselitz (1957) described the city as 'parasitic' because in his mind the development of cities requires the transfer of rural resources, and this leaves the rural economy weak and poorer. The urban thus came to be

associated with the wealthy, and in South Asia at least, the issue of urban poverty was rarely considered by development discourse.

The second reason is related to the view that the poor living in the urban areas are seen as problem creators. It was thought that material deprivation made the poor frustrated to the point that they would reject the dominant values of urban society (Lewis 1967). Their inability to participate in the wider urban economic system would make the poor cynical and foster mistrust against the government and other social institutions. Furthermore, they would feel helpless and suffer from a sense of insecurity and inferiority. This would result in a 'culture of poverty', perpetuated from one generation to the next (Lewis 1958, 1967).

## **2.2 Common Features of Urban Social Transformation**

As mentioned earlier, urbanisation is generally seen in positive terms from the modernisation perspective but in reality such social transformation can have negative effects, producing a number of consequences which lead to urban poverty. Urban social transformation in developing countries is characterised by three distinguishable features.

Firstly, the growth of the urban population has led to the creation of mega cities. In 1950 there were only two mega cities in the world (London and New York) while by 1990 there were fourteen mega cities in developing countries of which nine were in Asia. These mega cities or 'urban conglomerations' normally have a population of eight million or more (Afsar 1995a), and absorb most of the country's urban population. For example, half of the total urban population of Thailand lives in Bangkok.

Secondly, it has been found that most cities are densely populated. For example, Calcutta in India is the most densely populated Asian city, while the number of persons per habitable room is highest in Karachi, at 3.6. The density of population in Dhaka is comparatively lower than other Asian cities; it was 9,930 per km. sq. in 1980-88, but the density in slum areas is as high as 162,000 per square kilometer (Table 1.1).

Thirdly, such a pattern of urban growth produces sub-human settlements where living conditions are very poor. Environmental and ecological problems now pose a real

threat to people's lives as inadequate urban provision results in the mushrooming of 'informal' settlements like slums and squatter colonies (table 1.1).

**Table 1.1: Slum and squatter formations and urban overcrowding in selected Asian countries and cities**

Country	Urban population in slum/squatter settlement %	Persons per habitable room	Major city with highest population density	
			City	Population per Km <sup>2</sup> 1980-88
Republic of Korea	47	1.5	Seoul	15,932
Japan	-	0.8	Tokyo	13,973
Indonesia	54	-	-	-
Malaysia	15	1.2	Kuala Lumpur	4,712
Philippines	28	2.3	Manila	45,839
Thailand	16	-	Bangkok	3,486
<b>Bangladesh</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>Dhaka</b>	<b>9,930</b>
India	36	2.8	Calcutta	88,135
Pakistan	-	3.6	Karachi	3,990
Sri Lanka	21	2.1	-	-

*Source: Afsar 1995a quoted from UN, 1993b 2- 42 and 2- 47.*

It is generally argued that slums and squatter settlements are the result of overcrowding in the city (Islam 1996, Afsar 1995a). The cities continually attract the rural population, but fail to provide sufficient shelter or services. Migration from rural to the urban areas contributes to making cities bigger and more overcrowded, thus creating an obstacle to the economic development of the city itself (Hauser 1985).

### 2.3 How are the Consequences Perceived?

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter urban poverty is a relatively new area of interest in development studies in South Asia. Elsewhere, while much of the early research presented various aspects of the urban phenomenon in negative terms later studies reacted by underlining the positive aspects of urban poor and their overall contribution to the national economy. In the following sections I review these discussions in a little more detail.

#### *General Perceptions*

First, there is a tendency to label the urban poor as a 'neither category'. The 'neither category' can express both geographical and sociological perspectives. From a geographical point of view, 'neither categories' arise through a re-classification of urban areas. Although the growth in urban population is associated with a real increase in the cities' population, it also occurs because a wide range of rural areas are reclassified or redefined as urban areas. This re-classification may occur even with the introduction of a few modern facilities, like electricity or roads. "In China (which has an enormous impact on global urbanisation statistics due to its population size), vast tracts of countryside are included in the catchment area of cities in order to provide reservoirs and hydro-electric power supplies for urban dwellers" (Wratten 1995:21). In view of this, Wratten (1995:21) raises the question, "Should peri-urban areas be classified as urban, rural or neither categories?". From a sociological point of view, it is observed that the migrated population follows a pattern of circular migration, shuttling between town and countryside. Although they live in a slum, dwellers are not fully integrated into either the city or rural areas (Lloyd 1979). In this sense they are people who seems to belong to a 'neither category'.

A second perspective offers a more positive scenario. It has been shown that migrant labourers gain a substantial income through their participation in the urban informal labour sector. Furthermore, as the urban inhabitants are concentrated in a smaller area, the supply of necessities like piped water and electricity is easier and cheaper to provide (Peterson *et al.* 1991). This helps the poor set up small enterprises. A micro study in Mexico suggests that even female labourers can find opportunities to set up small enterprises (Chant 1991). Most of the micro studies suggest that self-employed labour in the informal



sector can achieve higher incomes than wage labourers. It has also been suggested that the informal sector positively contributes to the urban economy in particular and to the national economy in general. Moreover, both opportunities for participation and the higher incomes of the rural migrant labourers contribute to the rural economy. Migrants often send back home part of their incomes and this benefits the rural economy (Mohan 1984).

### *Sub-Culture Perspective*

As mentioned earlier, urban poverty is often presented negatively because crime and social disorder are seen as characteristics of the 'culture of poverty'. This concept was developed by Lewis' biographical description of the experiences of migrants who lived in the cities of Puerto Rico and Mexico. The high population density and concentrated settlements contribute to a culture of mistrust and lack of community solidarity. Moreover, such settlements have the reputation of being a haven for criminals and are often referred to as 'urban ghettos' (Bartles-Smith *et al* 1976). The communities of the urban poor are seen to be helpless, having low expectations, to be dependent and to have an inferiority complex. This leads to the notion that vulnerability and insecurity are perpetuated by the poor people themselves, as they are internally competitive, have little sense of community, a cynical view of life and a mistrust of and lack of participation in formal institutions (Lewis 1967). Lewis gave an account of the structure of relationships, horizontal in nature, among the poor but this structure does not create wider solidarity for social action. The problematic nature of community is thus a key element in vulnerability and insecurity. Most critically, Lewis (1967:50) argues that the marginality of the urban poor becomes a self-perpetuating process:

"By the time slum children are six or seven they have usually absorbed the basic values and attitudes of their sub-culture and are not psychologically geared to take full advantage of changing conditions or increased opportunities which may occur in their lifetime".

This theme has been taken up more recently in the 'underclass' debate. This identifies an American underclass as poor because of "dysfunctional social habits like teen preg-

nancy and drug addiction - that would persist even if the economic opportunities existed" (Fukuyama 1995:38).

Similarly, Banfield (1967) found that in a Southern Italian peasant community after the second world war, the social ties and moral obligations were limited and individuals did not trust each other, thus limiting wider solidarity within the community. Based on this observation he developed the concept known as 'amoral familism' which means that these communities develop a cynical view of life with low expectations and submit themselves to a relationship of clientelism dominated by criminal gangs. This is seen in Southern Italy where the economy is facilitated by the Mafia who emerged as a result of distrust produced in wider society (Gambetta 1988). Various urban studies show that slum communities are often dominated by the gangs who produce a 'culture of violence' (Moser and Holland 1995). Alternatively, however, it can be argued paradoxically that trust is produced and maintained through these same intermediaries, and this facilitates socio-economic action (Khan 1998). However, the trust in intermediaries does not produce a wider solidarity to protect insecurity and vulnerability through associational engagement.

### *Citizenship Perspectives*

The extension of citizenship to the poor is important as it "focuses on the ways in which and extent to which people exercise that right collectively to make changes in the way resources are allocated "(Roberts 1995:185). The socio-political marginality of the poor produces livelihood vulnerability by limiting various rights to get access to market and to participate in the political process. Thus, the allocation of citizenship rights becomes a practical issue.

When focusing on social integration, sociologists consider the urban poor as 'marginal', "a person who belongs to two cultures or societies, being fully integrated into neither" (Lloyd 1979:60). The lack of integration is also reflected in the ideas of conventional economists who consider the slum dwellers as "parasitic upon society and should therefore be eliminated that is excluded from the town or transformed into wage earners"(ibid:60). The idea of elimination of the poor from urban society echoes the denial of citizenship rights of a group of people who are poor, and have often migrated to the ur-

ban setting. The denial of citizenship rights is reflected in state policy where the access of the urban poor to resources is restricted. For example, there is no policy or provision to allocate land to the urban poor in Bangladesh. As their access to the city land is denied, (Islam 1986), slums and squatters become the only abode for the poor migrants (Afsar 1996). Since the state appears to feel no obligation to these people, the urban poor can neither establish nor protect their citizenship rights. The lack of rights of tenure can be cited as an example of the preceding. Slum houses constructed on government fallow or disputed land are managed, operated and controlled by the *mastaans* - intermediaries or brokers - living either in the *bustee* or in nearby non-*bustee* houses. Apart from the high rent which is as high as that of the most expensive commercial area, the operators preserve the right to terminate or evict the poor, if and when they wish to do so. The exercise of the right to evict the poor migrants adds further vulnerability to urban poor livelihoods and this is exacerbated by the state when it takes initiatives to dismantle the slums.

The state's contribution to marginality is acknowledged by political scientists when they consider "marginal those who do not participate fully in the modern democratic process" (Lloyd 1979:61). The denial of citizenship right excludes the poor from enjoying city services like education, health and social security. Apart from the lack of city services, the unauthorized development of slums on government fallow and disputed lands does not allow people to construct the minimum infrastructure required for living such as sanitary toilet, internal roads, drainage. The lack of the minimum required physical infrastructure has adverse effects on human health, and in turn on human resources. The ill health of income earners threatens the survival of the *bustee* migrants in the urban economy. Moreover, the scope of developing human resources is further restrained due to lack of access to education and skill-oriented services; access to education is limited both by the non-availability of schools and by the child labour required for families' livelihoods. The preceding discussion suggests that urban poor livelihoods are maintained through a complex web, stemming from the default of state responsibility and the absence of social security.

### *Asset Vulnerability Framework*

The asset vulnerability framework has been developed to bring the 'asset ownership' concept from rural to the urban context. Sen (1982) conceptualised 'entitlement' by relating it to the two dimensions of 'endowment' and 'exchange'. Since Sen's work, which sees this asset ownership concept in terms of 'entitlement', debate on it continues and lists of assets are continually added when assets are considered in relation to food security and vulnerability.

Based on Sen's work two asset ownership approaches have been merged: identification of 'investments, stores and right to claim' has been combined with identification of 'risk to food entitlements'. Vulnerability and security are seen as a function of asset-holding by Swift (1989) when he identifies: 'investments' as being human in education and health, physical in housing and land; 'stores' as being food, expensive goods like jewelry; and the 'right to claim' as being networks with kin, friends or patron. Maxwell and Smith (1992) also classify five sources of entitlements: productive capital, non-productive capital, human capital, income and claims.

The above mentioned asset ownership analysis approaches have been developed on the basis of evidence from the rural sector. Moser (1998) has classified assets as a function of vulnerability and security in the urban sector. She identified its three generalised characteristics: 'commoditisation', 'environmental hazard', and 'social fragmentation' and sees the level of these to vary from rural to urban life. Moser (1998) therefore developed an 'asset vulnerability framework' which identifies those assets which are essential to reduce vulnerability or secure livelihoods of the urban poor. The 'asset vulnerability framework' has therefore been developed to classify assets as Moser (1998:4) summarises:

- \*       *" Labour - commonly identified as the most important asset of poor people.*
- \*       *Human capital - health status, which determines people's capacity to work, and skills and education, which determine the return to their labor.*
- \*       *Productive assets - for poor urban households the most important is often housing.*
- \*       *Household relations - a mechanism for pooling income and sharing consumption.*

\*        *Social capital* - reciprocity within communities and between households based on trust        deriving from social ties.”

Moser (1996, 1998) shows that achieving a successful livelihood depends upon the ability of people to manage resources which are transformed in two distinct ways: through the intensification of the existing strategy and through developing new or diversified strategies.

To sum up, it can be said that the rapid urbanisation which contributes to the rise of mega cities and urban growth is a significant expression of social transformation. Such social transformation, however, does not bring a high share of urban resources or facilities to the majority of those who become the urban poor. The nature of urban physical and social environments have thus become a matter of debate. Viewed negatively, urbanization is seen to create densely populated settlements which are responsible for a series of environmental and ecological problems. By contrast, other studies show more positive aspects of urbanisation. The urban poor are not marginalised, rather they participate in the social, political and economic activities, and so contribute to the overall economy. They are urban actors who construct different opportunities within the urban economy (Perlman 1976). In this the role of informal economy has been well recognised. In the following section I will focus on the urban landscape in social transformation in Bangladesh.

### 3. Urban Landscape in Bangladesh

Like other developing countries, Bangladesh has witnessed an increase in its urban population and a concentration of that population in the mega city of Dhaka. As a consequence, Dhaka is full of slums which contain half of the city's entire population. This produces a complex situation with a combination of physical problems in the cities and social tensions between different urban communities. I will offer an overview of general urban landscape focusing on : a) the increasing urban poor population, b) poor people's settlements, c) informal sector and d) an important urban actor: the *mastaan*. In this connection I will also introduce two urban terms which are frequently applied in the urban context in Bangladesh and are particularly relevant for this study. The terms are *bustee* and *mastaan*. The *bustee* is the local term used for slums and squatters settlements and *mastaan* is an well known urban actor.

#### 3.1. Urban Social Transformation: the Concentration of Urban Population in the Large Cities and Contributions of Slum Settlements

In order to understand the nature and consequences of urban social transformation, I will focus on three interrelated issues: a) the nature of urbanisation; b) the factors responsible for the growth of urbanisation and c) the significant consequences of urbanisation.

Although Bangladesh has a low level of urbanisation compared with its neighbouring countries, Bangladesh has experienced a rapid rate of urban growth over the last three decades. In very broad terms, between 1961-1981 the rate of growth was around 8%, while from 1981 to 1991 it was 6% average, about 8% during 1961-81, and 6% during 1981-91. Even with the projected declining trend, the urban growth rate is unlikely to be less than 4% until 2010 (Task Force, vol. 3, 1992). Given the country's large population lower, the absolute size of the urban population is enormous. An estimated 23 million people are currently living in urban areas. By 2005, this figure is projected to rise to over 46 million (Islam 1994), and by 2015 projections indicate that 68 million, or 37% of the population, will live in urban areas (Task Force, vol. 3, 1992). Crucially this rapid rate of urban growth is taking place without a commensurate increase in industrialisation or

planned urban or spatial development (Task Force vol. 3, 1992; UNDP; Alam 1987; Islam and Muqtada 1986; Shakur 1987, 1988).

Secondly, a combination of three factors have been identified as being responsible for this rapid growth of urbanisation in Bangladesh (Islam 1997, Afsar 1995a). These are as follows:

- the natural increase of the urban population i.e. the number of births exceeds that of deaths.
- the change in the definition of 'urban areas' i.e. the reclassification as 'urban'
- rural to urban migration i.e. new migrants from outside of the urban areas.

Among the three factors mentioned above, the latter two are the main contributing factors to the increased urban population in the Bangladesh for the last four decades and will remain the major contributors in near future (Afsar 1995a).

In relation to rural-urban migration in Bangladesh, the UN estimates that this factor explains between three-fifths to two-thirds of urban growth (Afsar 1995a) and for some large cities this contribution is much higher. Large cities like Dhaka and Chittagong absorb the migrant population arriving from the rural areas. The rate of absorption of migrants is as high as 70 percent. A survey conducted in 1995 found that 72 percent of urban poor household heads migrated to the cities (Islam 1997). The ULS survey conducted within the slum population suggests a much higher figure than 72%percentage share of other surveys. A rapid increase in the slum population mainly through migration positively correlates to the increase of the urban poor in Dhaka.

Natural population increase is another contributor to the general increase, although in this case figures are much more controversial. Citing the question of validity of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) data and referring to UN official data estimates, Afsar (1995a) states that 40% of the urban population can be accounted for by natural increase between the 1960s and 1990s. The UN projection also shows that the contribution from the natural increase continues to grow.

A third consequence is that it is also evident that the changes in urban boundaries also contribute to the urban extension. Afsar (1995a) notes that the contribution became

significant when the *upazila* (*Thanas* - the lowest administrative unit were converted to *upazila* by the then Chief Martial Law Administration in 1983) came to be considered part of the urban area. It appears that this boundary change contributed one-third to the urban growth between 1974 and 1981.

A fourth consequence of urbanisation is that it tends to lead to a situation in which the urban population is concentrated in the large cities and slum settlements generally emerge. Urban growth in Bangladesh is concentrated in two major cities: Dhaka, the capital city and Chittagong, the port city of Bangladesh. These two cities absorbed almost one third of the total urban population in 1981 (Shahabuddin 1998) and half of the country's total urban population of the country in 1991 (Afsar 1995a). Dhaka contains almost one third of the total urban population and half of those live below the poverty line. It is estimated that half of the urban population (or 11.45 million people) live below the poverty line and it is estimated that this number will increase to 22.72 million by the year 2010 (Task Force, Vol. 3, 1992). This growth has had serious consequences for the physical and socio-economic conditions of the cities (Task Force 1992; UNDP, 1993; CUS 1989; Madjumder *et al.* 1989; Miah *et al.* 1988). In particular, it has led to the accelerated growth of urban and peri-urban slum settlements (Arefeen and Mahbub 1993).

### **3.2. *Bustee* (Slums and Squatter settlements): poor migrants residential place and uncertain settlements**

In the previous section I stated that the growth rate of the urban population has had an impact on the physical and socio-economic conditions of the cities. The most noticeable impact in Dhaka is the emergence and extension of the slums and squatter settlements throughout the city. It is estimated that half of the total population are forced to live in slums and squatter settlements and these are urban poor who have migrated from the rural areas (Islam 1997). It may be useful to present the different terminologies used to describe the settlements of poor migrants living in the urban areas and the main features of the settlements.

The urban literature on poor settlements in Bangladesh use the terms slums and squatter settlements. In Bangla, people refer to them as *bustees*. The Centre for Urban



Studies (CUS 1988) adopts the terminology from the United Nations Centre For Human Settlements) and use the following definitions. as:

**Slums** are areas and communities of high density (over 300 persons per acre) with high room crowding (3 or more adults per room), and poor housing (impermanent (*kutchha*), semi-permanent (*semi-pucca*) or dilapidated buildings). These have inadequate water supply, poor sewerage and drainage facilities, few paved streets and lanes and irregular clearance of garbage. Such areas are inhabited by very poor and poor people who are mostly engaged in various types of informal sector activities.

**Squatter settlements** are the areas where people illegally occupy land belonging to government or non-government organisations by erecting makeshift structures of various nature for residential purposes.

A range of names are used throughout the subcontinent to refer to urban poor settlements: *chows* in Bombay, *katras* in Delhi, *cheris* in Madras and *bustees* in Calcutta (Chakraborty and Rana 1993) and in Dhaka. In this study I will use *bustee* as a generic term for both slums and squatter settlements for a number of reasons. First, it is the term most used by the people in Bangladesh. Second, by using the general term *bustee* I will avoid the confusion that may arise from using different names to different types of settlements. For example, table 1.2 shows that settlements are developed on the lands of government, semi-governments, private organisation, as well as on private land. There are also settlements developed on mixed and disputed lands. With the term *bustee*, I intend covering all these settlements types. Third, the management procedure of all settlements is broadly similar. For example, both the settlements developed on government and private land are primarily managed and controlled through violence which makes the rights of tenants equally uncertain.

**Table 1.2: Land Ownership Pattern**

<b>Land ownership</b>	<b>No. of cluster</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Government/Semi-government	328	29.2
Private (organisation)	23	2.0
Private (individual)	733	65.1
Mixed (public and private)	11	1.0
Unidentified disputed	30	2.7
Total	1125	100.0

Source: Islam (1996:133)

Although in this thesis I will use the term *bustee*, other researchers use different terms. When citing or referring of their work I will respect their own their terminological preferences. The main features of the settlements will be presented by referring to a) their physical condition, b) concentration of slums and c) levels of violence.

**Table 1.3: Some Basic Aggregate Information about Slum and Squatter Settlements (Clusters) in Dhaka Municipal Corporation Area, 1988**

Type of Information	Statistics
Total number of settlements identified	1125
Total area in acres	1340
Estimated households (in 1125 clusters)	146400
Estimated population (in 1125 clusters)	878000
Total estimated population including mini clusters	1010,000
Estimated number of structures	80000
Average number of clusters per ward	15
Average number of households per ward	1950
Average number of population per ward	11700
Average size of cluster (in acre)	1.20
Average amount of slum area per ward	18 acre/54 <i>bighas</i>
Density of population (per square mile/km)	420000/162000
Density of population (per acre)	655
Percentage of clusters up to one <i>bigha</i> (0.33 acre)	61
Percentage of clusters up to one acre ( 3 <i>bighas</i> ) in size	81
Average number of households per cluster	130
Average number of population per cluster	780
Percentage of clusters established after 1971	74
Established median size of a cluster (area/household/population)	13 <i>khathas</i> /30/180
Model pattern of monthly house rent	<i>Taka</i> 200-250
Percentage of clusters inundated (partly or fully) by 1987 flood	65

Source: Islam (1996: 128)

The first striking feature of slums and squatter settlements is the physical condition. It is evident that the poor migrants live in inhuman conditions. The settlements offer very poor housing, roads, sanitation and drainage, and basic facilities like water and energy. For example, with very few exceptions most of the houses are one-roomed including the cooking space. Generally the houses are small in size, constructed from fragile materials and are densely constructed. Such houses fail to protect people from winds, cold and rain (CUS 1983, 1988, Salway *et al* 1998) and fail to provide space for privacy.

The conditions of slums are better than the house of squatter settlements in terms of construction material used. Most of the slum houses have *kutchha* (mud) walls and tin roofs, while squatter houses are constructed from *bara* (woven bamboo sticks) for wall and roof. Some houses are bell-shaped and are constructed with one sheet of *bara* or polythene. They are so small that no adult can stand inside the house. These houses are known as '*jhupri*'. The ULS study found that the overall mean floor area per person is just 2.3 square meters (Salway *et al* 1998). The population in both slums and squatter settlements is extremely high. Table 1.3 shows that slums are densely populated with as high as 655 persons per acre or 162,000 persons per km.

The very poor quality of sanitation together with the almost or complete absence of a drainage system make the settlements' physical condition even worse. Most of the latrines have neither water-sealed nor *kutchha* drains. During the monsoon most of the houses are submerged under water due to the over flows from poor drainage. The ULS report found that more than 52 % of adult males and nearly 70% of adult females were ill during one round of its data collection. The overall health situation is also affected by water use. There are some settlements where dwellers have access to piped or tubewell water either through illegal connections or from neighbouring houses. To use illegal connections dwellers have to pay high 'fees' or wait a long time to collect water. Many settlements do not have water supply and the dwellers use river or canal water. For example, the dwellers in Beri Badh Bustee (BBB) use water from the river (Salway *et al* 1998) which is highly polluted by waste expelled from nearby leather factories. Many settlement dwellers enjoy electricity and gas through illegal connections but the connection is technically risky and is a main cause of fires in the slum areas.

The second feature alluded to above is the concentration of population in city settlements. Table 1.4 shows that the average number of households per ward (Ward is the

lowest administrative unit in municipality) is 1,950 and the average population is 11,700. While there are slums spread over all the wards of the city, slum settlements are concentrated in certain areas. For example, there is one ward in Dhaka city, namely ward No 54, which mostly includes the Mothiheel colony area adjacent to the Mothiheel commercial area, where there are no slums. The main reason for this is that there is less land available for constructing slums and there are very few employment opportunities other than domestic work in this residential areas. In contrast, there are concentrations of slums around the main market and business places. For example, in Islambagh, which includes important business centres and a river port, there is a high concentration of slums and a high density of population (Islam 1996). The main rural areas from where migrants move to Dhaka city are: the central part of Bangladesh and especially the greater Dhaka district; southern districts like Barishal, Faridpur and Patuakhali; south-east districts like Comilla and Noakhali; and Jamalpur a northern district (Islam 1996). All these districts are well connected to Dhaka by rivers and railways. For example, in slums in the wards connected to the river port concentrate regional migrants from Southern districts like Barishal and Patuakhali which are directly connected to Dhaka via rivers. Similarly, slums close to the railway stations are concentrated by migrants from districts like Jamalpur which have a rail connection with Dhaka.

The different 'routes of migration' also contribute to the concentration of skills and occupations in certain areas. For example, many migrants from the South live in Islambagh and work as *kulis* (labourers) at the river port. The ULS study found that in the slums which have been established for a long time there is a high concentration of skills (Salway *et al* 1998). The reason behind such concentration is that migrants living in the newly settled slums are new and young and their main objective is to enter in the urban labour market. Most of the migrants (over 60%) will accept almost any job after arriving in the city (Islam 1996). In contrast, long-time migrants move as their skills develop (Opel 1998). This skill generation process is basically attached to social networks. The combination of networks and the nature of job availability results in the concentration of particular skills in particular areas.

The concentration of skills is also influenced by information regarding job opportunities. For example, wage labourers who are employed on a daily basis need to belong to a network of good information. Most belong either to the *sardar* (traditional labour leader)

or to different labour gangs. Similarly, job availability also influences skill concentration. For example, in commercial areas like Motijeel there are limited *rickshaw* garages due mainly to the lack of space while are very common in the Mohammadpur area (Opel 1998).

Slums are also characterised by age and sex. The available literature on migration to Dhaka slums confirms that people migrate at a young age (Islam 1996, CUS 1983, 1990, Afsar 1995a). In fact 80% of the migrants migrate between the ages of 16 and 25 years (Islam 1996). Huq-Hussain (1996) also states that recent female migrants tend to be comparatively younger. This present study confirms this finding for the case of single female migrants. Newly settled areas are therefore dominated by newer migrants who tend also to be younger.

The fact that age and profession influence migration patterns results in another characteristic, an imbalance in the sexes. The female-male sex ratio among migrant population is 100:156 (Islam 1996). This means that slums tend to be numerically male dominated. However the increase in the number of jobs available in the export oriented garments industry has led to an increase in female migration and the slums situated close to the factories have predominantly more females.

A third feature of the slum areas is the level of control exercised through violence. Key actors in the web of violence which characterises both slums and squatter settlements are the *mastaans*. Living quarters are often developed and managed by *mastaans* who resort to violent tactics in order to extort protection money from the dwellers. Violence is also used by house owners to receive rents on time and evict tenants. The use of violence is particularly common for evictions. Table 1.4 shows that the government department is the main actor in cases of eviction, while the second main actor is the *mastaan*.

**Table 1.4 : Agency Making the Eviction from the House/Area**

Types of crisis	Dhaka (%)	all urban (%)
Govt. department	62.1	56.8
Landlord	4.2	11.7
Mastan ( <i>Mastaan</i> )	19.7	21.6
Uncertain	8.5	7.2
semi-government	2.8	1.8
Private organisation	1.4	0.9
Total	100.0	100.0
n (number of households)	87.0	111.0

Source: Reproduced from Islam *et al* (1997)

### 3.3 The Urban Informal Sector: Opportunity for Employment and Source of Insecurity

It is acknowledged that urban informal sector (UIS) is important for its employment absorption capacity and its contribution to the economy (Peattie 1974, Harris 1982, Islam 1996). However, the trends and characteristics of the UIS are poorly understood. This is mainly because of lack of time series data. Despite this, various studies highlight the dualism of the UIS. On the one hand, it contributes positively as a source of income, on the other hand, it is a source of insecurity and uncertainty (Harris 1986, ILO 1973, UNDP 1993,). An attempt will be made here to understand how the informal sector both offers opportunity and produces constraints for the urban poor in the context of Bangladesh.

In order to understand the UIS in the context of Bangladesh, it is first necessary to understand the most significant features of the sector. The task is not helped by the fact that there is a lack of reliable data. Given this limitation I will follow two approaches. I will look at features of the urban sector in general from the official time series data and use other studies to complement this data. First of all, I will use data produced by the Labour Force Survey (LFS). Unfortunately, this data cannot be disaggregated and it does not include the persons engaged in household work. This creates two problems. First of all, disaggregated data eludes my analysis. Secondly, women participation in the UIS is not adequately reflected. However, despite their limitations, the official government data clearly show that urban employment has been steadily rising over time compared to the rural sector (table 1.5).

**Table 1.5 : Urban-rural employment share in Bangladesh**  
(million)

Year & source	Bangladesh	Urban	Rural
1961 Census	16.9 (100)	1.0 (6)	15.9 (94)
1974 Census	21.9 (100)	2.1 (10)	19.8 (90)
1981 Census	25.9 (100)	3.3 (13)	22.6 (87)
1983-84 LFS	28.5 (100)	3.9 (14)	24.4 (86)
1984-85 LFS	29.5 (100)	4.1 (14)	25.4 (86)
1985-86 LFS	30.9 (100)	4.7 (15)	26.2 (85)
1989 LFS	50.7 (100)	5.7 (11)	45.0 (89)
1990-91 LFS	51.2 (100)	8.7 (17)	42.5 (83)

*Note: Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage*

Source: Islam *et.al.* (1997:65)

Secondly, I will consider observations made by various micro and cross sectional studies on the informal sector in Bangladesh. It is evident from these studies that those labour employed in the urban informal sector enjoy a wider range of opportunities compared to the rural sector. This is mainly due to the limited absorption capacity of the agricultural sector which slowed down even further during 1980s. Meanwhile there has been a notable development of the urban informal sector creating labour demand (UNDP 1993). In fact, as much as half of urban employment is provided by the informal sector, while a number of studies claim this share is much higher. For example, the World Bank (1992) claims that the urban formal sector provides only 10% of urban employment and the rest is provided by the informal sector. The urban informal sector has played an important role in generating employment and income for a large section of people living in the urban areas. Islam (1996:70) notes:

“It is now well recognised that the urban informal sector which comprises a number of small and micro enterprises and embodies a wide range of activities like hawking, street vending, letter writing, knife sharpening, garbage and waste collecting and *rickshaw* pulling, is no less important than the formal sector”

Many studies confirm another important feature of the urban informal sector: the participation of women. (Amin *et al* 1997, Kibria 1995, Mannan and Akter 1991). Between 1974 and 1982 the annual rate of increase in female labour force participation was as high as



14.5% in the urban labour market, while the male labour force was 6.1%. The new openings in export-oriented garments industries have contributed to the high rate of female labour force participation (Islam 1996).

The high labour absorption capacity of the informal sector is both the source of opportunity, but also a problem for the urban poor. The problem is conceptualised in two ways: 'barriers to entry' and 'free operation'. Insecurity for the poor is generated by the 'barriers' which protect people accessing employment opportunity. The barriers restricting entry are commonly seen in access to information and the interlocked and social embedded characteristics of the market (Wood 1998, Opel 1998, Amin 1991). Although such characteristics of the market are considered typical in a developing country, Granovetter (1977) argues that the social embeddedness of markets is equally visible and active for the markets of developed countries like USA. Granovetter's work suggests that 'barriers to entry' is a general market problem and that labour market entry heavily depends on networks, particularly in terms of generating and accessing information. In the Bangladesh context, evidence suggests that 'barriers to entry' is an important mechanism and it may generate insecurity for the urban poor if they are excluded from information channels.

There is some ambiguity in the notion of 'barriers to entry' for as mentioned earlier, there is labour demand in the UIS and new migrants can secure employment soon after their arrival to the city. In most cases within 15 days (CUS 1989, Islam 1996, Huq-Hussain 1996). This indicates that urban poor in Bangladesh in one way or another do in fact enter the labour market. In reality however the informal sector is dominated by casual workers and dependent self-employed, who make up 39.9% and 25.2% respectively of the total labour force (table 1.5). Labour market demand therefore does not ensure workers gain entry nor does daily employment ensure security. Wage labourers and self-employed workers like *rickshaw* pullers are employed on a day to day basis and there is no guarantee they will be employed the next day. For example, dependent self-employed workers like a *rickshaw* pullers, who depend on *rickshaws* of others for their employment, are not granted regular access to their means of survival.

A second way of explaining the generation of insecurity is by referring to the 'free operation' of informal markets. This 'free operation' has two dimensions. The first dimension refers to the structural flexibility and dynamics of the sector (ILO 1973, Amin 1986), while the second dimension considers the lack of legislation, trade union organisations, wage

and employment security and labour segmentation (Amin 1986, Harris 1986). While studying the Indian informal sector, Harris (1986) noted that the different nature and contextual arrangements among the categories of labour and the varied forms of contractual arrangements produced insecurity of employment and income. Labourers who belong to the informal sector do not enjoy formal protection or employment rights.

Furthermore, labourers are also denied the right to different services required to operate in the market, like credit, skills and education. The lack of such rights in the informal sector generates insecurity.

The insecurity which exists in the informal sector is highlighted when we analyse different labour categories of the urban labour market. Below I reorganise the employment data by the ULS study to capture differences associated with labour segmentation.

**Table 1.6: Labour Segmentation in Urban Labour Market**

Occupation category	Percentage of people involved	Percentage reported missing at least one day of working
<b>Regular salaried worker (skilled)</b>	11.0	7.1
<b>Wage worker</b>		
Casual wage worker (skilled)	6.6	44.0
Casual wage worker (unskilled)	33.3	18.1
<b>Self-employed</b>		
Dependent self-employed worker	25.2	13.7
Unpaid family worker	2.8	3.1
Self-employed	22.1	9.9

Note: Estimated from Salway *et al* (1998)

Table 1.6 shows that there are three main categories of labourers in the informal sector. Around 50% of these labourers are in the self-employed categories. The self employed categories may be broadly divided into two groups: those who are dependent on others' means (e.g. *rickshaw* pullers) on a regular basis, and those who are independent (i.e. those who are work in their own establishment). The second highest percentage labourers are waged workers. These comprise around 40% of the total labourers engaged in the informal sector and it is the most significant category because labourers are employed in a wide range of occupations with very similar contractual arrangements. Vari-

ous slum and informal sector studies show that daily wage labourers are employed in activities ranging from urban agriculture-related work to construction (Amin 1981,1986, 1991, Majumder 1996, Salway *et al* 1998). They receive employment on a daily and on-the-spot contractual basis. Females are employed as daily wage labourers (Salway *et al* 1998). Finally, the regular salaried category is by far the lowest percentage, comprising only one tenth of total labour force.

The insecurity generated from the informal sector is different for different labourer categories and can be categorised in three different sets: associated insecurity, mainly produced from insufficient income flows; uncertainty of the actual labour market and instability arising from self-employment.

Associated insecurity refers to insecurity that is not generated directly from the employment but from the low income generated from employment. For example, regular salaried workers may not have employment insecurity but the ULS data confirms that people often receive very low incomes. The cost of regular employment therefore is significantly lower incomes. For example, although garment workers have regular employment, they are forced to accept low salary. In many cases it is as low as Tk. 300/ per month (i.e. 6 US dollars per month). With such low incomes many labourers resort to taking credit with interest or seeking lower security jobs with higher salaries. Some garment workers who migrated from the rural areas either return to villages or become involved with other jobs, even prostitution.

The uncertainty of the actual labour market produces insecurity both for wage labourers and dependent self-employed labourers. There is no guarantee that either of these categories of labourers will secure regular employment. As mentioned earlier, securing employment is daily work.

Evidence shows that many labourers fail to secure employment (CUS 1989, Opel 1998, Kabir 1998). This insecurity forces labourers to accept any job and any condition. For example, many wage labourers have to pay the *sardars* (labour leaders) an amount of their earning and accept any sort of work the *sardar* offers.

There is a particular form of instability mainly associated with self-employment. Self-employed labourers work in their own establishments which are themselves unstable in nature. Most of the establishments have been developed in the slums and squatter set-

tlements where inhabitants do not have formal rights to access required services. For example, in most cases, electric and gas facilities that can only be obtained illegally and on payment of very high rates to the *mastaans*. These lacks pose serious threats to the *bustee* dwellers. Not only are they faced with the prospect of having to close their businesses, they are also faced with the threat of eviction.

### **3.4 *Mastaan*: an urban actor with a contradictory image**

*Mastaans* are well known actors in the urban landscape of Bangladesh. The *mastaan* is an ambiguous, even contradictory character. In the development discourse two terms are found - '*mastaani*' and '*mastanocracy*'. '*Mastaani*' refers to criminal types of activities while '*mastanocracy*' refers to an urban political economic culture where informal rights are prevalent. By informal rights, I refer to socially instituted claims which although lacking any legal status, are more than mere ad hoc arrangements. These informal rights are highly predictable and are often enforced through social norms. In short, therefore, *mastani* has clear negative contributions while '*mastanocracy*' has at least some sort of legitimacy or acceptance. Thus, urban dwellers are both adversely affected by and benefit from the activities of *mastaans*.

*Mastaans* are therefore virtually always considered in negative terms. They are almost synonymous with gangster criminals who are mainly responsible for urban social disorder. '*Mastaani*' refers to a package of activities carried out by *mastaans*. Those activities *mastaans* ensure their income. For example, extorting money in the name of raising toll in commercial areas and construction sites is an everyday feature in urban life (Siddiqui 1990). This image is prevalent from the legal frameworks guided by state machinery and generated by law enforcing agencies and formal state institutions. However, the terms *mastaan* often confused with two other terms: *cadre* and *gundha*. In many cases it is difficult to separate these three but *mastaan* has its own meaning and is somehow different from the rest. The term *cadre* is used to refer to the underground party members who own arms, while *gundha* refers to professional killers who can be hired for criminal activities. Although *mastaans* are muscle-men they are also associated with important functions captured in the term '*mastanocracy*'

'*Mastanocracy*' refers to an urban political economic culture which may produce informal rights that help urban dwellers manage risk, uncertainty and insecurity. Informal rights are essential in the case of risk management especially when there is a lack of sufficient formal rights offered by the state. The absence of adequate formal and legal rights creates a space for intermediaries like *mastaans* to operate between people and their imperfect institutions. From this perspectives, building trust for the poor with these intermediaries is essential.

Gabetta (1993) demonstrates how the Mafia in Italy develop their interests by controlling access to both orderly and disorderly markets. The Mafia develop a business of providing protection services to keep the others' business running. In such a situation, people need to maintain strategic contacts with the Mafia. The contacts constitute social networks. In his analysis of how networks function Boissevain (1968) distinguishes two orders of tangible and intangible resources. 'First order' resources include material assets such as land, house, employment and special knowledge like practical skills. 'Second order' resources puts emphasis on 'strategic contacts' with others who own or control first order of resources and who help others access those resources. People who own 'first order' resources are known as patrons while those who rather have to seek brokered access to 'first order' resources are known as clients. The third group who maintain 'strategic contacts' and act as intermediaries to establish contact between patrons and clients are known as brokers or intermediaries.

*Mastaan* in the urban economy are strategic contact actors. In order to understand their 'strategic role' in the urban economy, I will look at two aspects: a) the structure through which *mastaans* operate and b) the level and importance of their services in the urban economy.

In order to fully understand the *mastaan* structure, we need first to appreciate the factors associated with '*mastanocracy*' that allow *mastaans* to exist in the urban political economic culture of Bangladesh. The answer is related to the historical role of 'civil society' in Bangladesh since the colonial and semi-colonial period. However, there are in total three factors which make the *mastaan* accepted actors in the urban landscape: i) cultural perception as hero ii) historical role within civil society and iii) existing state power practice.

The first factor of cultural perception as hero is connected to a customary belief about *mastaans* which is reflected through Bangladeshi arts and cultural products like films, novels, drama, short stories and fairy tales. For example, there is a famous sub-continental song about *mastaans* recorded in Pakistan in the 1950s which starts with the word '*domadam mast Kalander*'. The term *mastaan* comes from Turko-Persian word '*mast*' which is "possessed or one who is not in control of oneself and in a derivative sense one who is controlled by supernatural power" (Ahmed 1999). The sense of 'one who is controlled by supernatural power' expresses the heroic image in that it denotes that one can sacrifice oneself for others or for some betterment. For the betterment of an unjust and exploitative society, young people protest and sacrifice themselves and this makes them honorable icons among the common people living the same unjust society. All of this is reflected in the recent television drama series based on the popular Bangla novel '*Kothao Keu Nei*' written by Humayan Ahmed (1997). The central character of the story is a *mastaan* called '*Baker bhai*'. '*Baker bhai*' extends his helping hand to the oppressed people in the community and punishes oppressors. This however is considered a crime from a strictly legal point of view. Before the end of the last series, there was a huge demonstration and procession organised mostly by young people in different parts of Bangladesh to convince the director not to hang '*Baker bhai*', as was the original '*Baker bhai*' in the novel. The question arises why '*Baker bhai*' became so popular given that he is a *mastaan* convicted of being a killer. The answer may lie, at least in part, in the role the *mastaan* performs in creating informal rights in the urban landscape.

The second factor alludes to the historical role played by *mastaans* in civil society. During the colonial rule under British and semi-colonial time under Pakistan, the civil society that struggled and fought against the British and Pakistan rulers was exposed to violence and polarization. This situation continued until the liberation war in 1971. Thus, violence was a well established and accepted part of the reality lived by civil society. The post independence phase is dominated by *mastaans* and "only *mastaans* could profit from the reproduction of violent and polarized civil society" (The Daily Star, 1999). In analysing the emergence of the *mastaan* in Bangladesh Mohammad (1987) expresses the same opinion but in a slightly different manner. He argues that the emergence of *mastaans* in Bangladesh arises from the political failure to use the resourceful youth of the country who had fought and sacrificed their lives for the independence of the country.

The third factor is that the existing political system itself makes the *mastaan* an acceptable actor. Existing power relations are deeply connected to the present form of democratic practice geared to secure state power. "Politics is said to run on 'money' and 'muscle', both of them being the required tools of an infant democracy where politicians find it easier to express themselves with street violence than parliamentary debate" Another statement given by a *mastaan* and recorded by Bearak states that "I am the senior vice president for Ward No 41 ... I organize the voters for the party. When they need a crowd, I can produce a crowd" (Bearak 2000: A4). *Mastaans* therefore work for 'big bosses' who are often political or public figures and *mastaans* become mobsters in that they establish their right to do their business by providing and selling monopoly services with the blessing of their 'big boss'. In addition, the alliance between political actors and *mastaans* create a wider influence in society, particularly the urban one.

A combination of factors is therefore responsible for the acceptance of *mastaans*. Their alliance with other political and governmental actors ensures a structural shape guaranteeing the monopoly position of the *mastaans*. The economic political culture generates a gap and creates an opportunity for establishing informal rights even through violence. The gap is filled by different 'intermediaries', including from *mastaans*, political actors, corrupt officials and hired goons (the Daily Star, 1999). Therefore, *mastaans* are not only armed men who extort money from people, they also represent an 'unarmed' intermediary group providing institutions and administration who extort money through extra-legal operations. This implies a structure which makes the society and the economy functional in the urban political economy. I refer to this as the '*Mastaan Structure*'. This structure will differ according to context, situation and level. For example, in the *bustee* context a micro-level structure can be observed.

In order to focus on the importance of the *mastaans'* strategic role as intermediaries I would like to refer to a recent household survey. This survey gives evidence of the pervasive existence of *mastaan* in the urban economy. Referring to the survey, Ahmed (1999) reports that intermediaries influence people's access to basic health, education, and other services. In public hospitals 21% of people have to pay for registration and 35% for admission. The admission to a school requires the mediation of a pressure group and 22% of people have to take this while 32% have to make extra payment in the form of private tuition for getting promoted requires to a higher level, 17% requires influence

peddling for getting FFE (Food For Education) allocation and 39% do it for getting school registration. In elections *mastaans* may vote for absentee persons, or prevent voters from coming to vote or interfere with election process. In addition, as many as 37% of households complained that payment had to be made to lodge a complaint with the police and another 29% said that it was possible to influence police reports on payment to and /or intimidation of *mastaans*/ influence peddlers. 54% of the people with pending cases in court made payments directly or through intermediaries for setting dates for hearings or for influencing outcomes. 85% of the people reported that they made extra legal payments and sought help of intermediaries to get their land deeds written or registered. A sizable 43% said payment made directly to or through intermediaries were needed to secure loans from banks. 23% got their WASA bill reduced and 30% got their electricity bill reduced through the help of intermediaries. These simple but meaningful statistics indicate that intermediaries are required in every sphere of life in the urban areas. Therefore, it is not the case that *mastaans* only extort money at gun point, rather *mastaans* are in a system where 'trust' is problematic and they develop 'trust' between third parties for monetary benefit. Therefore *mastaans* are both the source of uncertainty and as well as offering a relationship for managing insecurity and risk.

#### **4. Conclusion**

In this chapter an attempt has been made to provide an overview of the urbanisation process and its consequences for the poor. I first of all discussed the global aspects of urbanisation and then introduced to the context of Bangladesh. Two major observations have been made. Firstly, the phenomenon of urbanisation has brought a global social transformation in that a large proportion of the world's population has become urban dwellers. The second observation is that urban social environment in Bangladesh is highly associated with urban poor who have become a part of the urban economy. The urban economy is dominated and operated by urban actors known as *mastaan*. The urban economic system produces opportunities and insecurities, uncertainties and risks for the poor as the economy is operated or regulated through informal rights. In the following chapter I will focus on a particular *bustee* in Dhaka in order to examine more closely the sources that generate both opportunities and uncertainties for the urban poor.



## Chapter Two


### AN INTRODUCTORY ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE STUDY *BUSTEE*

#### 1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to *Beri Badh Bustee 2 (BBB2)* where I carried out my fieldwork. The idea for the thesis emerged from the Urban Livelihoods Study - (ULS) which sought to understand the livelihood strategies of the urban poor in Bangladesh. The *bustee* which is analysed in this thesis was one of the ULS study areas. The ULS had a multi-disciplinary focus combining both qualitative and quantitative approaches to investigation and my specific role was to coordinate the team undertaking the qualitative analysis. My fieldwork was therefore embedded within the ULS endeavour and the *bustee* was selected following the ULS methodology. I used the 'key-hole' approach in my fieldwork and started my research with 20 households from three different economic categories, which provided 'windows' onto the *bustees*. Of these households, five were 'improving', ten were 'coping' and five were 'declining'. I discuss the basis of this household classification further in chapter three when detailed methodology will be discussed. In this chapter, I offer a basic ethnography of the *bustee*.

#### 2. The Setting: *Beri Badh Bustee 2 (BBB2)*

Although the general area of my fieldwork is called *Beri Badh Bustee*, it has six different parts or sections and each part is distinguished by a Bangla number such as *ek*, *dui* (one, two). The part of *Beri Badh Bustee* which was selected for my fieldwork is known as *Dui Nombor Beribadh Bustee* (*Beri Badh Bustee Number 2 - BBB2*). This *bustee* was developed under *Mohammadpur thana* (administrative unit) on Dhaka city protection embankment. The Dhaka protection embankment was constructed in 1989 after the devastating flood of 1988. *Mohammadpur* is located in the middle of two *thanas*. The Northern part is connected to the inter district bus stand called *Gabtol*, under *Mirpur thana*, and the Southern part is linked to an extended embankment of *Lalbagh thana*.



Map 2.1 : Showing both quantitative and qualitative (BBB2) study area in Beri Badh.

All six sections of Beri Badh *Bustee* belong to two wards of the city commission (Dhaka city commission comprises 64 wards). While Beri Badh *Bustee* one belongs to ward no. 43, all the others belong to ward no. 46. Therefore, there is a strong administrative and political bond among those from section two to section six since they belong to the same ward.

BBB2 is located between *bustee* one and *bustee* three which are situated in the north and south respectively. In the west there is a vast field (five kilometers wide) which extends up to Basila the last part of Mohammadpur *thana*. During the monsoon this field is submerged under water and turns into marshland. In order to protect the embankment from the waves of the water, BWDB (Bangladesh Water Development Board) made the western slope concrete. Therefore, most BBB2 houses to be found on the eastern side of the embankment. There, the housing plots are developed by private real estate companies filling in or levelling out open areas. These housing plots will be extended up to the newly built residential areas known as Mohammadi Housing Society and Mohammadia Housing Limited.

### **3. Physical Condition and Dwelling**

As mentioned earlier BBB2 is located at the fringe of the city and on the embankment. It is not only situated at the fringe in terms of location, but it is also isolated in terms of communication with the city. Although there are three roads - one to the South, one to the East and the other to the North and although both in the summer and winter two roads are open, migrants need to walk a long way to reach to town. The third road is linked with a more distant periphery, but is impassable during the monsoon season. Migrants can use boats during this time but this is rather costly compared to their regular income and they often walk a long way to use the road in the South, which runs through parts of Beri Badh number three and four.


As mentioned earlier the physical condition of BBB2 is better than the average *bustees* in Dhaka. Advantages and disadvantages result from the settlement pattern and location of the *bustee*. For example, as the settlements are developed on the slopes of the embankment, they have the advantage of not being waterlogged. However since it is located

on the fringe of the city and a lacks communication, residents often have difficulties travelling to the city for work or shopping.

There are three physical advantages enjoyed by migrants living in BBB2. Firstly, people have settled down on the slope of the embankment like hill dwellers. Unlike other *bustees*, the slope protects it from water logging. Although those living at the base of the embankment face the problem of floods during the monsoon as the water level rises, they can shift their houses up the embankment during this time. Secondly, BBB2 is relatively under populated and therefore the migrants have extra space on top of the embankment. Migrants can use the embankment for many purposes. For example, they can sleep under the sky during summer in order to avoid the heat. Thirdly, migrants have the opportunity of taking possession of a piece of land and constructing their own houses which saves them from paying regular house rent.

Despite these advantages, migrants living at BBB2 are also negatively affected by the area's physical condition and location. Firstly, BBB2 housing structure and conditions are worse than other *bustees* of the ULS. Most of the houses are *jhupri*, with *bara* (woven bamboo sticks) for walls and thatched roofs. A few houses are made out of polythene sheets and bamboo. The weak construction makes them vulnerable to wind and rain, so they require repair throughout the year.

In addition, the houses are small and over crowded. It is almost impossible for an adult person to stand erect inside a house. These houses have no ventilation as there is no window and have only a small bamboo-made door. This lack of space however helps protect houses from natural calamities, such as winds. Furthermore, many migrants willingly construct their houses in a densely packed manner. There is, therefore, no space around the houses and people enter them through tiny passageways. Both the crowded rooms and the lack of ventilation



Map 2.2: Showing BBB2.

creates a damp atmosphere, which becomes worse during the monsoon. In a single-room house, all the household activities, including cooking, are carried out in the same space, worsening the overall situation. Only a few houses which are situated at the top of the embankment have separate cooking areas.

The location of BB2 results in further disadvantages for its residents. These are the lack of various facilities like electricity, water and sanitation which are available illegally in many other *bustees*. The Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA) provides safe drinking water and sanitation facilities for the inhabitants of Dhaka city. However, migrants of Beri Badh are not supplied with any water by WASA. For this area there are only three tube-wells for the 180 households. Of the three, one is privately owned and was installed for selling drinking water<sup>1</sup>. *Bustee* migrants were earlier served by four tube wells installed by World Vision, an international NGO. Two of these, however are no longer in working order due to lack of proper supervision and management. Consequently, women either have to go long distances or stand in long queues for water collection. This adds to the existing workload of women labourers. Like other *bustees* developed on common land, people in BBB2 consider that shortage of drinking water is their main problem<sup>2</sup>.

In order to meet their need for water, migrants depend on water sources which are not potable. For example, they use water from the marsh for washing and bathing. Moreover, this water gets polluted due to garbage disposal, hanging toilets over the water surface and chemical pollution from the leather processing industry situated in neighbouring Hazaribagh, (Lalbagh *thana*). This is a particular problem late in the cold season when the water flow is interrupted. Although both sides of the embankment are under water during monsoon the water is cleaner then than in the dry season.

Like WASA, other public utility services do not serve the migrants living in this *bustee*. For example, Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) and *Titas Gas* which supply electricity and cooking gas to city dwellers, do not operate. The people living in unit one and unit four have illegal access to electricity because like many other *bustees*, they are situated close to power supply lines.

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<sup>1</sup> Huq, S. (1994:35-37) describes the mechanism of water selling to the *bustee* dwellers. She calculates that one can earn Tk. 300.00 to 400.00 per day from this business.

<sup>2</sup> Forty four percent of respondents of Agorgaon *bustee* identified collection of water as one of their major problems (Majumder et al 1995:14).

In the absence of public utility services, *bustee* dwellers have somehow to manage fuel. Normally dried cow-dung, waste wood etc. are used for cooking. But due to the shortage of supply and the high demand of fuel, people have to pay a very high price for it. Migrants, therefore, cook only once a day, mostly before lunch, and they eat this same cooked meal three times. Their main food is rice and this saves their cooking time. In this sense, the migrants maximize the use of the resources available to them.

A further locational disadvantage is that the migrants are excluded from the services provided by the NGOs for the urban poor in Dhaka city. Except for the ASD (Assistance for Slum Dwellers) there are no NGO activities in the *bustee*. World Vision withdrew their activities in 1994. ASD however is working with very limited coverage and only targets women with a credit support programme. It also runs one non-formal school for adolescent girls and children's literacy. There is a *madrassa* (religious school) for the children run by *Jamat-E-Islami*, a Muslim fundamentalist political party.

#### **4. The Bustee Migrants**

BBB2 is part of an embankment known as Dhaka City Protection Embankment which was constructed in 1989 after the devastating flood of 1988. Most people moved to this slope of the embankment from the *bustee* on the adjacent real estate plots owned by a private company. Others came from other parts of the city and from rural areas. All the people living in BBB2 had originally migrated to Dhaka from different parts of rural Bangladesh. There were a total 180 households living in BBB2 when I started my field-work in January 1996 while at its end in December there were 218. Only seven households left during this time. Of these seven households, two went back to their rural origin and 5 households moved to other *bustees*. This simple statistic indicates that the annual rate of increase of households in BBB2 is as high as 21%.

In the following section I present the basic migration differentials of the study *bustee*. First, the migrants' place of origin. The migrants living in BBB2 are predominantly rural even if most came from neighbouring *bustees*. There were only eight households in BBB2 in 1989. At the time of the first major settlement, most of the people settled towards either end of the embankment so as to be nearer to their places of work. In the south people could easily enter the city while in the north settlers could work at the Northern Central bus stand. Consequently, the middle parts of the *bustee* area were not initially inhabited.

**Table 2.1 : Districts as place of origin**

Name of the Districts as Place of Origin	% of old Mi-grants <sup>3</sup>	% of New Migrants <sup>4</sup> (%)
Bhola	60	50
Barisal	20	34.38
Dhaka	03	6.26
Faridpur	05	3.12
Rangpur	10	3.12
Khulna	02	3.12

As Table 2.1 shows, apart from the first settlers, people living in BBB2 migrated from five districts, mainly in the central and south-western parts of Bangladesh. The exception is Rangpur district, which is in the north. Among the old migrants, more than 90% of the people migrated from the south-west districts, Bhola in particular. This data differs from the findings of another survey, carried out for the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) by Mujumder in 1990. There are two reasons for this discrepancy.

First, the BIDS study location was Agargaon, which is centrally located and established 30 years ago. Second, Bhola was not considered by BIDS a separate district since it was then a part of Barisal. Yet, in both studies Barisal (including Bhola) appears to be the most common district in terms of the place of origin of the migrants (Majumder *et al* 1995). The table indicates that although the share of migration from different places of origin has been changing over time, a high percentage of new migrants still come from Barisal. This situation can be partially explained by considering how migration occurs. Networks play a key role in migration decision-making and hence the close communication between those in Dhaka with Barisal accounts for its frequency as a district of origin.

A second migration differential is the age of migrants. Here there are differences between temporary migrants who engage in seasonal or circular migration while maintaining livelihoods in the rural areas, and permanent migrants who are settled *bustee* residents (differences between these different migration strategies are discussed further in

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<sup>3</sup> Calculated in a PRA exercise held in the *bustee* in April '96.



chapter five). The majority of people in both groups (temporary and permanent) migrate to the *bustee* in early adulthood, between 16 and 29 years. Other studies of migration to Dhaka *bustees* confirm this trend (Islam 1996, CUS 1983, Afsar 1995a). Moreover, two-thirds of the temporary migrants are between 15 and 20 years of age and the majority of new migrants in this age group are single. The assumption is that they migrate for better employment opportunities in the urban labour market.

**Table 2.2: Temporary migrants**

	No. of migrants (%)	No. of Family members(%)
Single ( Male)	11 (34.37)	11 (18.32)
Single (Female)	01 (3.12)	01 (1.7)
Male with Family	11(34.3)	33 (55)
Female with Family	04(12.5)	10 (16.7)
Single – married after arrival	05(15.62)	05 (8.3)
Total	32 (100)	60 ( 100)

A third migration differential is sex and marital status. This study shows that more than half of the total migrants are unmarried and more than fifteen percent of them marry in the *bustee* after arrival (table 2.2). When considering sex and marital status there is an imbalance between the female and male migrants. There are three reasons for this imbalance. Firstly, many young males migrate before marriage. Secondly, married men may decide not to bring their wives to the *bustee*. Thirdly, female migrants who migrate do so with their family and are known as “associational” migrants, in other words, autonomous female migration rarely occurs in this *bustee*. All these influence the imbalance in the sex ratio in the *bustee* and the structure and dynamics of *bustee* households.

### 5. *Bustee* Social Organisation

As mentioned earlier, the inhabitants of BBB2 are of rural origin. Not surprisingly, the forms of social organisation they have adopted resemble those of rural areas. For exam-

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<sup>4</sup> Calculation based on the findings collected during one year field work

ple, the *shamaj* (village association), which is the highest form of social organisation in the rural areas also exists in the *bustee* albeit in a modified manner. This modification is noticeable on two counts: a) the structure and b) the use of different terms. In order to clarify the roots and significance of the modifications, I will present a comparative description of the social organisations found in the *gram* (village) and the *bustee*.

Village social organisation is organised along hierarchical lines and at the top of this hierarchy stands the *shamaj*. The *shamaj* is made up of *paras* (neighbourhoods), *gustis* (lineages) and *baris* (homesteads) which provide the core bases of identity. The idea of *gramer shamaj* often extends beyond the geographical boundaries of the village and infers a strong sense of identity and affiliation (Rahman 1998). It is therefore distinct from the administrative unit, the *mauza*, which was established by the British rulers to organise rural tax and toll collection (Hartmann and Boyce 1983).

Every level of social organisation has its designated male leaders who are primarily responsible for enforcing particular moral codes of behaviour (Arens and Burerden 1977). These leaders are known as *matubbar* (village leader), *para-matubbar* (neighbourhood leader), *muribbi* (homestead leader), *khana prodahan* (household head) and *khana shadasha* (household member) (Rahman 1998). The comparative situation of village and *bustee* in terms of structure and leaders of each position of the hierarchical structure is presented in figure 2.1




Figure 2.1: Social Organisation in Village and *Bustee*

Major differences can be observed between the structure and social organisation of rural villages and urban *bustees*. Firstly, in the hierarchical structure of the *bustee* social organisation, there is no *gusti - bari* (lineage homestead). This is an important institution in the village social structure. Many factors explain why there is no *gusti - bari* in *bustees* but the most important is that first generation migrants tend to come either without families or as a nuclear household.

Secondly, in the *bustee* context, the notion of 'neighbourhood' mainly refers to relationships developed on the basis of regionalism and factionalism. Instead of *para* (neighbourhood in the rural context), *bustee* neighbourhoods are known as *bustee angsho* (part of the *bustee*) and they often carry the name of the region where the dwellers come from. For example, in BBB2, there are three *angsho* which are known as *Rangpur angsho* (the part of the *bustee* inhabitants by migrants from Rangpur district), *Faridpur angsho* (the part of the *bustee* inhabitants by migrants from Faridpur district), and *Bholer angsho* (the part of the *bustee* inhabitants by migrants from Bhola district). The name of the *bustee angsho* and even the name of the *bustee* itself can also reflect the name of the founder or leader of that area.

Thirdly, the composition of the *bustee shamaj* is different from the rural *samaj*. The *bustee shamaj* leader is known as *netha* (leader), a term often found in South Asian political vocabulary. The *bustee netha* is mostly self-designated while the *angsho netha* (leader of the *bustee angsho*) is usually nominated by the *bustee netha* and the *mastaan*. In BBB2 there is one *bustee netha*, three *bustee angsho netha* and one leading *mastaan*. The *bustee shamaj* is comprised of a *bustee netha* (leader), *angsho netha* (leader) and *mastaan*, while the rural *samaj* is made up of the leaders from *khana*, *gusti* and *para*. In the *bustee shamaj*, the *mastaan* is the main actor responsible for enforcing codes of behaviour through the *shalish*, (found in the villages as a form of people's court). The complex combination of relationships among the actors belonging to the *bustee shamaj* is presented in Figure 2.2. To give a fuller sense of the overall functioning of the *bustee shamaj*, in the next section I focus on the two most important levels: the *mastaans* and households.




Figure 2.2: Leadership in the *Bustee*

### 5.1. Bustee mastaan structure

As mentioned earlier, the *mastaan* is a critical actor in the *bustee shamaj*. *Mastaans* however are themselves located in a broader structure, which is shown in figure 2.3. Those at the top of the structure are usually known as *ostad*. This term is adopted from the traditional educational system to refer to an honourable learned teacher. However in the *bustee* context it is also clear that *ostads* provide shelter to their followers, teach them how to control and exercise influence in the locality and also teach them how to deal with enemies. In BBB2, the leader is called *netha* by the ordinary residents and *ostad* by the *mastaans*.

The second position in the hierarchy is the 'top-*mastaan*'. The 'top-*mastaan*' interacts with both the local political leaders and *ostads* to create a strong chain of command within the hierarchical structure. The main actor in this chain is the *mastaan*. To control and capture a specific territory, *mastaans* often use their muscle power and in fact are often known simply as 'musclemen'.

In BBB2 *mastaans* have different names according to their level of influence, the nature of their activities, the quality of their leadership, age, social reputation and networks. Some teenage boys operate as trainee *mastaans*. These are known as *utthi-mastaans* or *pati-mastaans* and *rangbaj*. *Pati-mastaans* are the most promising trainees while *rangbaj* are the less promising ones. *Rangbajes* are normally considered community trouble makers. For example, they often tease young girls or create scenes. Since they are members of the *mastaan* structures their behaviour remains unchallenged. Drug addicts, who are not usually allowed to be serious members of the *mastaan* gang, are however protected and are known as '*heroenchi*'. This strongly structured network of relationships is central to the power of the networks *mastaani*.




Figure 2.3: The *mastaan* structure

Two types of *mastaans* can be identified in BBB2, full-time and part-time. In BBB2, there is no *ostad*. The name of the top-*mastaan* is Raja. Both types of *mastaans* acknowledge the authority of Raja. Five *mastaans* always accompany Raja. They are engaged in no work other than *mastaani*. These *mastaans* are between twenty and twenty five years of age. They have an average monthly income of more than ten thousand *taka* from toll money collected from different sources. There is a strong discipline among these five *mastaans*, they trust each other and share any income earned.

**Table 2.3: Numbers and different levels of *mastaans* living in BBB2**

Category of <i>Mastaan</i>	No.
Top <i>Mastaan</i>	01
Full-time <i>Mastaan</i>	5
Part-time <i>Mastaan</i>	up to 15
<i>Pati-Mastaan and Rangbaj</i>	up to 25
<i>Heroenchi</i>	up to 10

To conclude this section, although BBB2 is isolated from the centre of urban activity in terms of its location and social interaction, it has quite strong social links with other *mastaans* residing at the centre. Although *mastaans* have a negative image in the urban context, their role in terms of intermediaries and power brokers is generally accepted by the urban poor and particularly by the *bustee* migrants. The *mastaans'* structure will be further discussed in chapter six.

## **5.2. The *bustee* household**

The household is the basic social unit in the *bustee shamaj*, just as it is in the village *shamaj*. Village people understand the household as *ghar* or co-residential unit (Rahman 1998) and *bustee* people do the same. The term commonly used for household is *chula* (stove) or *khana* (eating unit). The ULS thus incorporated these two dimensions of co-



residence and shared consumption in their definition of a *bustee* household. In this section I present a brief description of the types of *bustee* household structure and attempt to give some sense of their internal dynamics.

Like any Bangladeshi village, there exist three types of households in the *bustee*. These are commonly known as 'nuclear', 'joint' and 'extended' households. The dominant form in BBB2 is nuclear (62.5%) consisting of a co-habiting couple and their children. Joint households, which also include married sons and their wives, are relatively few but significant (12.5%). 25% of households are extended. In sharp contrast with the village context, these households are 'extended' through the inclusion of fictive kin, who are in most cases paying guests. In rural villages there is little provision for paying guests, and fictive kin relationships are typically contracted outside of the household. Despite this practice of extending household membership, however, the average size of households in BBB2 is still only 4.2 persons, as compared with the national average household size of 5.6 persons (GOB 1994).

As stated above, a 'snapshot' of household structures shows that the nuclear form is predominant. Considered over time, this trend towards nucleation is magnified. Most of the joint and extended households are interim and temporary arrangements. Thus, many of the households which were joint in January of 1996, had become nuclear before the end of my fieldwork in December of 1996. Those households with scope to arrange the house for newly married sons may continue for some time as 'joint households', but they eventually split and become nuclear units.

The extended households were similarly in transition, and this took two forms. The paying guest arrangement mentioned above is the more common. These paying guests are single migrants who are seeking to develop the necessary social networks to survive in the urban economy. Simultaneously such arrangements help host households to earn extra income. The second way in which households become extended households is through providing temporary shelter to families breaking up. Separated, divorced and widowed people join their natal household as a temporary measure until they manage to set up their own separate household anew, usually close by the natal household. It is thus clear that the *bustee* household is in a transitory process towards the nuclear house-

hold structure. This trend has important implications for the relations between household members.

In Bangladesh, in general, the internal structure of households is hierarchical, under the authority of the senior male who is generally known as *khana prodhan* (household head) (Cain 1978). Individual members maintain a close interpersonal relationship within the household and the household unit determines the nature of relations with other households, neighbourhoods and the wider village context. Although there are differences, this broad pattern holds for BBB2. The wife moves into her husband's house after marriage. In a nuclear household, the husband is the *khana prodhan* (household head). Females may become *khana prodhan* only by default, either on temporary basis or when there is no male household head.

It was estimated by the PRA participants that 20% of the total households in BBB2 were either female-headed or female-managed. During the temporary absence of the male head, the female may become the proxy household head, assuming responsibility for managing the household activities. I prefer to call this arrangement 'female managed households'. While the concentration of female-managed households are in the 'improving' and 'coping' categories, the female-headed households are in the 'declining' category.

I also observed that some households are male-headed but female-managed. In BBB2, for example, most of the shops are run by women who receive financial assistance from ASD, an NGO working in the area. Although it appears that these women are responsible for the financial management of the household, in reality all the decisions even in relation to the business, are taken by the male members of the households. It is therefore a mistake to interpret the fact that women are running the shops as an indicator of their empowerment. In reality there is no difference in terms of economic freedom between the women working in household shops and the rest of the women doing household activities in the *bustee*.

Similarly, female household management should not be interpreted as evidence of empowerment. Typically, they only have the customary right to take decisions on how to implement activities which have been designed or planned by the male members or male heads of the households. Even when the household male is absent for work reasons and

the female member assumes responsibility for running the household, she cannot take major decisions (for example, extending or investing money) without consulting or getting permission from the husband or other adult male members.

The complete absence of the male household head typically follows family break ups, like divorce, separation or death. Here females head the households. But in the *bustee* context, this household form is also temporary in nature. Since the sense of insecurity stemming from threats of sexual abuse, rumour and humiliation is extremely high, women, particularly young ones, cannot live alone for a long period and are forced to find new partners. In fact permanent female headed households are rare in BBB2. Normally, such households turn into male headed ones after a certain period of time.

**Example 2.1**

*Karimon, a 46 year old woman, has been living in BBB2 for six months after moving from her rural house following the death of her husband. She has been living with her three daughters and three sons. One of her daughters is a divorcee and the other two young girls are working in a garment factory. The oldest son is a rickshaw puller and is 16 years old. The other two boys are twelve and ten years old. Her second daughter received a proposal for marriage from a young man living in the bustee. Since she declined, she was beaten and accused of being a prostitute. Finally, she was forced to accept the proposal and marry the man. The youngest daughter also had to marry in similar circumstances. The oldest son left his natal household after marrying a bustee girl. Within six months, this household had become small and Karimon tried living with her two sons but this also failed. Finally she was forced to marry a bustee leader who then established his rights over any income that Karimon earns as a maid servant.*

If male dominance is the first determinant of *bustee* household relationships, the second is marital instability. The *bustee* households are very fragile in nature and this is reflected in the widespread practice of serial monogamy. Serial monogamy refers to a series of changes of conjugal partners. In BBB2, half of the household heads and their spouses have been married more than once. During the PRA exercise held in April 1996 it was noted that 60% of married men had been married more than once. One extreme case is that of Khaleqe who had been married 19 times by the age of 45. During my fieldwork, I tried to investigate this further and found serial monogamy is far more frequent than polygamy (table 2.4). The table also shows a high number of single marriages but this is be-

cause around half of the households in this category belong to the 20-30 age group.

Serial monogamy is common among men who marry early and arises mostly where the patrilineal ideology enforced by the village *khana prodhan* is absent. The major difference between the village and *bustee khana prodhans* lies in this area. This is connected to the absence of the *gusti* (patrilineal descent groups) within the *bustee*. Consequently, the *bustee khana prodhan* operates in a context where there are no relations among *khana prodan* which creates a social vacuum. Thus the *bustee* migrants themselves explained the high level of female headed households by referring to the inability of the concerned families to impose sanctions. This social vacuum means that there is little support for households in difficulty and little sanction against households breaking up. This structural fragility is compounded by the marriage behaviour of both men and women, albeit in different ways.

The tendency towards serial monogamy is further compounded by the insecurity experienced by *bustee* females. Loose morality is a common characteristic of men's marriage behaviour. Females can be divorced at any time and for any reason since there do not exist any formal or informal rights to prevent divorce. Women are then forced to accept a new partner as the case study of Karimon (example 2.1) indicates.

**Table 2.4: Number of marriages in lifetime of key informant household heads and their spouses**

Types of Marriage	Improving HH		Coping HH		Declining HH	
	Man	Wo-man	Man	Wo-man	Man	Woman
Single Marriage	00	01	10	11	02	01
Serial Monogamy						
02 times	03	06	03	03	00	04
03 times	00	02	01	01	00	00
04 times	00	00	00	00	00	00
05 times	00	00	00	00	00	00
06 times	01	00	00	00	00	00
07 times	00	00	00	00	00	00
08 times	01	00	00	00	00	00
Polygamy						
02 wives	02	00	01	00	00	00
03 wives	00	00	00	00	00	00
04 wives	01	00	00	00	00	00

Serial monogamy begins with a child marriage (table 2.5). Child marriages in the *bus-tees* are common. In most cases these marriages take place between an under-aged girl and an adult man. Among the ten under-aged girls' marriages I observed during my fieldwork, all except one of the brides, were found to be between eleven and fourteen years old<sup>5</sup> whereas the bridegrooms were in their early twenties. Insecurity forces women to marry, but does not keep them married, and so polygamy or serial monogamy results.

**Table 2.5: Age of brides and bridegrooms during marriage in early aged girl**

Age group	Bride	Bridegroom
11 - 14	09	00
15 - 17	01	00
18 - 20	00	05
21 -23	00	05

To sum up this section, in the *bustee* men do not face the same social pressures as they would in the village. They are not normally considered immoral for marrying several times or keeping more than one wife. Females are forced to marry to minimise social, physical and economic insecurity. While women often suffer violence within the home, if the household dissolves they become even more vulnerable as they can be beaten or humiliated by anyone, not just their husbands. Before going to deal with *bustee* violence I will discuss *bustee* cash economy.

## 6. *Bustee* Cash Economy

As a part of the urban economy, cash income is important, necessary and desirable for the *bustee* migrants. To acquire cash, migrants use their labour in multi-dimensional ways. As mentioned earlier *bustee* migrants are basically rural labourers and unskilled which makes it difficult for them to enter the formal urban labour market where secure, protected and regular cash income flows can be found. Therefore, the main option open to *bustee* labourers is the informal labour market which however does not offer the same financial security and regularity. In short, *bustee* labourers are often found in the unstable jobs of the urban informal market.

A PRA (Participatory Rural Appraisal) exercise conducted by me in BBB2 found that the migrants were mainly involved with selling their labour or selling goods. Under the ULS categories, no distinction was made between labour intensive workers and sellers of goods, as they were both categorized together as self-employed labourers. The *bustee* migrants, however, insisted that business was a separate category of cash source even if what was meant by business was simply selling goods. To reflect this, I subdivided the

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<sup>5</sup> The legal minimum age for marriage is 18

ULS category to classify self-employed labourers as ‘sellers of labour’, while capital intensive self-employed labourers like entrepreneurs were put under ‘sellers of goods’. It should also be mentioned here that the labour intensive self-employed, like *rickshaw* pullers, were included in both ‘self-employed’ and ‘wage labourer’ categories due to their dual characteristics of autonomy and the need to secure a job on a daily basis.

Besides selling labour and goods, migrants also get involved in illicit occupations like thieving and prostitution, as well as cost saving activities (matrix 2.1). However, it is difficult to draw a sharp line between different sources of cash income through work because individual labourers frequently switch their employment. To do so they need to keep up multiple contacts to gain information regarding job availability. If and when they fail to secure employment, many *bustee* migrants in BBB2 get involved in illicit occupations. Moreover, cost savings activities are carried out mainly by the children. Matrix 2.1 presents the different cash income categories I identified, and these are described a little further in the following sections.

**Matrix 2.1: Classification of sources of income through different work**

Categories	Ranking
Sellers of labour	5
Sellers of goods	3
Carryovers illicit occupations	1
Cost savings activities	2

### 6.1. Sellers of Labour

Selling labour is the main source of income for the *bustee* migrants of BBB2. The high concentration of different types of labourers both in different *bustees* and within particular *bustees* (see chapter one) influences the *bustee* economy and affects peoples’ options and levels of cash income. For example, Noorhosener *bustee*, which was one of the *bustees* in the ULS qualitative study, shows two sharply contrasting trends. Migrants from southern districts engage in labour intensive work like *rickshaw* pulling, while those from the eastern part of the country are mostly involved with garbage collection.

In BBB2 I distinguished four different categories of labour. Self- employed and wage labour are the most common, while a lower proportion are employed in establishments like restaurants and brick fields. In both cases, the majority of workers are young and male. Male and female labour forces are engaged in all different categories of employment, but the share of participation in terms of age and sex is different due to the nature of the job in which they are engaged (Matrix 2.2).

**Matrix 2.2: Labour segments by ranking, age and sex**

Labour Seg- ments	Ranking	Age		Sex	
		<i>Old</i>	<i>Young</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
Wage Labourer	5	X	XX	XX	X
Self- Employed	5	X	XX	XX	X
Domestic	4	XX	X	X	XX
Employees in establishment	2	X	XX	X	XX

Each of the four labour categories varies widely in terms of payment and contractual arrangement, generates different ambivalences, insecurities and uncertainties and provides different options for creating opportunities. Since labour selling is the main income source, I will discuss how each of the different labour categories produces risks, uncertainties and also opportunities. The overall picture is briefly presented in matrix 2.3.



**Matrix 2.3: Labour segments and contractual arrangement**

Sellers of Labour		Contract & Payment Arrangements		Uncertainty produced by structure(1)	Flexibility(2)
Wage labourer					
	Unskilled eg. Earth cutter,	Short-term and Casual Temporary and Casual	Labour intensive Time intensive	X	X
	Skilled eg. Builder	Long-term and Regular		X	
Self-employed	Unskilled	Short-term and Casual Temporary and Casual	Labour intensive Time intensive	X	X
	Skilled eg. Makers,		Capital intensive Time intensive	X	X
Domestic	Unskilled	Long-term and Regular Temporary and Casual	Labour intensive Time intensive	X	X
Employees in establishment	Unskilled eg. Brick breaker	Short-term and Casual Temporary and Casual	Labour intensive Time intensive	X	X

*Note: (1) By uncertainty produced by structure I mean those uncertainties of work or income over which the workers have no control.*

*(2) By flexibility I mean the freedom of workers to decide to give up their jobs.*

The most significant form of employment in the BBB2 cash economy is daily wage labour. This reflects the capacity of the urban labour market to absorb unskilled and agricultural workers. Indeed, information about the demand for labour is the main motivation in encouraging migration.

Young male migrants access the labour market easily as it does not require any skill and is labour-intensive. In most cases they work on a short term and casual basis. One feature of the wage labour sector is its ability to continually absorb new workers. This is helped by the fact that most of the settled *bustee* migrants (both the young and the aged) try to shift over time to better prospects. For example, young and second generation migrant *rickshaw* pullers look for jobs where there is the prospect of becoming scooter or taxi drivers. Such a continuous shifting of occupation again ensures that the demand for migrant labourers remains high.

There is also a considerable female labour force seeking this type of employment. This is for two main reasons. Firstly, apart from employment in the garment factories or as domestic maids, there are very few job opportunities open to women. In addition, middle-aged women have very limited options to join the skill-based job sectors. Extreme hardship thus forces them to enter the market as wage labourers, so that households can make use of the whole household 'stock labour'.

Daily wage labourers are very sensitive to changes in the market. This is because they are not guaranteed work and may have to go several days without work. At the same time, they cannot always maintain their wage levels as those depend on the fluctuations in the demand for labour. Thus, daily wage labourers experience insecurity and even though some may be loosely associated with the *sardar* (informal labour leader), most are unorganized and unable to protect their interests by themselves. On the other hand, an additional characteristic of daily wage employment is that all types of daily wage labourers enjoy some sort of autonomy. Even though they are dependent on others for the means of production and they do not participate in the decision-making structure, they are not completely controlled.

A second prominent form of informal sector employment found in BBB2 is income generation through self-employment. Generating one's own income in this way allows autonomy over the production process. In most cases, this involves unpaid family labour. Self-employment thus allows for the appropriation of profit.

Most young male migrants are initially absorbed into this self-employment section of the labour market. *Rickshaw* pullers and taxi drivers are common forms of this, and they learn these skills on first arriving in town. These labourers rent vehicles such as *rick-*

*shaws*, push carts or baby taxis for a certain period of time and at the end of the scheduled time, return the vehicles to the owners deducting the rent from their income.

The self-employed labour force enjoys different types of status in terms of autonomy and income earned. Employment is regular and payment is normally made on a daily basis. Labour-intensive workers (*e.g. rickshaw* pullers) who have self-employed status, also devise their own strategies for protecting their income earning process. For instance, the labour force working in the transport sector belongs to trade unions. Recently a *Rickshaw* Trade Union was formed to protest against the City Corporation's intention of phasing out *rickshaws* from city streets. The leader of the union organised a press conference and published leaflets for public support. Finally, the Mayor of Dhaka City Corporation agreed to consider the case sympathetically.

Another important category of the informal labour force in BBB2 is the female labour force engaged in different domestic services. These labourers are divided mainly into two age groups: (i) older experienced workers, and (ii) the new migrants who are usually younger. As mentioned earlier, the use of female labourers, particularly older ones, is directly correlated with household economic stress, and often with female headship. *Bustee* households make use of their female labour force as 'stock labourers'. Often these women are unskilled and have very limited employment options. They are therefore forced to participate in the labour market either as domestic or as wage labourers. Many again work part-time. Although there is a high demand for garment labourers, some of the younger migrant women who have little or no experience in the urban context, are also forced to seek employment in the domestic service. This occurs when the women lack alternative contacts and so they accept domestic work on a temporary basis. Many of them are brought directly from the rural areas by the employers themselves. Finally, there are also many males involved in domestic services, especially young boys. A number of agencies have sprung up recently in the city to supply male domestic workers, such as security works or guards for residences and offices.

Labourers employed in domestic services may have either long-term or casual labour status. Like all other wage labourers, this section of the labour force is unorganised and this means they have no bargaining power which protect their economic interests. These workers therefore are very vulnerable.

A fourth type of informal employment in BBB2 is found in different establishments which recruit labour. It is estimated that 96% of these urban establishments belong to the informal sector and each provides employment for 1-9 persons (UNDP 1993). The location of BBB2 means that relatively few of these opportunities are available there. However, many migrants find employment in street restaurants, brick factories, garment factories and motor garages. Migrants may work in an establishment on a long-term basis, but this does not mean that their jobs are secure. For instance, in the transport sector, companies do not make any formal written contract with their workers regarding the terms of their employment. Employees in fact are not entitled to anything but their monthly wage. There are even many labourers working on a long-term basis who do not enjoy a monthly salary, but are treated as casual labourers and are paid daily. This means that they are not paid for their days off. This practice is also prevalent among garment workers.

There are also many labourers who work on a temporary or seasonal basis for these different establishments. Brick breakers and brick-field workers fall under this category. Those who need cash for buying goods for their daily survival may prefer this, as it offers them a daily wage. Many young girls also leave garments factories and begin labour-intensive work like brick breaking. This indicates that the young female labour force is breaking away from cultural constraints in the face of socio-economic necessity.

To sum up, it is clear from the information mentioned above that the four categories of labour are highly influenced by two main features: a) the characteristics of the workers and b) the status of the employment sector. Labour force characteristics are determined by workers' age, sex, length of migration to the city, culture and norms, plus, of course, the economic condition of their households. Normally, labour terms and conditions do not favour the labour force, nor do they guarantee employment. In order to secure employment and offset its instability, migrants need to maintain a number of contacts with other actors. The sense of insecurity constantly accompanies labourers in the different categories of the labour market. Despite this, they also enjoy a certain degree of flexibility, freedom and autonomy which means they can give up one job to take up another. This often represents a means of increasing income. For example, it has been observed that garment workers often change factories because when they get a new job, they get a higher salary to reflect their accumulated experience.

## 6.2. Sellers of Goods

As mentioned earlier in any *bustee* cash economy, individuals can sell labour or goods to obtain money. There are two groups of migrants who sell goods: those vending and those engaged in fixed petty trading. The first group trades or sells goods in *bustee* and non-*bustee* localities by hawking and vending. The second group operates an enterprise using their family labour. I will discuss here the characteristics of the sellers of goods, as well as the risks and opportunities linked with their occupations.

The first group involved in the trading or selling of goods can be divided into two categories of vendors in terms of the location of their activities. One group sells their goods mainly in residential areas by hawking from door-to-door. These normally sell household goods. The second group consists of street hawkers who sell their goods on the busy foot paths, parks, business areas or in any strategic place like in front of schools.

Both types of vendors share a number of common characteristics. First, the circulation of goods is on a day-to-day basis. The vendors buy these goods almost every day and try to sell them on the same day. Second, vendors tend to buy a small quantity of goods in order to minimise risk. The main risk is that goods can be easily damaged since they are normally perishable goods. Third, this kind of dealing requires only a small amount of capital. Fourth, this trade does not require utilities like fuel and electricity. Fifth, there are no capital expenditures like official taxes. Sixth, it does however return high rates of gross income. Finally, net income is determined by three main conditions: a) investment of human capital; b) cost of credit; and c) cost of protection money.

Matrix 2.4: Sellers of goods and credit arrangement

Sellers of Goods	Main sources of credit	Credit Payment Arrangements	Uncertainty produced by structure	Flexibility
Vending eg. door-to-door peddler, street hawker	Informal	day-to-day	X	
Fixed petty traders e.g. shopkeepers, garage owners	ROSCA, NGO credit		X	X

These three net income conditions differ for the two groups of vendors. The net income of door-to-door hawkers mainly depends on their source of credit and any related terms and condition (matrix 2.4). Most of the door-to-door hawkers have a credit relation which takes the form of a *baki* (a loan in kind normally taken from shops without interest but with the goods supplied at a high price) with fixed traders (matrix 2. 5). They have to settle their daily credit transaction on a day-to-day basis. In order to make a net profit, they need to work hard selling a good quantity of good. Additionally, the door-to-door hawkers living in BBB2 do not need to pay extra protection money to *mastaans* or police for their trading. In contrast, the net income of street hawkers depends on the cost of their credit and protection money. They take credit either from wholesalers or fixed traders with interest as high as 10% per day and have to settle their account on a day-to-day basis (matrix 2.6). In addition to this high cost of credit, the street hawkers need to pay protection money to the police, *mastaans* or both to be able to sell their goods in a specific place or area. This significantly increases their capital expenditure. Therefore, in order make a net profit, they need to work hard for longer periods. In most cases, younger migrants are involved with this type of vending.

**Matrix 2.5: Types of informal credit in *bustee* cash economy**

Local name of credit transactions	Meaning
<i>Hawlat</i>	A small loan in the form of cash taken from relatives, friends, acquaintances without interest.
<i>Baki</i>	A small loan in kind normally taken from shops with high price.
<i>Dhar</i>	Similar to <i>hawlat</i> , yet it is a larger sum taken in the form of cash from relatives, friends, acquaintances without interest
<i>Reen</i>	A loan taken on interest.

Fixed trading is another source of cash in the *bustee* economy. Fixed trading refers to a number of enterprises located in rented out houses or shops in the *bustee* or in the kitchen market. In addition to capital investment, the development of these *bustee* enterprises depends on locational advantage. For example, *Neel Khet* slum which is close to Dhaka New Market, has become a good place for women entrepreneurs as they supply most of the food sold in the nearby hotels. Similarly, many rickshaw and motor repair garage businesses have been developed in Agargaon located in the central part of Mohammadpur *thana*. In BBB2, fixed trading occurs in four major areas: rented out houses, shops in *bustee* or shops in the kitchen market and *rickshaw* garages. Often these are all owned by the same people. Apart from rented out houses, fixed trading is strongly linked with *bustee* informal credit markets (see matrix 2.5).

Before going on to describe the link between fixed trading and credit markets, I will briefly outline the basic feature of this part of the economy. First, most of the businesses are simple in structure and managed on a day-to-day basis. Second, they use their household labour in trading. For example, most of the shops in the *bustee* are run by women and shops in the kitchen market are run by other household labourers like younger brothers or young sons of the owner. Third, most fixed traders in BBB2 receive support from an NGO called ASD, which only has women group members. Fourth, all fixed traders have to pay protection money to police or *mastaans* or both. Fifth, all shops

operate *baki* transactions which ensure a higher rates of income. Sixth, the risk of *baki* transaction is minimised through ROSCAs (Rotating Savings and Credit Associations).

When considering the link between fixed trading and protection payments it is important to understand how businesses are organised to ensure maximum profit. As mentioned earlier, most fixed trading is usually run by the same group of people, who own *rickshaw* garages, or shops. These owners pay regular protection money. The purpose of protection money is two fold: a) it protects the person from other people (police or other groups of *mastaans*) demanding payment, and b) it ensures them monopolistic control of their business, since others are prevented from entering. For example, the *richsaw* garage owners maintain strong networks with *mastaans* and police by giving them regular protection money. The main purpose of this protection money is not to protect the garage, but to prevent the entry of competitors. In this way, the garage owners monopolise the trade and rent out space for others to keep *rickshaws* or sell *rickshaws* on a *baki* arrangement. Although the capital expenditure of all fixed traders' is high, they need to pay the protection money on a regular basis to ensure themselves of high profits.

**Matrix 2.6 : Access to the different types of credit**

<i>Credit</i>	<i>Baki</i>	<i>Dhar</i>	<i>Reen</i>
For Invest- ment	Vendor take from fixed traders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vendor takes from rela- tives/friends</li> <li>• Fixed traders takes from rela- tives/friends</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fixed traders take from money lender /NGO</li> <li>• Vendors take from money lender /NGO/ fixed traders</li> </ul>

Credit transactions are critical to the profitability of enterprises. There is no formal credit support (except ASD) in BBB2 but there is a huge demand for investment and consumption credit. As mentioned earlier, vendors acquire credit support mainly from fixed traders in the form of *baki* transactions. Similarly, most labour sellers are uncertain about regular cash income, so they need support for consumption credit. This credit also takes the form of *baki* transactions and is taken almost on a day-to-day basis. For example, wage labourers take goods in some form of *baki* before going to their work and they pay back their loan on returning home in the evening. Most of the monthly paid garments



workers also need consumption credit. *Rickshaw* pullers also buy *rickshaws* from garage owners on credit. All these credit transactions occur through *baki* arrangements.

The successful mobilisation of ROSCA is the main factor of *baki* transaction which helps the fixed traders to charge higher prices. In BBB2, it was almost impossible to find anyone who was not involved with a ROSCA. While ROSCAs seem to be a spontaneous form of organisation, in reality they are highly managed by the fixed traders. The fixed traders receive two main benefits: a) they can mobilise a large amount of capital which can be used to finance their running costs; and b) they use this money as a source of guarantee of their *baki* transactions. Under *baki* transactions it is common for goods to be priced as much as 50% above the normal level. Loan recovery is also importantly backed up through the use of violence supported by the *mastaans*.

In terms of support and services, *mastaans* are trusted. For example, during my field-work the word spread that all the migrants were to be evicted and this threw most people into a state of panic. In order to deal with this situation, they gave a huge amount of money to the police and BWDB officials through the *mastaans*.

To sum up, the sellers of goods have a wide range of opportunities to ensure high profits if they pay protection money. Critical of this process is the mechanism of *baki* transactions. The main factor behind this transaction is the ROSCA, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter six, and the customary right to increase the price of goods. This customary right is ensured by the *mastaan* on payment of protection money.

### **6.3. Illicit Occupations**

There are a number of occupations migrants do to earn cash in the *bustee* economy, which may be considered immoral or anti-social. It is not the case that migrants engage in these occupations willingly, but this work is casual source of cash income. There are five different types of illicit occupations which migrants use to secure cash. These are presented in matrix 2.7.

Matrix 2.7: Carryovers Illicit Occupations

Occupations	Uncertainty produced by structure	Flexibility
Thieves	X	
Drug selling	X	
Gambling	X	
Beggars	X	X
Prostitution	X	

In BBB2 most of the so called thieves are involved in stealing *rickshaws*. They usually belong to organised gangs headed by *rickshaw* garage owners and guided by the *mastaans*. They receive all sorts of support and shelter from the *mastaans*. Although, theft is usually a casual or part time occupation, it is difficult to exit the system. Some thieves also operate independently, neither organised nor protected by the *mastaans*. They steal on an occasional basis from *bustee* houses or shops. This group of thieves can 'exit' with greater ease.

A second group of illicit workers are drug sellers. However, given the locational disadvantage of BBB2, this is not very profitable. Four households sell local wine (normally known as *tari*) and drugs (*gaja*) under the protection of the *mastaans* and police.

The third group is gamblers. Gambling is very common in BBB2, as it is in other *bustees* in Dhaka. Gambling is organised under the protection of the *mastaans*, who receive regular protection money. Almost all the young male inhabitants of BBB2 participate in gambling either on regular basis or occasionally. The participants have the freedom to gamble but those who organise gambling have little chance of exit. Even if they stop organising gambling, they still have to pay protection money.

The fourth group comprises beggars. There are two types of beggars living in BBB2: occasional and professional. Occasional or part-time beggars normally beg in the residential areas, walking from door-to-door. Professional beggars, on the other hand, have fixed public places like entrances to mosques, courts or traffic signal spots. The occasional beggars do not need to pay any protection money, while the professional beggars

must pay protection money to the police through the *mastaans* in order to use the public places for begging.

The fifth group is prostitutes. ASD provided me with a list of eight casual prostitutes who had received STD (sexual transmitted disease) treatment from them. They are not organised or controlled by any gang. These eight women either work as maid servants at different dormitories or in garment factories and they get additional cash from prostitution when they need or get the opportunity.

#### 6.4. Cost Saving

When individuals fail to secure work producing cash income, they resort to cost-saving activities. Most children are engaged in the cost-savings activities, such as collecting fuel, grass for cattle and snails for ducks. They also collect waste vegetables from the market place and look after household activities which allows the adults (particularly the mothers) to work outside the home. It can therefore be concluded that in the *bustee* community only infants are a dependent population given that all the other *bustee* migrants are employed or engaged in cost saving activities.

### 7. *Bustee* Violence

When people migrate from the rural area they come either individually or with their families, leaving behind their social organisational heritage. In the *bustee* social organisation it appears that two structural levels (neighbourhoods and homesteads) are replaced and one level *gusti* (lineage homestead) is completely missing. There is therefore, a lack of lineage centered social organisation in the *bustee shamaj*. This results in a sort of vacuum in the *bustee* social organisation which I want to call a 'structural hole'. The *mastaan* structure acts as the missing link between the *shamaj* and household, to fill this hole.

Similarly, lack of sufficient formal rights offered by the state force *bustee* migrants to use informal rights produced by intermediaries like *mastaans* in order to manage risk and uncertainty. The absence of adequate formal and legal rights creates a space for intermediaries like *mastaans* to operate as brokers between people and institutions. From the perspective of the poor building trust with these intermediaries is essential.




Figure 2.4: The Structural Hole in Bustee Institutions

The “missing link’ or ‘structural hole’ of the *bustee* social organisation produces two distinctive features in the *bustee*. Firstly, the ‘structural hole’ created by the lack of ‘*gusti*’ creates household tension, insecurity, and violence. Household conflict resolution and negotiation of household conflicts take place in the rural society though the *murrubi* who is the *gusti* leader. The *murrubi* has the right to enforce the code of behaviour on his *gusti* members and others in the village through his seniority by age and sex, and as member of the *shalish* (village court). The main responsibility of the *shalish* is conflict resolution, both among the lineage members and the villagers more widely. In the absence of formal rights, the *shalish* is more powerful in the *bustee*.

The lack of an enforced moral code leads *bustee* migrants towards individualistic behaviour which is less cooperative and more conflict oriented. For example, wife beating is very common in BBB2 and occurs either for minor reasons or even without reason. If a wife fails to prepare food on time or the husband can not find his shirt before going out for work, the husband starts beating his wife. Household violence is the means for resolving conflict and this reinforces the complete subordination of the wife. Although, wife beating is also common in rural areas, household conflicts are resolved socially via the *murrubi* and this offers some protection against extreme abuse, divorce or polygamy. Women in the *bustee* are afraid of divorce. This induces distrust and women consequently try to find sources of cash as an insurance for the uncertain future. This may lead to more violence within households.

Secondly, the ‘missing link’ between the *shamaj* and the household affects the function of the social organisation. Rural people obey the enforced moral code of behaviour out of respect for the age and position of the lineage leaders. Sanctions are also obeyed because of pressure from the lineage groups. But in the *bustee*, codes of behaviour and sanctions are imposed by the *mastaan* structure through violence.

Thus violence is a product of the ‘structural hole’ in the *bustee* social organisation. The level of violence and extent of opportunity given to the *bustee* migrants depends on their relationships with the *mastaans*. *Mastaans* never allow anybody to challenge them. I found that when *bustee* migrants challenge *mastaans* in BBB2 they are punished for this. For example, in BBB2, there is a system of paying protection money. Every household must pay Tk 10.00 at the end of the month. If people fail to pay the money by a specific

date, they will be subjected to humiliation or physical assault. In the same way *bustee* migrants can be victimised if they fail to pay back under *bakis*. Thus, the lack of an appropriate social institution to impose sanctions and the monopolistic control exercised by *mastaan* induces a 'culture of violence' within the *bustee*.

## 8. Conclusion

BBB2 is a place where a group of heterogeneous new migrants with different socio-economic experiences live together. The life of the *bustee* migrant becomes one of constant struggle for survival within a persistently uncertain, insecure and risky social and economic environment. The 'missing levels' of social organisation and the legislation free cash economy associated with the informal market create gaps which are filled in by the *mastaan* structure. The nature of the *bustee* social organisation and the *bustee* cash economy creates both tension and opportunity for *bustee* migrants. The *mastaan* structure becomes the 'structural missing link' in the *bustee* social organisation and it acts as a source both for insecurity and opportunity for the *bustee* migrants.

The role of the 'missing link' provides *mastaans* with an opportunity to enjoy the customary rights of imposing sanctions in both social and market transactions. Therefore, *mastaans* are in a position to create both constraints on and opportunities for the *bustee* migrants. However, the degree of constraint and extent of opportunity given to the *bustee* migrants depends on their attitude and disposition to the *mastaans*. Most of the *bustee* migrants accept various forms of violence orchestrated by the *mastaans* for everyone knows the price to be paid for resisting or challenging *mastaans*. By submitting to the *mastaan* however they can access opportunities in a protected and relatively secure way.

The informal sector is notoriously uncertain since it operates outside legislation, formal rules and regulations. *Mastaans* have established their customary rights, though violence, to keep the informal sector running. The *mastaans* provide opportunities for higher income flows either by assisting people to run their businesses or by allowing them to carry out illicit occupations. The *mastaan* provides the traders with all sorts of support ranging from negotiating with police, other *mastaans* or any other urban actor. Within such a *bustee* environment migrants surrender completely to the *mastaans* who in turn ensure the creation of economic opportunity, minimise risks and protect from insecurity. This is a fact of life

in the *bustee* and the migrants internalise this culture and learn to live with it. For migrants in BBB2 life is full of insecurity, uncertainty and risk but also opportunities. In the following chapters I will look further into this paradox.

## Chapter Three

# RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

### 1. Introduction

As mentioned in the introduction, my Ph.D. research developed out of the Urban Livelihood Study (ULS). This was a piece of longitudinal research conducted by Proshika, a Bangladeshi NGO, in collaboration with the University of Bath and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM). Professor Geof Wood of the University of Bath was a member of the advisory team, and also supervised my Ph.D. Within the ULS I was responsible for supervising and coordinating the qualitative research. I spent most of the time in Bangladesh with occasional visits to the University of Bath. After completing the ULS and producing a monograph (Khan 1998) as one of its outputs, I moved to the UK to begin in depth analysis of the field information.

It is therefore clear that my Ph.D. research did not follow the conventional three year research process. The typical pattern for this is for one year of preparatory work, one year collecting data and one year writing-up. The process basically starts with theoretical study and literature review, which gives the context against which field data is subsequently collected and analysed. In contrast, my main research themes emerged directly from my field observations. My research methodology both strongly reflects and also advances the ULS methodology.

The 'flexible' but 'topic oriented' process that was used in the ULS qualitative methodology, provided me with the opportunity to develop my own research methodology. 'Flexibility' refers to the fact that the ULS qualitative methodology was developed in the course of the research to suit the specific context under investigation. 'Topic oriented' instead refers to the fact that each researcher on the team had a specific research topic selected from the initial results. The combination of the 'flexibility' and 'topic oriented' approach meant that the qualitative team members had to follow their 'own' research methodology in order to investigate and analyse their own data and produce topic based research monographs. As a member of the qualitative research team I therefore followed the same process initially. After selecting the *bustee*, however, I independently developed the additional methodologies required. In this chapter I shall present both of my re-



search experiences: the qualitative methodology of the ULS; and the methodology used for this research only.

## **2. The Qualitative Methodology of the Urban Livelihood Study**

As mentioned earlier, my research developed out of the ULS and the research methodology was initiated within the shared ULS process. Therefore, the methodology used for this research was strongly linked with the ULS methodology, both quantitative and qualitative. In this section, the qualitative methodology will be described with reference as appropriate to the quantitative methodology.

### **2.1. Qualitative Research Design and Fieldwork Plan**

The ULS made use of the resource profile framework developed from Sen's entitlement approach by scholars at the University of Bath. Since the ULS recognised the importance of "endowment" and "exchange", the qualitative team placed particular emphasis on understanding the constitution of different types of social relations in *bustee* livelihood strategies. With this focus, the challenge was to translate the conceptual framework into a practical tool for field research. This was done through the following process. First of all, the team attended several courses and workshops on different technical methods. In October 1995, I thus attended a course on methodology in the University of Bath. I also participated in the workshop on qualitative data analysis organised by the cholera hospital (ICDDR,B) in Bangladesh. Secondly, the team consulted various data and documents on the *bustees*. Thirdly, a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) exercise was carried out to get an idea of *bustee* life. Fourthly, three methodology workshops were organised. Dhaka-based academics and researchers attended the first workshop. In the second workshop, all NGO activists working with *bustee* migrants participated. In the third workshop, all ULS staff and consultants participated. To build on all of the activities mentioned above, a final workshop was organised in Dhaka and facilitated by Professor Geof Wood. In this workshop a four-phase plan of action was developed. This is presented in chart 3.1.

**Chart 3.1**

### Qualitative Research Process

Time	Activities/Methods	Out-put
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#### a. Pre-Phase Activities

April '95-December '95	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PRA Methods: transact walks to different selected <i>bustees</i>, social and resources mapping,</li> <li>Group Discussions</li> <li>Oral Histories</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Overview of <i>bustee</i> life, local perceptions regarding vulnerability and shocks,</li> <li>Questionnaire preparation and field testing</li> </ul>
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#### b. Methodology Workshop

01-04 January '96	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review of CUS*, ICDDR,B data and QPS* methodology;</li> <li>Share pre-phase PRA findings</li> <li>Visit <i>bustees</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Bustee</i> selection</li> <li>Develop four-phase work strategy</li> </ul>
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#### c. Four-Phase Ethnographic Research Strategy

January '96- April '96	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Use PRA methods e.g. social and resource mapping, matrix ranking;</li> <li>Mini-census;</li> <li>Informal interviewing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Location profile for in-house presentation and review</li> </ul>
May '96- August '96	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>QPS questionnaire,</li> <li>Observation</li> <li>Key informant interviewing,</li> <li>Witnessing key events</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Household profile for in-house presentation and review</li> </ul>
September '96-December 96	Group discussion, Observation Key informant interviewing, Witnessing key events	Issue based report for in-house presentation and review
January '97 - April '97	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Weekly discussion meeting among researchers,</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Draft Monograph for in-house presentation and review.</li> </ul>


\* Notes: CUS is the Centre for Urban Studies at the University of Dhaka. QPS is the Quantitative Panel Survey.

The Qualitative team of the ULS consisted of five researchers. I was the team coordinator and also had responsibility for liaison with the quantitative team. Although all the team members started working together, the team members worked independently in different phase-wise activities. I was solely responsible for the fieldwork carried out in BBB2.

At each phase the next phase of activities was identified and the required tools and techniques were developed. For example, while developing the *bustee* profile during the first phase, a set of indicators were identified which influence the life of *bustee* people. The experience gathered from one phase of activity thus determined the area of investigation and the methodology developed in subsequent phases. Thus, the field investigation methodology of this thesis was developed partly in response to the research theme selected halfway through the ULS. Before I share my experience in this research, I shall place how the *bustees* were selected for qualitative part of ULS.

### **2.1.1 Bustee Selection**

As mentioned earlier, my research site of the BBB2 was selected using the ULS methodological framework. The ULS was conducted among sample *bustees* in one *thana* in Dhaka Metropolitan City. The name of the *thana* is Mohammadpur. Mohammadpur was selected as a suitable site for a number of reasons. First, it contains the largest proportion of *bustee* dwellers in Dhaka. Mohammadpur *thana* alone contains 20% of all the *bustee* dwellers in Dhaka (Arefeen and Mahbub 1993). Second, it has various different types of *bustees*: those developed on government land by semi-government organisations, by private individuals or partnerships, those established on government land which is disputed. Third, it is close to the city centre but it has peripheral areas, watersides and large single rooms in the city. Although the selection of the *bustee* for qualitative study depended primarily on the Quantitative Panel Survey (QPS) of the ULS, we also considered the experiences gathered through the PRA exercises of the pre-phase, which were done in different *bustees*, situated in different *thanas*.



Map 3.1: The location of the ULS under Mohammadpur thana

Following area sampling, twenty-five clusters out of 538 were selected randomly for the QPS of the ULS. We wanted to include in our sample a range of government and private land, as well as *bustees* situated close to and further from the city centre. Eleven were selected from Agargaon (a very large *bustee* area on government land situated to the North East of the *thana*), five from Beri Badh (sprawling *bustees* on the Western edge of the *thana* and the fringe of the city), and nine from the central part of the *thana* (these being mainly smaller pockets of *bustees* situated on a mixture of private, government and disputed land). Each cluster contained between 20 and 60 households.

While conducting PRA exercises in preparation for fieldwork, it was observed that a number of factors were particularly significant in defining the livelihoods of *Bustee* migrants. These were: tenure arrangements; the existence of common property resources and entitlement to access; distance from work-places; and the nature of employment available in and around the *bustee*. Control mechanisms developed in the *bustees* also influenced people's access to different resources and their livelihoods. Consequently, for the qualitative study a number of important factors were considered in selecting the *bustee*. These included: capturing a range of experiences particularly in relation to employment and social relations; finding a reasonable *bustee* size in order to explore a variety of relations; and focusing on sites from the locations adjacent to the cluster sample of the QPS of the ULS mentioned above.

Considering the above factors, a two-fold selection process was followed. Firstly, three locations - central, periphery and fringe - from the cluster maps were selected. These were Agargaon, Rayer Bazar and Beri Badh. Secondly, 5 *bustees* were drawn from each of these three locations. Two *bustees* from Agargaon which were close to the central area of Mohammadpur thana, 2 from Rayer Bazar from the periphery area and 1 from Mohammadpur Beri Badh area which was located in the fringe area of Mohammadpur (see chart 3.2).

**Chart 3.2: Important Feature of the Selected *Bustees***

	<b>Agargaon</b>		<b>Rayer Bazar</b>		<b>Beribadh</b>
<b>Features</b>	<b>Shahider Tek <i>Bustee</i></b>	<b>Hatemer <i>Bustee</i></b>	<b>Noorhosener <i>Bustee</i></b>	<b>Pulpar <i>Bustee</i></b>	<b>Beri Badh <i>Bustee</i></b>
Settlement	Government land	Government land	Private land	Private land	Government land
Location	Close to city centre (Agargaon)	Close to city centre (Agargaon)	Periphery (Rayer Bazar)	Periphery (Rayer Bazar)	Fringe of the city
Communication with city centre	good	Good	not good	not good	bad
Working opportunity	good	Good	good	good	not good
Water supply	pipd and tube-well	Piped and tube-well	tube-well	pipd	tube-well and marsh
Common Property Resources	available	Available			available
Electricity	available (illegal)	Available (illegal)	not available	available (illegal)	not available
Concentration of houses	dense	Dense	dense	fair	fair
Physical environment*	bad	Bad	bad	fair	fair
Social environment*	significantly bad	Significantly bad	significantly bad	fair	bad
NGO activities	available	Available	not available	not significant	not significant

\* Notes: Physical environment means such things as drainage, roads, and space in homesteads. Social environment means the community situation regarding violence, prostitution, drugs etc.

### **3. Additional Methodology for this Research**

The choice of a specific topic for my research developed out of what I learned through the process of selecting *bustee* and key informant households. As mentioned in the previous section, the BBB2 migrants placed particular emphasis on social resources as prereq-

uisites for their survival in the urban context. To explore this further it was necessary to develop an additional research methodology. In this section I describe this.

### 3.1. From ULS Conceptual Framework to People Centred Epistemology

The first limitation that I found in the ULS methodology was its conceptual framework. Trying to extend this provided a methodological turning point in my research. The analytical framework of the ULS gravitates around a livelihoods approach, which examines the social and material conditions within which targeted participants seek to gain access to food and other basic needs. This approach is based on the work of authors such as Sen (1982), Swift (1989), Kabeer (1989) and Lewis (1993). Sen (1982) uses the now familiar term 'entitlement' to cover a set of resources and relationships determining the control a household has over basic resources.

A household's 'entitlement' consists of: 'endowments' and 'exchanges'. Firstly, a household is considered to be endowed with a set of resources, which conditions the range of economic options available to it. These resources include:

- \* *Material resources*: the assets and stores of value including money
  
- \* *Human resources*: the skills and capabilities of people within a household, including the age, gender, educational and skill status, and health and nutritional condition of household members.
  
- \* *Social resources*: the set of relationships which a household has with other individuals, households and organisations - ones that may be used to maintain or improve their situation. These are regarded as "claims" to assistance which may include claims on food, credit, labour or productive resources or services from kin, neighbours, labour groups, patrons, landlords and employers, from government, or from NGOs and the international community.
  
- \* *Cultural Resources*: this dimension refers to the cultural status of the household or individuals within households, since the perceptions of others of that status will influence the outcome of negotiations and their value to the household.
  
- \* *Common property resources*: natural resources which may be shared by different kinds of households either with clearly defined property rights, or adjudged as national common property. Within the urban context, common property resources may include water, grazing land, fodder materials, fuel, trees, natural vegetation and garbage.

Source: Lewis and McGregor (1992)

Secondly, there is the potential provided by the 'exchange' of any part of what is owned (for money or kind) to have access to food and other basic needs. For example, human labour may be sold for a wage, commodities produced may be used for domestic consumption or sold on the market, or used for trade. A household may therefore have several possible sources of 'entitlement' or resources, including social and common property resources, which may be seen as constituting its livelihood, here defined in relation to a socially acceptable minimum level of requirements for basic needs.

One of the most significant features in BBB2 where I carried out my fieldwork is that the livelihoods of the *bustee* migrants are highly influenced by the *mastaan* structure. As mentioned in previous chapters the *mastaan* structure sets the context of the livelihoods options for *bustee* migrants by both constructing opportunities and producing insecurities. The livelihood options are produced through the establishment of informal rights in the context of a 'culture of violence'.

While it is clearly important to understand the underlying structures of political economy, the danger is that this does not leave any explanatory space for human agency (Wood 1998). This means that in understanding *bustee* livelihoods, the migrants themselves would be treated as passive recipients. I reject such an epistemological position for four different but interlinked reasons.

Firstly, the ULS conceptual framework generally adopted a 'resource profiles approach' which assumes "individuals, households and communities actively manage their resources in an attempt to achieve the best possible outcome" (McGregor 1998:7). Secondly, there is an insightful literature focusing on Bangladesh which has shown that even if the poor appear silent (Chen 1986, Hartman and Boyce 1983), they have the capacity and knowledge to act and creatively shape their own world (D'Rozario 1998, Devine 2000) and manage their resources efficiently (Van Schendel 1986). Thirdly, my own experience within an NGO actively working with the poor has given me first-hand encounters with episodes where the poor are active agents in their own lives. The most cited example from Bangladesh in this regard is the success of micro-credit programmes. This shows that the poor have a remarkable capacity to create the best possible development outcomes within a situation of multiple constraints (Wood and Sharif 1998). Fourthly, the sociology of development has recently argued against over-determined



structural explanations of social action and human behaviour. Instead, there has recently been considerable emphasis on human agency (Hulme 1994, Booth 1985).

Taking a lead from Wood (1998) I therefore approached my research from the perspective of what can *bustee* migrants do, rather than how they are constrained. *Bustee* migrants' action and interaction may be understood as the outcome of both 'structure' and 'agency'. These concepts and the relationship between them lie at the heart of sociological theory and are highly debated. While formerly theorists tended to emphasise *either* structure *or* agency, recently there has been considerable interest in understanding the relation between the two. As McGregor states (1998:3): "The midwife in this respect has been Anthony Giddens (1984), whose ideas on structuration, if not publicly popular, have been extremely influential".

'Structuration' seeks to understand the iterative relation between structure and agency, in which action is both shaped by social structures and in turn contributes to the reproduction or transformation of those structures in a dialectical relationship. Giddens (1987:61) argues that: "structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling". Structure thus promotes certain opportunities for action, while at the same time restricting others. This presents a picture of social reality as proceeding through a dynamic process of negotiation (Devine 2000) in which both structure and agency play an important part.

Within the sociology of development, the most influential work in this area has been that of Norman and Ann Long's edited collection (1992) on 'actor-oriented approaches'. Influenced by this and the wider post-modernist move in social theory, the 'actor-oriented approach' has been widely used in development studies as a more 'people-centered' epistemology (Wood 1998, Devine 2000). The central focus of Long's 'actor-oriented approach' is 'human agency' which emphasises people's abilities, knowledge and creativity to construct and shape the world around them (Long 1992). Agency is a quality not only of individuals but also organisations and groups. Bourdieu (1989) clarifies the concept of the relationship between structure and agency further, through his notion of 'habitus'. This describes the way an individual's response to a particular situation is the outcome of a habitual disposition, or approach to reality, which is formed through a combination of the social and cultural context and the individual's own particular ex-

periences. In particular, this 'habitus' determines the scope of action, by defining what 'can' and 'should' and 'must' be done, as well as drawing the boundaries of the 'unthinkable' and therefore impossible. As Bourdieu (1989:95) states: "Through the habitus, the structure which has produced it governs practice, not by the processes of mechanical determinism, but through the mediation of the orientations and limits it assigns to the habitus's operations of invention." For this research, this means that the *mastaans*, *bustee* leaders and *bustee* migrants inhabit a shared social context which is significantly defined by the political economy of the world beyond it, and towards which their diverse experiences and social locations dispose them to act in varying ways. Within this context, which is both constraining and enabling, they act as social agents, producing in turn social processes within the *bustee* which again influence their individual behaviour, action and interaction.

### **3.2. The Native Development Practitioner as Researcher and Rapport Building**

Rapport building in anthropological discourse is considered highly significant for researchers in that it helps outsiders gain inside perceptions (Appadurai 1988). An 'outsider' may be both one who is not familiar with the language, and the broader culture of the research community and the 'native' who is as a Bangladeshi, familiar with the research community. Hence, I also needed to follow a process to become an 'insider'.

As a development practitioner, I have been working with the poor for more than twelve years. In this sense, it may be said I am a 'trained native'. From an anthropological perspective, my 'trained native' position may be considered an advantage for me. It is an advantage in that I faced fewer difficulties in my investigation due to my familiarity with the broader society, language, cultural codes and patterns of informants' behaviour. For 'non-native' researchers these can all constitute real barriers in the need to establish effective communication (Lewis 1989, McGregor 1991, White 1988). Effective communication as an 'insider' provides unique opportunity to observe the way of life of a group of people. In narrating her own experiences, Margaret Mead (1977:6) writes: "as the inclusion of the observer within the observed scene becomes more intense, the observation becomes unique". However, despite the advantages I enjoyed, there were still distinctions between being a 'native' and being an 'insider'.

There were two ways in which being a 'native' brought me negative experiences. The first was incidental in nature. At the beginning of the first phase fieldwork, there was a clash between BBB3 *mastaans* and Proshika-organised group members. As a result, local *mastaans* attempted to attack Proshika staff because they had difficulties in collecting tolls and in controlling the *bustee* migrants. Since I am Proshika worker I could not enter BBB2 to start my fieldwork. In order to get access to the BBB2 I decided to introduced myself as a research student of the University of Bath, rather than worker of Proshika.

The second is related to the nature of typical *bustee* cultures. There is a mutual distrust between middle class people and *bustee* migrants. The attitude of middle class people living in Dhaka city towards *bustee* migrants is generally negative. Middle class people consider *bustee* migrants criminals and riff-raff treat them accordingly. Therefore, harassment of *bustee* migrants by 'outsiders' is common. As a result *bustee* migrants are suspicious of 'outsiders'. In the Indian *bustee* context, Chakraborty and Rana (1993:156) argued that: "For the people in the slums the world outside means the government, politicians, welfare groups, and the upper and middle class". I was considered an 'outsider' because I was perceived as belonging to the middle class.

To build a good rapport in the *bustee* I adopted a number of strategies. Firstly, to avoid the incidental crisis mentioned above I hid my identity as an NGO staff member. Still it was hard to convince the *mastaans* that I meant them no harm. One evening, while I was returning from the *bustee*, one of the *mastaans* accosted me and started questioning me. I took this opportunity to explain my purpose to them and again presented myself as a student of a foreign university. Many *bustee* migrants have experience with interviewers coming from different research institutions<sup>6</sup>. In the end, I was able to convince them that my intention like other researchers was to understand their life for academic purposes. Unexpectedly, the *mastaans* offered me all sorts of help but they also reminded me that I should accept their offer. I expressed my gratitude to them and appreciated their offer. Concealing my NGO identity generated two problems. The first problem was obviously moral (this will be discussed further at the end of this chapter under The Problem Encountered); and the second problem was associated with 'suspicions'. While dealing with

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<sup>6</sup> At that time ICDDR,B, was collecting information from different *bustee* in Mohammadpur thana while ASD and GSS were collecting data from BBB2 to establish schools there. During our fieldwork, ASD restarted one school in BBB2 and GSS established another school in a border of BBB2 and BBB1.

*mastaans*, I encountered distance with the common *bustee* migrants. I gradually came to understand that the 'suspicions' were mainly manipulated by the *mastaans* in order to produce distrust to make *bustee* migrants feel obliged. This will be discussed in chapter six.

Secondly, I drew on my experience of working in an NGO in the ways that I set out to generate trust. The very first step taken by an NGO worker in seeking to organise and mobilise the poor is to make him/herself trusted. The common strategies used to make oneself trusted are:

i) 'Listening' to the problems of the poor. In BBB2 the common talking place is the shops. I was introduced to a few shop-keepers doing business in BBB2. In the afternoons I used to chat with some people who spent their time there. By discussing common issues and listening to everyday problems, people received me in a friendly way. Many of them appeared happy and started relating their stories to me.

ii) Showing respect to and valuing the poor. While conducting the PRA exercise I tried to show the value of my informants' analysis. During the PRA, the *bustee* migrants enjoyed the opportunity to analyse their problems, debate among themselves, and visualise common futures. The PRA exercise turned out to be an excellent opportunity to build relationships with people. I wrote their names and noted identification marks of their houses in my diary so that when I met them later I could address them directly.

iii) Making fictive kinship bonds. I tried to memorise and use the names of my informants. Gradually a fictive kin relationship like "*bhai*" (brother), "*chacha*" (uncle), "*chachi*" (aunt) was established with many of the *bustee* migrants of BBB2. This relationship became closer when I gave informants the photographs taken during the PRA exercise and group discussion. This kind of goodwill helped me to get even closer to them and become an 'insider'.

Thirdly, day-to-day interaction helped me to build relationships of trust with the *bustee* migrants. For example, I met many BBB2 *bustee* migrants at their work places outside the *bustee*. I used *rickshaw* pullers of BBB2 and bought goods from their shops. Three boys regularly visited my family house when they came by selling nuts. In fact, I received a lot of information regarding the happenings in the *bustee* from them. Even the maids who worked in nearby houses visited my residence. These people helped me de-

velop trusting relations with the *bustee* migrants. Over time, I became close to *bustee* migrants and was eventually like a relative of theirs. Usually they would invite me to their social celebrations like marriage ceremony.

### 3.3 'Key Informant' Household Selection

Our fieldwork was guided by the 'keyhole' approach which provided me with 'windows' onto the *bustee*. I started my observation with 20 households. The selection of 'key informant households' was considered to be one of the important steps for understanding the structure of relationships among the people living in the *bustee*. The 'key informant households' were selected mainly through PRA, but a pre-PRA census was also conducted in order to facilitate the PRA sessions.

A simple census for basic information on the types of household, people's occupation and length of stay in Dhaka city was conducted in the *bustee*. These three indicators were identified during the pre-phase and first phase fieldwork as key factors which directly influence *bustee* migrants' livelihoods. With the help of some assistants, the census sheets were filled in by visiting households door-to-door. All five team members worked together and five *bustees* were covered. A list of the total households was made on the basis of the census. This census provides basic information on the households living in the *bustee*, it also helped develop a detailed and updated list of *bustee* migrants.

As mentioned above, 'key informant households' were selected through a PRA exercise conducted among the *bustee* migrants. But the selection was not straightforward, three major steps were followed. Firstly, a series of *bustee* migrants' resources were selected using the resource profile framework. These selected sets of resources are presented in matrix 3.1. Secondly, an attempt was made to analyse how these resources affect people's endowments. It was found that a single resource was unable to facilitate exchange. For example, one of the households owned a *rickshaw* which was pulled by another household member. When the owner became sick, he tried to rent it out but he could not because the *rickshaw* was in need of repair. The owner was unable to use his own *rickshaw* due to his sickness, while he could not repair it for lack of money. People's sense of the inter-relation of resources is reflected in their selection of resources. Thirdly, the *bustee* migrants themselves identified there are three different survival groups. The

survival groups are dynamic and they differ from each other according to their ability to store and make use of different sets of resources.

**Matrix : 3.1 *Bustee* migrants resources**

- *Material resources*: house, rickshaw, livestock like cows, shops, land in rural areas, fishing tools, agricultural tools, tools for repairing like key smith, amenities, ornaments, cloths, clock, radio, bicycles, cassette players, savings, cash in hand.
- *Human resources*: youth, good health, education, male household members, skilled labour,
- *Social resources*: kin networks, non-kin networks like friends and colleagues, networks *bustee* associations, networks with non *bustee* organisations like NGO, networks with officials, networks with business association like kitchen market associations, networks with law enforcing authorities, association with *mastaans*.
- *Cultural Resources*: respected households members, for example, persons working in a government office, stable marriage.
- *Common property resources*: ground water, grazing land, fodder materials, fuel, trees, natural vegetation and garbage.

The dynamic categories identified are: improving, coping and declining. People belonging to the upper stratum were termed ‘improving’, the middle one ‘coping’ and the lower one ‘declining’. In this exercise, it was clear that while a few people could be considered to have economic surplus, most *bustee* migrants didn’t wish to be categorised as improving, since they are not socially accepted by the larger community. However, a few households were classified as improving on the basis of their human or socio-political resources, even though they did not have a sound economic base.

**Matrix 3.2: Indicators used for *Bustee* Migrants Categorisation**

<b>Improving households</b>	<b>Coping households</b>	<b>Declining households</b>
• Surplus income	• Balanced income	• Deficit income
• More income earners	• Balance income earners and dependents	• Less income earners
• No/few dependent(s)	• Few dependents	• High no. dependents
• Productive assets	• Less Productive	• No productive assets
• Multiple Income sources	• More than one income sources	• Single income source
• Income erosion is less	• Income erosion is high	• Income erosion is very high
• Illness of family members/ earners is less	• Illness of family Members is high	• Illness of income earner is high
• Have savings	• Very little savings	• No savings
• Strong support network	• Weak social support network	• Very weak social network
• Strong relation with different agencies	• Weak relation with agencies	• Very weak relation with agencies
• Obtain crops from the village	• Need to send remittance to the village	• Need to send remittance to the village
• Literate	• Illiterate	• Illiterate
• Female HHH is almost nil	• Female HHH is less	• Female HHH is very high
• Business profession is high	• Mostly skilled labour	• Mostly unskilled labour
• Serial monogamy is high (male)	• Serial monogamy is less	• Serial monogamy is high (female)

In the second phase, the household profile was developed mainly according to the information gathered through the QPS. Interestingly, some discrepancy was noticed between people's judgment during PRA and the information collected through QPS which

was based on economic issues. For example, during the PRA exercise people put Shahid Mia in the improving category. From QPS we found that Shahid Mia's economic condition is no better than Abdul Odud who was put in the coping category, and was almost similar to Ms. Nurani Begum who belongs to a female-headed household and was designated a declining household. Both Abdul Odud and Ms. Nurani Begum have very weak social ties. Ms. Nurani Begum was not socially accepted because her eldest daughter worked as a sex worker. Even though Shahid Mia's household economy was not comparable to the people belonging to the improving household category, he enjoyed wide connections in terms of social network. At the end of the study, people's perceptions proved to be accurate since Shahid Mia's social network was very strong. He eventually became the chairman of BBB2, replacing Monir Islam. After completion of this exercise, the aggregated result was compared with the result obtained on the use of ranking and bar diagram. The ratio of 'improving', 'coping' and 'declining' is 3:5:2.

In the third step, 20 key informant households were chosen according to the percentage distribution of the specific category and their willingness to participate in the study. The selected households of the specific category were again chosen on the basis of a range of indicators - such as household structure, occupation and time since migration.

### **3.4. Doing Fieldwork**

In doing fieldwork, initially I encountered two major problems. One was the time-scale of the study. The question arose as to how far I could go within a year in developing a detailed 'sociology of everyday life' of the *bustee* migrants given that there was no previous study. The second problem was related to the question of research skills in translating the field information into a research format. The first question will be addressed here and the second question will be dealt with in the following section.

In the *bustee* context of urban life, the dynamics of the livelihoods depend to a great extent on how individual actors are associated with different urban organisations through which individual labourers can transfer and exchange their resources. As mentioned in chapter two, resource exchange is constrained and at the same time facilitated by the *mastaan* structure. The 'structural constraint approach' generally focuses on how people's actions are constrained by the structure, while my emphasis was on 'what can



people do?'. Thus, I put emphasis on the power and knowledge of the 'local people', particularly on the 'actors' living in a given condition. I used a broadly anthropological approach with an 'actor-oriented' analysis, and PRA methods in undertaking my particular study. I began work in BBB2 by developing profiles of various locations and households. To achieve this, as mentioned in chart 3.1, I employed a number of tools and techniques based on PRA principles with the intention of creating room for participation of the *bustee* migrants and allowing their own analysis to emerge.

Firstly, I employed a number of tools and techniques developed on the basis of PRA principles with the intention of creating room for participation of the *bustee* migrants and allowing their own analysis to emerge. PRA developed from Rapid Rural Appraisal - RRA - which was in turn developed in the 1970s by Robert Chambers. PRA is normally described as "a basket of techniques" for encouraging participants themselves to construct several tools, like diagrams, maps and charts to analyse their present and past situation (ULS 1995). In fact, Chambers (1994) advocates PRA from a theoretical development perspective rather than as a methodological tool. The objective was to make the poor the subject of development activities rather an object. Thus PRA was projected to be an essential tool for empowering the poor through the participation in development planning, changing the 'top-down' development approach.

While, PRA is flexible according to the applicability of the specific community in terms of tools used (Abbot and Gujit 1997) it is not in terms of approaches regarding the empowerment of recipients. Therefore, the PRA used in this study is not comparable with the theoretical conception of PRA. Secondly, in this study I only used the tools and techniques developed for the rural one, with some modification for the urban poor. It is used here more as Participatory Rural Appraisal in the urban context rather than Participatory Rapid Appraisal as such.

My first move was to conduct a mini census containing migration and demographic information. This was conducted with the assistance of *bustee* migrants and checked in a PRA session. Secondly, a physical resource map was drawn showing the location of *bustee* resources like sources of water, roads and common property resources like garbage disposal and ground water etc. Thirdly, using the census data, I arranged an exercise in

household resource ranking and categorisation. In this session *bustee* migrants themselves identified each household's resources (Matrix 3.1). While drawing various resource maps and diagrams I took notes that helped me conduct further investigation smoothly. For example, I wrote the name of different key actors and locations where they stayed so that I could easily identify them when I needed them for discussion, informal interviews or observations.

Resource ranking in the *bustee* context proved not to be an effective tool to analyse social and cultural resources, which relate to migrants' status and power position. More detail on this is given in section 4 (Strength and Weakness of the Methodology). The point that needs to be emphasised here is that the PRA exercises provided the basis for identifying key points of departure. In particular, PRA exercises clearly indicated that social resources provide the basis for the accumulation of other resources. In addition they served importantly to identify key actors both within and outside *bustee*, such as the *sardars* on whom they depended to provide access to work opportunities. Similarly, when they mentioned that police harassment is very common, I asked who helped them to negotiate with them. In this way I built up my knowledge of a number of key actors who belonged to the *mastaan* structure within the *bustee* and others who did not live in *bustees* but were connected to the *bustee mastaan* structure. This enabled me to see the *bustee* as a 'keyhole' through which a glimpse of a broader functioning structure could be obtained.

Secondly, I used a number of anthropological techniques which include life histories, biographies, profiles, oral histories, observation of participants. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the objective of my research is to understand how the functioning of the *bustee mastaan* structure influences *bustee* migrants' livelihoods. Life histories helped me to understand the genesis of the *bustee*. Thus by fitting together piece by piece the various national and community level events which *bustee* migrants described I was eventually able to build up a complete picture of development process of BBB, its initiators and their different connections. The biographies of the key actors of the *mastaan* structure further illustrate the significance of social connections and networks with different individual actors and organisations. Due to my good rapport with the *bustee* migrants, I enjoyed some sorts of rights to gain access to different places. Participating in various events also gave me an opportunity to chat informally and so learn more about

them and their activities. Sitting in a *rickshaw* garage or a shop and chatting with the owners who generally belong to the *mastaan* structure provided me opportunities to observe their interaction with others and the nature and types of exchanges between and among them. This sort of informal talk also gave me an opportunity to know more about their biographies, both past and present, and so to situate their different actions and behaviour. Similarly, sitting and passing time with *sardars* enabled me to observe and understand more about the role of social relationships in facilitating market exchange. Recognising the significance of access to work, I also visited workplaces such as garment factories and the wage labour market. Visiting the places where gambling was organised, I observed how important gambling was for the *bustee* migrants in terms of making relationships with *mastaans*.

Finally, as far as note taking is concerned, I took notes on the spot only during the PRA exercise but maintained a diary that was written at the end of each day. This recorded the facts, events and cases with some explanatory notes. I used my initial findings to write thematic field reports including *bustee* and household profiles. These I later compiled into a monograph. All such documents were used in this thesis.

### **3.5. The Problems Encountered**

As mentioned earlier, this research adopts an 'actor-oriented approach' to explain the process of negotiation between the *mastaans* and the *bustee* migrants. In ethnographic study, researchers face various obstacles in their fieldwork. This is inevitable given that researchers become part of the research process itself through face to face interaction with the informants. Difficulties arise from the physical condition of the researcher (Harmmersley and Atkinson 1995), their nationalities (Lewis 1989), gender (White 1992) and occupation (D'Rozario 1998). All such potential difficulties do not only refer simply to encounters rather they also refer to research ethics. In what follows I offer a glimpse of the main difficulties encountered in my research. The nature of my difficulties varied over time and extended on into the writing up stage.

#### **3.5.1. Problems encountered in the field**

Tension arose from the fact that I was associated with different stakeholders during my fieldwork. The stakeholders may be categorised into three groups. The first group of

stakeholders were mostly officials and consisted of Proshika staff and the donors. The second group of stakeholders were the research team members, The third group of stakeholder were the *bustee* people, both *mastaans* and *bustee* migrants. Each different group of stakeholders exerted some influence on my fieldwork.

With regards to the first group of stakeholders, the influence I experienced was both negative and positive. After a certain period of time, both Proshika and its donors wanted understandably to know some of the findings of the ULS. For example, during the annual planning, Proshika planning department wanted a report from ULS team. Similarly, when the government was taking serious initiatives to eradicate slums from the city, Proshika desperately sought ULS reports to mobilise people to build a strategy for advocacy. Unfortunately, it was too early for the ULS to produce such report. This created a certain tension among the ULS team members. This tension, however, produced two immediate results: First of all, it gave a new urgency to the research because it had failed to serve the immediate needs of the *bustee* dwellers. Secondly, the whole situation provided a unique opportunity particularly for me to observe the relations of *bustee* migrants with different urban actors. For example, I witnessed how the police set fire to and destroyed the *bustee* and how the *bustee* migrants organised themselves to survive in such a hostile situation.

The second group of stakeholders consisted of the ULS team itself. There were 40 members who worked for the ULS. Three coordinators were responsible for academic and management aspects, and had to coordinate both the work of their own team members as well as between the teams. I often had to spend time in administrative meetings and this meant that I had consequently to withdraw myself from the field. Such intervals created some information gaps. For example, during one such administrative meeting when I was away from the *bustee* one of my informants was burnt by the *mastaans*. I came to know about this through the newspaper.

The third group of stakeholders were the *bustee* migrants. As mentioned earlier, I chose to hide my professional identity from the very beginning my fieldwork due to the clash which occurred between the local *mastaans* and Proshika organised group members. I did not and was not required to disclose my professional identity throughout my fieldwork. Even when I returned to the *bustee* from Bath in July 1998, the migrants considered me a student and asked about my examinations.

The most serious tension I encountered with the *bustee* migrants occurred at the initial stage of my fieldwork when the *bustee* migrants considered me as 'outsider'. Devine

(2000) observed a similar situation to this during his fieldwork in rural Bangladesh. People tried to label him '*amader lok*' (one of us) or '*tader lok*' (one of them). My interest in the *mastaans* meant that *bustee* migrants identified me as '*tader lok*' (one of *mastaans*). Eventually, however, I managed to show that I was a 'group neutral' researcher. I felt my acceptance among the *bustee* migrants when they promised to remember me in their prayers. Trust was built on the basis of my word to my informants that I would not disclose or use the collected information other than for research purposes. This was particularly an issue in relation to the *mastaans*.

### 3.5.2. The problems encountered during the writing up period

As mentioned in the previous section, I enjoyed some advantages during my field work as native researcher but a number of factors influenced the research process. The problem in the field is more or less commonly found in anthropological literature since the 'fieldwork' is considered to require a range of 'field skills' which are personal in nature (Gudeman 1990). Most researchers face potential difficulties in the field in obtaining the required data. The collection of reliable data is an essential part of ethnographic research process, but equally important are the stages of interpretation and analysis. As a development activist, I encountered a number of difficulties particularly in the writing up stage.

I finally moved to the University of Bath on January 16, 1999 after completion of the ULS and some additional fieldwork in the *bustee*. The main task I was given after my arrival from the field by my supervisor, was to search for relevant literature in order to develop a solid theoretical basis to interpret the data collected. I would put the practical problem of getting a visa and a place to stay first, the second problem was related with literature and the reliability of data.

Firstly, a certain amount of tension was involved in arranging my stay in the UK: finding a house, and extending my visa. These continued the main sources of tension throughout my stay in Bath. Finding a house greatly depends on finding a suitable group to stay with. As a non-seasonal student, it was not a easy to get a group to rent a house. Such details may appear irrelevant but they affected the process of research. For example, to extend my visa (second time) I had to consider when I needed to face my Ph.D. viva.

Second, I felt somewhat isolated and had some individual problems. In a non-sessional academic situation, I could only share my ideas and problems with my supervi-

sor. Also as my research process was unconventional, I needed to find suitable theoretical foundation after completion of my fieldwork, and this was not at all easy. In my search, the most familiar term which values relationships in development discourse, 'social capital', was considered first. Most of the literature that I found related with 'social capital' were very rosy about community (Levi 1998) which did not seem to fit my field information where relationships with the *mastaan* were the most important resource for livelihoods. However, the idea of the 'dark side social capital' (Putzel 1998) and 'adverse incorporation' (Wood 1999) gave a theoretical space to explain *bustee* migrants' behaviour and action. But the question I needed to answer about why *bustee* migrants established their relationship with *mastaan* structure was not found. At one stage I was advised to look at the Mafia literature but I did not find any relevance as most of the literature was about the ethnography of the Mafia, the process of emergence, their career and the way they function. In regular tutorial sessions I shared my progress and problem with my supervisor. At one stage, I was advised to study more about 'networks' and 'trust' since they were the most important ingredient of social capital. Two further important ingredient I found which helped me were Boissevain's (1974) idea of 'strategic contact' for accessing resources and Gambetta's (1968) analysis of the Mafia's role in trust-building.

The third problem was associated with the meaning of my data. As mentioned earlier, I followed a process of data collection combining anthropological approaches and PRA methods. But, my experience says that the available methods are not enough to refine the data and understand the sense of it. I may present here one experience in this regard. In BBB2, Nasreen migrated after her husband went to jail. Her husband was convicted in a murder case. Nasreen sold everything that she had and sent her one year old son to her mother and moved to Dhaka. Nasreen became an earth cutter and got regular income but suddenly she decided to go back home. One day when she was crying for her son, many of her neighbours blamed her for irrational behaviour. It was considered irrational by her neighbours because affection for her son was going to affect her income opportunity. I was also convinced by the argument given by the neighbour because the *bustee* economy is dominated by a 'cash culture'. In other words, income is the main priority. But Nasreen did not accept this and left for her son. According to the local people's values and knowledge, I considered Nasreen's behaviour to be irrational. But after, one and half years, I had to revisit the story when I received photographs of my son. It was

impossible for me to imagine my son at the age of 20 months. I saw him last when he was only around four months old. My pain pushed me to reassess Nasreen's behaviour from a totally different perspective. In an article, Nobonitha Sen, expressed her feelings when she went abroad with her husband, Professor Sen, leaving her son in Calcutta. Nobinitha Sen never forgave her self-interested behaviour (Nobonitha Sen 1998). Rational behaviour, thus, does not depend always on rational choices. People consider the cost of gain according to a particular context. Accordingly Bourdieu (1989) says a combination of three elements influence people's moment-to-moment behaviour. These are:

- i) 'forthcoming reality', what is actually happening in the actors' setting;
- ii) 'objective potentialities', consideration of what to do or not to do
- iii) on going structure of habitus

This simply suggests that the meaning of data may change according to the interpretive context, creating a tension. Being a development practitioner, I valued people's knowledge, their perception of their own position. Acquaintance with new experience and theories led me to revisit the data and appreciate there a new sense.

#### **4. Strength and Weakness of the Methodology**

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, my research is one of the outputs of the ULS, which was a multi-disciplinary research project. Although I was responsible for coordinating the qualitative part of the ULS, the study was very much embedded in both quantitative and qualitative approaches. For example, selection of *bustees* for qualitative research depended on a multiple sampling procedure. In this section I will present my experience, first in relation to the qualitative/quantitative issue and in the second part I will describe the methods used.

##### **4.1. Combination of Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches**

The setting of this research was highly dependent on a quantitative approach where logical justification demanded the use of quantitative techniques which included the different data sets, particularly CUS and ICDDR,B's data, and which had developed an acceptable sampling procedure. Systematic questionnaire procedures were also used. When the observations from the field demanded research into the role of *mastaans* in facilitating

*bustee* livelihoods, this pushed me towards a more qualitative ethnographic approach. However, the research as a whole involved a mix of the two approaches.

There is no point in making general judgments on the relative merits of qualitative and quantitative approaches in research. Many researchers agree that both approaches have their own value and the value depends on proper use of the approaches. Moreover, the proper use of a specific approach, it seems to me, greatly depends on the nature of the research, research topics, the commitment of the researcher, and the context.

In the belief that research is a continuous process of refining data, interacting with a process of interpretation, my research approach is similar to Hammersley (1992) who thinks the complexity of social phenomena cannot be conceptualised in a single approach. However, my research experience convinced me of the value of qualitative methods. This experience is confirmed by others (Cottle 1972, Bogden and Taylor 1975). The qualitative approach provides a unique opportunity for the researchers to interact directly in a face to face manner with the informants and this helps make more sense of data, allowing the sharing of views, and the research can be refined accordingly.

Such a process may be seen negatively when people over-emphasise 'objectivity'. As Walker (1983:13) states:

"What a researcher learns from his research greatly depends on the quality of his interaction with the people, his ability to interpret what he observes and is told and his ethical and social values [...] consequently, there can be no absolute objectivity but only agreements on truth and validity shared by people who hold the same meaning system, most notably by researchers of the same methodological persuasion".

There are two points here: reliability of data and reliability of research. The reliability of data in this research will be considered in the following section when the major methods used are discussed. The 'objectivity' of research greatly depends on conceptual understanding. In my case, I used an 'actor- oriented approach' as mentioned earlier.

#### **4.2. Anthropological Enquiries and PRA Methods**


In this research the combination of anthropological and PRA approaches is especially appropriate, considering the requirements of multiple levels of data collection at community, household and individual levels. At the community level, participatory techniques were used to generate discussions on livelihood strategies and standards, to pro-



mote understanding about vulnerability and to identify households exposed to different economic trends and social support. At the household level, structured and semi-structured in-depth interviews were taken. At the individual level, oral histories were taken to elicit key insights into different issues.

The participatory approaches were exercised at different stages for different purposes. At the initial stages, some selected tools of PRA were used to understand the *bustee*, to learn *bustee* vocabularies and at the same time to build rapport with the *bustee* migrants who later provided a range of inside information. It was particularly useful in identifying key informants for specific issues.

### Triangulation of information



The use of quantitative questionnaires in offering a comparison with the information gathered through qualitative methods is mentioned above. In addition, the observation and witnessing of key events provided me with the opportunity to triangulate the information. Furthermore, the qualitative study included four approaches, which distinguish it from most of the poverty studies available. First, a macro level approach, combined households and communities as the major units of analysis. Secondly, a long study period over which shifts in the communities and households could be observed longitudinally. Thirdly, a comparative framework offered cases that vary with different levels of economic development and institutional context. Fourthly, the incorporation of *emic* (insider's point of view) perspectives in the analysis allowed the subjects' own understanding of various issues to come to the fore.

The strength of this research is its capacity to comprehend migrants' responses at household and community levels. This complements research that focuses on individuals by highlighting the role that informal and formal social and financial institutions play in different contexts to facilitate or limit the capacity of households to adjust to external circumstances. It is also intends to highlight and strengthen, rather than deny or substitute for, people's own inventiveness.

To develop a *bustee* resource-profile during the first phase of fieldwork, a number of exercises developed on the basis of PRA principles were conducted. The experiences show that such an exercise was not very easy to conduct in the *bustee* where migrants are dependent on a group of people. One such experience is presented in example 3.1.

**Example 3.1**

*During the exercise of resource mapping (a PRA tool) in a bustee called Sareng Bari Bustee under Mirpur thana, one of the bustee leaders became angry and refused to continue the exercise. None of the bustee migrants dared speak out in front of him since he was the most influential leader in the community. Considering the situation, it was decided that one of the team members would tackle the leader through appreciating his positive contributions to this locality in the next exercise. Accordingly, two team members arranged the discussion, two of them took note and one kept the leader engaged in talking separately in front of a tea stall. The result of the exercise was unique as all the participants took part in developing the resource map.*

Thus, during the first phase PRA exercise, the team was able to avoid interference by influential people on particularly sensitive issues like land holding, power base etc. Experiences such as this taught the team to devise different strategies and techniques for undertaking PRA in the *bustee* context.

Experiences gathered from the pre-phase activities indicated that PRA is not a suitable method in a heterogeneous group in which people are related to each other in a vertical manner as in a patron-client arrangement. To avoid 'courtesy bias' and 'audience effects' the whole team worked together in all five *bustees*, devised tools and arranged the exercises accordingly. The process involving strategy development is described here.

As was done in Sareng Bari *Bustee*, two of the team members led the exercise, two took notes and one was busy in managing troublemakers, if any. When the team brought together a group of people and started talking about daily events, gradually the size of the group started growing. Step by step the two leaders brought the selected issues to the floor for discussion. At the same time information gathering and analysis of the types of occupation in the *bustee* and working conditions continued. Although occupation in general is a less sensitive issue, due to the nature of relationship between employee and em-

ployer, the former try to avoid speaking in front of the latter. This follows the broader custom that subordinates should show deference by keeping silent in the presence of those on whom they depend. Most of the participants who could not express their own options and experiences in a group situation, were quite different when talked to individually. There was also a tendency to summarise for others. If one person was hesitant, or did not explain or illustrate fully, others might take over, in drawing conclusions, or even to encourage exaggeration depending on the topic of discussion, participants' composition and the position of the participants in the *bustee*. A case of such 'audience effects' is illustrated here in example 3.2.

**Example 3.2**

*Salimuddin, aged 17, has been living in this bustee for three years, pulling a rickshaw and renting from Faruque Mia. In the PRA exercise it was found that Salimuddin could not speak freely as he was interrupted by Faruque Mia. Observing this tension between them, Faruque was brought to a shop and he was asked to tell about his success in business. After talking to Faruque Mia it appeared that one of his rickshaws had been stolen from Salimuddin and two thirds of the price of the stolen rickshaw would have to be repaid by Salimuddin. The repayment decision was taken by Faruque Mia and accepted by Salimuddin. In the absence of Faruque Mia Salimuddin participated in the PRA exercise.*

It was also observed that the cultural composition of the group affected the session both in terms of data gathering and analysis. As with patron-client relations mixed-sex group sessions were found to be less effective than single sex. Although *bustee* women are more vocal than rural ones, most of the working women were found to be deferent to male group members in group sessions. One such experience is presented in example 3.3.

### ***Example 3.3***

*A PRA session was arranged one evening with a group of earth cutters living in the bustee. In discussing employment access, they started narrating different experiences. But, in the course of the discussion, it was noticed that most of the time men were repeatedly supported by the women participants. In a different session organised only for women, individual articulation by the same participants was quite different*

In addition I found in all exercises that common *bustee* migrants avoided talking about persons who are placed in advantageous positions because the resource-poor *bustee* migrants have an obligation to those actors who can often help them to have access to jobs and resources. Due to scarce resources, people belonging to the same stratum do not share such information with each other for fear of losing the competitive edge they have through the patron-client type of relationship. This situation affected individual behaviour in group sessions.

Due mainly to 'audience effect' and 'courtesy bias'; it was clear that 'PRA' method was not sufficient to understand the complexity of relationships developed on the basis of access and the use of different types of resources available in and around the *bustee*. PRA was unable to identify the key "power players" living both within and out of the *bustee*. Therefore, PRA was not a suitable tool to understand the relationship between common migrants and the people who control the *bustee*.

While PRA has limitations, it proved useful in that it identified actors and issues which were later followed up. Thus the pre-exercise helped identify different categories of households reflecting different livelihood contexts. As my information of these households increased, I was slowly able via chain interviews to review and triangulate my data. At the same time, the level of trust between myself and the households grew and this resulted in the latter introducing me to their important external contacts as well as 'informing' me of incidents and events occurring in the *bustee*. Although the PRA exercise

had many limitations, it offered me access to the most important events and people who subsequently informed by research.

## **5. Conclusion**

In this chapter I have presented how the progress of my research resulted in my entry into the everyday life of a particular group of people. To achieve this, information cannot be quickly attained and research methodologies need to be flexible and open to innovation and revision. Although the epistemology of research “tells us, sometimes descriptively, more often prescriptively, about what we can know, and about how we should go about gathering knowledge” (Law 1986:3), the practical situation is itself a teacher, and what it says may not be fully reflected in our prescriptive models.

This thesis is exploratory in nature. The exploration began with an extensive and intensive survey methods and was followed by a period of study and idea building in order to make analytical sense of the data collected from the field. In the next chapter, I introduce the main conceptual idea of social capital which helped me analyse, organise and interpret my data .

## Chapter Four

# CONCEPTUALISING SOCIAL CAPITAL RESOURCES

### 1. Introduction

My observations in a Dhaka *bustee* suggests that the structure of relationships are an important resource to be used for maintaining urban livelihoods and that the *mastaan* structure is central to the creation and nurturing of these relationships. While the *mastaan* structure is mainly organised for the benefit of the *mastaans*, it nevertheless offers various services to the *bustee* dwellers which help them maintain their livelihood in the urban economy. This point was made in chapter two. In this chapter, I set these observations in a broader theoretical context. In particular, I draw on the concept of 'social capital' to explore how it analyses the social structure of relationships and focuses on how human behaviour and institutions are affected by social relations.

The term 'social capital' entered development discourse with some force in 1993 following the publication of Robert Putnam's book, *Making Democracy Work*. Social capital is therefore a new term, which has not been systematically analysed (Harris and De Renzio 1997). It is however used increasingly in diverse development and research development contexts (Portes 1998) and this attests to the importance of the issues it identifies.

The problem of understanding social capital is related to its various interpretations and use. Different elements of social capital are emphasised in different empirical and analytical contexts. For example, the element of trust is widely cited as an important ingredient for economic prosperity. A theoretical foundation has also been developed around the 'reputation effect' in game theory (Arrow 1999). Similarly, social networks have long been considered one of the most important elements of social capital. Thus Wood (1998) argues that the notion is critical to understanding slum livelihood strategies since "people use networks, associations and broad principles of social organisation as a means of reducing risks, accessing services, protecting themselves against degradation, and acquiring information".

The wide and multi-dimensional use of social capital can be divided into two broad dimensions: the empirical observation of social capital as a resource and its theoretical use as an analytical tool. As a resource, social capital acts as a lubricant in the transac-

tions which occur between individuals and their social environment, through which people satisfy their material and social needs (Rahman 1998). Theoretically, social capital emphasises how actors' actions and transactions are embedded in structures of social relations. The need to understand people's livelihoods therefore also addresses one of the classic questions of social theory, that of how actors' behaviour is affected by social relations and institutions.

In this chapter, my primary concern is to conceptualise social capital as resource. To explore this, I focus on three issues: the conceptual background emphasising actor's action; the analytical foundation emphasising different views; and empirical studies, emphasising the effects of social capital resources.

## **2. Conceptual Background**

The understanding of actors' action as a foundation concept within social capital has emerged through academic controversies between sociologists and economists. Sociologists typically emphasise the socialisation of actors seeing "the actor as socialized and action as governed by social norms, rules and obligations" (Coleman 1988: S96). Economists tend to promote a view of self-interested individuals, seeing "the actor as having goals independently arrived at, as acting independently, and as wholly self-interested"(ibid:S96). Both approaches have attempted to capture the actor's action within the given social and economic system where economic transactions take place by emphasising the limitation of each discipline and adapting tools both from within their own discipline and from others. In this way, both have contributed to developing the new intellectual traditions of 'new institutional economics' and 'new economic sociology'; and both have helped social capital become a more general term referring to the means actors adopt to achieve their economic goals. Social capital theory in development discourse may therefore be seen as the confluence of two streams of works. Before explaining how these two traditions have helped promote the concept of social capital, we need to first look at how they each conceptualise actors' action.

### **2.1. Economic Approach: From Utilitarian Tradition to Institutional Account**

The economic approach to actors' action is primarily dominated by the utilitarian tradition of the 'self interested economic man'. This conception does not consider any im-



pact of social structure and social relations on production, distribution or consumption (Granovetter 1985). The utilitarian tradition is influenced by two basic assumptions: market behaviour and individual satisfaction.

The first assumption is that the modern market is perfectly competitive and focuses on and emphasises economic capital and 'economic man' in analysing the actions of actor (Rahman 1999). Neo-classical economics ignores actors' relations or interactions within the system. "Under perfect competition there is no room for bargaining, negotiation, remonstrance or mutual adjustment and the various operators that contract together need not enter into recurrent or continuing relationships as a result of which they would get to know each other well" (Hirschman 1982:1473). However, in reality, the market does not operate in isolation from social ties, personal or institutional trust. Granovetter (1985:484) for example makes the point that Hobbes' "conflict free social and economic transactions depend on trust and absence of malfeasance. But these are unlikely when individuals are conceived to have neither social relationships nor institutional context - as in the 'state of nature'". The market is therefore considered to have institutions and social networks which facilitate exchange (Baker 1981, Godelier 1967).

The second assumption is that 'economic man' is the product of the market and its exchange norms and that market influence shapes individuals' economic action. Neo-classical economics focuses on the idea that actors act rationally to maximize utility because it is thought that "individuals are goal-oriented, and once goals are known, the actions taken will be those that individual perceives to be most efficient toward that goal" (Coleman 1994b:167). Utility maximization, thus, makes the actor an 'economic man' through individual motivation. Neo-classical economics therefore assumes that the actor is rational and acts for economic gain in a market system. The motivation involves the "logically most simple types of motivation: rational, selfish, outcome oriented" (Elster 1989:37). Economic utility maximization motivated by economic gain thus leads the actor to seek control over resources. An actor increases "utility by gaining control of a resource and loses utility by giving up control over a resource unilaterally" (Coleman 1994b: 169). Action taken to achieve the goal of economic gain and control over resources creates actors' maximization of utility.

The above-mentioned understanding of actors' action meets two empirical problems. First, the assumption of a perfect market limits the influence of institutions on market behaviour, and second, the conception of 'economic man' assumes an individualism which limits links between actors and other structures and institutions. Both of these aspects have been highly contested. For example, with 'new institutional economics' many economists consider the market is influenced by institutions and they analyse how human actions are affected and influenced by these institutions. 'New institutional economics' considers the value of organisations to show how economic institutions develop in certain social contexts and influence the maintenance of systems. It questions individualism and moves analysis towards system levels and structural aspects. This not only gives more of a role to formal institutions but also constitutes fertile ground for the discussion of social capital (Loury 1977, North 1990, Furubon and Richter 1989, Williamson 1985).

## **2.2 Sociological Approach: From Utilitarian Tradition to Relational Accounts**

Actors' action in relation to economic transactions is addressed by 'economic sociologists' who consider that the role of social organisations together with economic activities facilitate economic action. This notion is influenced by, and emerged through, the rational choice theory within economic sociology. Actor's action in economic sociology, unlike neo-classical economic utility maximization, does not focus on individual interests alone but also on social relations. Actors' actions are, therefore, constituted through socialisation.

In this sociological approach, the issue of action is addressed in reaction to the 'over socialised conception of man in modern sociology'. Wrong (1961) approved of the break with the 'atomized utilitarian tradition' developed by neo-classical economics and the subsequent emphasis on the embeddedness of all social action. This approach, however, is rather problematic in that society is seen to influence the actor's action and behaviour in a mechanical manner. On this issue Granovetter (1985:486) comments:

"Once we know in just what way an individual has been affected, ongoing social relations and structures are irrelevant. Social influences are all contained inside an individual's head, so, in actual decision situations, he or she can be as atomised as any *Homo economicus*, through perhaps with different rules for decisions".

Granovetter then refers to the dynamic properties of culture which keeps actors as active and strategic decision makers. A cultural analysis of market makes clear that “culture is not a once-for-all influence but an on-going process, continuously constructed and reconstructed during interaction. It not only shapes its members but also is shaped by them, in part for their own strategic reasons” (ibid 1985:486)

Unlike neo-classical economists, economic sociologists believe utility can also be gained by giving up control. Rational choice theory in economic sociology cites examples of actors’ giving up control of action to others. When one believes that transferring the control of one’s action to another will lead to a better outcome or minimise risk or uncertainty, then it is rational to transfer control of one’s action to another. “Such transfers, or trust, or influence, can be expected when information is scarce, that is, when there is great uncertainty about the outcome of an action” (Coleman 1994b:169). Moreover, the actor’s action is also likely to be determined by the pattern of distribution of rights. “Yet rights have their origins as the outcome of social processes, in which individuals act rationally to further their interests by collectively establishing a rights allocation that will benefit them”(Coleman 1994b:170). Therefore, utility maximisation in the economic sociology approach focuses on others’ action along with the action of the actor him/herself.

In contrast to the neo-classical approach of ‘methodological individualism’ economic sociology focuses on actors’ actions in relation to others in a pay-off situation. For example, according to rational choice perspectives in a two person game outcomes depend on the actions of both actors. Figure 4.1 shows that the first number is the payoff to actor A and the second number is the pay-off to actor B. According to the pay-offs figure 4.1, A can become better off by 1 unit by taking action 2, while B can makes A worse off by 2 units. In this situation if both take action 2, it gives a pay-off 0 for both. While if both take action 1, it gives a pay-off 1 unit for both and both are better off than the action resulting from 2. This means, the actors action depends on the structure of the pay off structure, and the actor acts for minimising risk and prefers a win-win action than a win-lose or a lose-lose game.

Figure 4.1: Actors’ Action in Relation to Other in a Pay-off Situation

Actor B	
1	2

Actor A	1	1, 1	-1, 2
	2	2, -1	0, 0

Source : Coleman (1994b)

However, according to economic sociology institutions play two roles in terms of actor's action. Firstly, institutions combine individual actions and produce systematic outcomes. For example, individual action within a bureaucratic institution produces joint outcomes as it has its own coordinating structure. The second role is related to orienting the actor. For example, communication media may determine actors' cognitive worlds and so influence their actions. Economic sociologists, thus, consider institutions as engines of economic action and utility maximization. In this approach sociology economic transactions are understood as embedded phenomena. The economic actions and social institutions develop at the same time. Thus the importance of personal relations and networks of relations which generate trust, produce expectations and create enforcing norms are equally valued.

The new economic approach in analysing economic action and transactions within stable social relations produces fertile ground for the use of social capital as a more general term. Two major theoretical contributions have occurred, developing similar approaches with two different notions: the notion of symbolic forms of resources by Bourdieu (1977) and of social structural function by Coleman (1988, 1994a). Bourdieu considers social capital more as symbolic capital used to achieve resources through the mediation of cultural resources. Coleman considers it more as a means of resource gaining; 'the value of which depends upon social organisation'. In this perspective Coleman values social capital for its 'structural function'. Although these views offer different approaches to social capital, both recognise it as a less tangible resource. This will be further discussed later in the chapter when I look at the analytical foundations of social capital.

### 2.3 Social Capital : A Common Term from Two Perspectives

Both the economic and sociological approaches described above share in their respective disciplines a concern for the notion of embeddedness. This again is fertile ground for

understanding the conceptual development of the idea of social capital. From an economic perspective, Polanyi's notion of embeddedness emphasises institutional arrangements in terms of modes of transactions: reciprocal, redistribution and exchange. From a sociological perspective, Granovetter (1985) puts emphasis on the importance of personal relations and networks of relation in generating trust, in establishing expectations, creating and enforcing norms, which he calls 'social embeddedness'. Therefore, both the academic traditions contribute to the term social capital but keep distinct identities in terms of their approach to the issue.

**Matrix: 4.1: The Disciplinary Perspectives on Social Capital**

Discipline	Approach to the concept	Application of the concepts
Political Sociology/ Anthropology (Bourdieu 1977, Coleman 1988, 1994a; Putnam 1993)	Analysis of norms, networks and organisations	Analyse how networks and organisations help actors gain access to power, decision making processes and policy formulation, help them access and redistribute resources, and help them organise more effectively. Analyse how all of these influence actors' economic actions.
Economics (Loury 1977, North 1990)	Analysis of contracts and institutions	Analyse actors' economic behaviour, how rational actors engage in investment and transactions and make markets efficient.

These different approaches which have considered the term social capital and which are widely used in empirical analysis, all focus on actor's action. Although theoretical treatment of the term social capital has been established in both sociological and economic forms, it does not fall exclusively in either. As Coleman (1994b:175) notes:

"The term 'capital' as part of a concept implies a resource or factor input that facilitates production, but is not consumed or otherwise used up in production. This term, while central to economic theory, is foreign to social theory, which is not principally directed toward explaining economic production. The other half

of the concept, “social”, refers in this context to aspects of social organisation, ordinarily informal relationships, established for non-economic purposes, yet with economic consequences.”

Both anthropologists and political sociologists tend to approach this concept in analysing actor’s economic action through the analysis of norms, networks and organisations while economists focus on analysing incentives of contracts and influences of institutions on rational actors and their economic behaviour towards investments and transactions (matrix 4.1). The root cause of this differences lies in the different notions of actors’ action.

### **3. Analytical Foundation**

Both the disciplines (economic and sociological) have contributed to developing the term of social capital, providing analytical inputs, empirical evidence and thought provoking interpretations. The pastiche of the terms creates a loose theoretical coherence but allows for its multi-dimensional applications within broader frameworks. For the purpose of my research I want to emphasise the structure of relationships in understanding the analytical foundation of social capital. To possess social capital as a resource and make use of social capital, actors need to belong to a structure of relationships. Furthermore, the benefit of social capital depends on the response of other actors who share the same structure of relationships. Thus two main analytical sources - motivational and structural - broadly used by Coleman (1988) will guide my discussion here. Firstly, however, it is necessary to look at different views of the term social capital.

### **3.1 Social Capital: a contested concept**

Social capital has been defined and used in many different and sometimes contrasting ways. Despite this, it is possible to identify common ideas. The most common definitions of social capital (Box 4.1) express the broad idea that social capital facilitates action. This has been influenced by the publication of Putnam's work on Italy in 1993, although it is thought that Bourdieu (1977) was the first to give the concept systematic treatment (Portes 1998). Around this time Loury (1977) also published work criticising the methodological individualism of neo-classical economists and this is linked to the idea of social capital.

Box: 4.1 : Commonly quoted definitions of Social Capital

Bourdieu (1993:32)

“...one can give an intuitive idea of it [social capital] by saying that it is what ordinary language called ‘connections’...by constructing this concept one acquires ...clubs, or quite simply, the family, the main site of accumulation and transmission of that kind [economic] of capital”

Loury (1977:176)

“The merit notion that, in a free society, each individual will rise to the level justified by his or her competence conflicts with the observation that no one travels that road entirely alone. The context within which individual maturation occurs strongly conditions what otherwise equally competent individuals can achieve. This implies that absolute equality of opportunity ... is an ideal that cannot be achieved”.

Coleman (1988:598, 1994)

“Social capital is defined by its function. It is not single entry, but a variety of different entities having two characters in common: They all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of social capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence. Like physical capital and human capital, social capital is not completely fungible, but valuable in facilitating certain actions which may be useless or even harmful for others. Unlike other forms social capital inheres in the structure of relations between persons and among persons. It is lodged neither in individuals nor in physical implements of production”.

(North 1990:vii)

“the evolution of institutions that create a hospitable environment for cooperative solutions to complex exchange provides for economic growth”

Putnam (1993:167)

“Social capital ... refers to features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”.

Bourdieu (1989) identifies social capital as intangible resources and all resources other than land and livestock appear to fall into his category of ‘symbolic capital’. He uses the term symbolic capital in combination with economic terms like guarantees, investment and profit. Bourdieu argues that in the course of action, actors consider not only direct



material gain or loss, but also the symbolic gains and losses. These symbolic gains or losses include such things as honour, name and cultural standing.

This then is a symbolic treatment of the concept of social capital and it focuses “on the benefits accruing to individuals by virtue of participation in groups and on the deliberate construction of sociability for the purpose of creating this resource” (Portes 1998:3). Bourdieu, therefore, firmly believes that social networks are the outcomes of calculative investments of actors seeking to institutionalize group relations so as to then acquire other benefits. He identifies two main ways of acquiring access to economic resources: a) through direct contact with experts and individuals; and b) through affiliation with institutions. These he terms embodied cultural capital and institutionalized cultural capital respectively. Therefore, the acquisition of social capital requires deliberate investment of both economic and cultural capital. Outlining different forms of capital, Bourdieu (1977, 1993) says that both social and cultural capital tend to be characterized by less transparent and more uncertain exchange and transactions such as obligation and violation of reciprocity which ‘euphemise’ or disguise economic exchange.

Loury’s (1977) contribution to the notion of social capital is also worth mentioning. Although Loury (1977) does not systematically deal with the concept as such, his ‘anti-individualist’ theoretical position has strong links with elements of the concept of social capital. His notion of ‘anti-individualism’ emerged while analysing racial income inequality in America. He observes that the black minority suffers from poverty for two main reasons: a) inherited low material resources which makes black parents unable to invest for their children’s education; and b) the weak networks and connections of black young people which fail to provide the right information in getting jobs and economic opportunities. The notion of ‘anti-individualism’ captures the reasons behind the unequal access to labour market, making social contact and connections responsible for income inequalities. His ideas of the creation of information flow are well connected with the perspective of social capital.

Coleman (1988, 1994a) develops a theoretical foundation for this social capital concept which is close to the ideas of Bourdieu and Loury, although Coleman himself makes no reference to their work. Coleman focuses on an analysis of different forms, quantities and aspects of social capital and this allows him to develop a wider view of the social capital

concept, linking it with its creation, maintenance and destruction. Citing many different examples, Coleman (1988, 1994a) argues for the importance of the function of social capital in facilitating social action.

Coleman points out that social capital influences the structure of relations between and among actors in a similar way to other forms of capital. He also points out that social-structural relations may constitute a capital asset for one individual, but nevertheless be harmful for others. This arises in the context of discussing public-good aspects of social capital that arise as a by-product but nevertheless have implications for a wider audience. Thus, he says that social capital differs according to circumstances and for different groups of actors and elaborates separate structures of horizontal and vertical relations stating that social capital may be positive or negative and may facilitate social actions and economic transactions. His view of social capital focuses on two aspects: a) its role in constructing actors' action as a means of gaining resources; b) its role in constructing actors' structure of relationships.

Just as Loury and Coleman consider dense networks to be essential in emerging social capital, Baker (1990) and Schiff (1992) consider social relationships as resources within social capital. Baker (1990:619) defines social capital as "a resource that actors derive from specific social structures and then use to pursue their interests; social capital is created by changes in the relationship among actors". Emphasising the social structure Schiff (1992:161) defines social capital as "the set of elements of the social structure that affects relations among people and are inputs of the production and/or utility function". Utility gained through relationships is also the focus of Burt (1992) even if he arrives at quite different conclusions. He labels the relative absence of ties as a 'structural hole' that prevents individual mobility. Therefore, he sees social capital as "friends, colleagues, and more general contacts through whom you receive opportunities to use your financial and human capital" (Burt 1992:9). He contrasts this with the idea of 'dense networks', arguing that these tend to convey redundant information while weak ties can be an effective and reliable resource. This is somehow similar to Granovetter's (1995) argument of the 'strength of weak ties'.

North (1990) and Putnam (1993) pursue approaches that contrast with this stress on the relationships between actors or between an individual actor and a group. Rather, they consider social capital at the level of the community as a whole. North's concern is

with the significance for rates and patterns of economic development of formal institutions which produce contract law, transparent governance, civil rights and prescribed codes. He argues that: "the evolution of institutions that create a hospitable environment for cooperative solutions to complex exchange provides for economic growth" (North 1990:vii). Formal institutional relationships and structures facilitate the interaction of a wider community beyond the face to face relationships of individuals themselves. For North, therefore, a key function of social capital is to link together 'distant strangers'. Furthermore, the social interaction created through such formal institutions has a positive impact on efficiency which affects transactions and production costs.

Putnam (1993) identifies social capital with the level of 'civicness'. He sees 'civic engagement' or 'civic tradition' as being responsible for the difference between southern and northern Italy. Greater harmony in civil society is seen to play an important role in explaining better institutional performances. The southern villages of Italy with more feudal traditions were caught up in vicious downward spirals. In this situation social institutions reflect an adjustment to pervasive mistrust. The north and centre, on the other hand, had experienced communal republicanism which enabled them to develop in a virtuous upward spiral. He thus concludes that what has made democracy work more efficiently in the north as compared to the south of Italy are traditional historical norms of reciprocity and social trust among these respective citizens, and the existence of horizontal networks of civic engagement.

Putnam considers only those types of associational relationships which are desirable for different groups, communities and the nation as a whole. His main argument is that an active and democratic civil society with a high level of civic engagement through dense informal networks will generate greater social trust and collective action, and thereafter produce a 'strong economy' (Putnam 1993). Consequently, the heart of a 'strong economy' lies in the 'stock' of social capital which contains norms, trust and networks.

As has been mentioned earlier different disciplinary roots generate differences regarding the role of social and institutional relationships. These lead to the question of whether the concept of social capital applies only to 'desirable' relationships or also to those relationships that are 'undesirable'. When considering these issues regarding the struc-

ture of relationships and their outcomes, we can follow Wood(1998) in considering three main positions.

\* The first perspective on social capital considers only desirable outcomes. Here, the term refers to 'civicness' which is fostered by sets of horizontal relationships that link individual and civic institutions. These sets of relationships are non-formal and non-hierarchical and promote cooperation among communities and nations, fostering 'desirable' outcomes. This narrow conceptualisation of social capital is reflected in Putnam's (1993) work.

\* In the second perspective social capital is more broadly conceptualised and includes all relationships which allow actors to meet their goal and maximize their utility. Coleman (1988,1994a) for example considers both horizontal and vertical (i.e. hierarchical) relationships. Hierarchical relationships may distort markets and reflect unequal power relationships, but nevertheless facilitate action and interaction, and they may well contribute positively to the coherence of society.

\* The third perspective on social capital focuses on institutional aspects. In this perspective the definition of social capital includes formal institutional relationships and structures that influence social interaction through contract law and codes and which link together 'distant strangers'. As mentioned earlier, North (1990) is a pioneer of this approach.

As the development discourse on social capital is mostly associated with Putnam's work it is important to note the main criticisms of his analysis. A first point is that Putnam treats social capital as an endowment which is transmitted over generations. It can therefore not be created or used up. This makes it useless for development practitioners seeking to increase the capabilities of actors (Harriss and de Renzio 1997). Levi (1996) also points out that Putnam ignores power or social differentiation. Levi argues that specific sections or groups of people may maintain privilege by gender, ethnicity etc due to their accumulated social capital, keeping other groups in a position of relative or absolute disadvantage. Putnam has a very rosy notion of social capital, only considering horizontal relationships that foster development, and completely ignoring the role of conflict in social change (Hulme 1999). By contrast, Coleman (1988, 1994a) argues that both the horizontal and hierarchical relationships may foster social capital and facilitate actors' action and may produce both positive and negative outcomes. My own fieldwork suggests that specific groups remain privileged while others are subordinated and these differences

can be explained with reference to their respective access to and control over social capital. For example, *mastaans* become advantaged through accumulated social capital while common *bustee* dwellers use their relationships with *mastaan*, keep their payoff through hierarchical relationships in order to access greater opportunities.

### 3.2 Distinguishable forms and common themes

These differences in terms of understanding social capital and their applications can be identified, categorised and placed under distinguishable forms in a thematic manner.

#### 3.2.1 Distinguishable forms

As discussed earlier, the multiplicity of ways social capital is understood makes it either confusing or narrows its range both in terms of its understanding and application. In order to clarify some of the ensuing ambiguity Harriss and de Renzio (1997) have distinguished different forms of social capital and placed them under six different headings. These are as follows:

Family and kinship connections:	blood and other kinship ties are a social asset. People naturally share information within such close-knit circles for their collective benefit.
Social networks or associational life:	common interests of different social groups or kinship groups bring them together on the basis of 'common activities for different purposes'.
Cross-sectional linkages:	contacts across sector or power differences can be called 'network of networks' because organizations - both government and private -- are linked together to have a workable, if not ideal, formula for running society.
Political capital:	informal institutional arrangement for maintaining relations or co-operation between civil society and the state. It is characterised by clientelist relations and exclusion on the one hand, and effective representation, accountability and participation, on the other.
Institutional and policy framework:	a set of formal rules and norms -- constitutions, laws to name a few. In this form it works more as macro-level as well as micro level capital. At this stage social capital has a 'double nature' because of its influence in the formation of other forms of social capital

and also its capacity to co-ordinate action by different classes of people.

Social norms and values: Each society has distinct norms and values which have their influence on all forms of social capital.

### 3.2.2 Common themes

Although there are many different forms of social capital, there are also clear common themes which are covered by the concept. Adopting from Wood (1998) the most common themes are presented here.

- \* Social capital focuses on relationships in terms of networks of connections and contacts which foster effective and efficient action, both collective and individual. Social capital enhances the interaction among individuals and helps them participate in a range of actions in an effective manner.
- \* Social capital is an important resource that is required to gain access to other resources.
- \* Social capital may be achieved through processes and these processes can be created and strengthened.
- \* Social capital comprises both 'desirable' and 'undesirable' social relationships and it has a 'public goods' aspect. Such social relationships and institutions merit public support.
- \* Social capital assumes that social relationships are equally important in economic, social and political spheres. It influences market and state operations and is also influenced by them.
- \* Its influence through social relationships makes a positive contribution to development, livelihoods and quality of life because it produces trust and norms that make reciprocal relationships and reduce opportunistic behaviour. It fosters the quality of information that facilitates socio-economic transactions and exchanges.

#### **4. Sources of Social Capital Resources**

##### **4.1. Sources of Social Capital Resources :Motivational Factor**

As mentioned earlier approaches to social capital recognise the structure of relationships as an important resource. The structure of relationships refers to a person's relationships with others which effectively become his or her source of advantage. Practically, it means that an actor's benefit depends on eliciting the effective responses from others belonging to the same structure of relationships. The generation of benefit relies on motivating others to be obliging. The motivation for the donors and recipients in this case are guided by obligations and norms (Coleman 1988). Two assumptions support this statement. Firstly, it is thought that social capital depends on two elements: the trustworthiness of the social environment and the actual extent of obligations held. The trustworthiness of the social environment means that obligations will be repaid. Secondly, internalised norms as well as the social environment produce social capital. Different concentrations of obligations and norms of reciprocity constitute different motivational inputs which motivate both donors and recipients, involving beneficial transactions within the structure of relationships. Portes (1998:9) distinguishes these further, as he states: "the motivations of others to make resources available on concessionary terms is not uniform. At the broadest level, one may distinguish between consummatory versus instrumental motivations to do so".

##### **4.1.1 Consummatory motivation : value introjection and bounded solidarity**

Consummatory motivation is described by Portes (1998) as having two main aspects: value introjection and bounded solidarity. Value introjection emerges from internalised norms which motivate actors to satisfy obligations that enhance behaviour which can be appropriated by others as resources. Such norms make actors less self-interested and increase collectivity. Effective norms and positive sanctions motivate people for collectiveness and the community shares the outcome. Coleman (1988:S104) gives an example of this. "Effective norms that inhibit crime make it possible to walk freely outside at night in a city and enable old persons to leave their houses without fear for their safety".

A second aspect of the consummatory source of social capital is bounded solidarity. This is a powerful motivational force which leads actors towards altruistic dispositions and action. This altruistic disposition and action is not universal but is limited by the community. For example, workers learn to identify with each other by working together

in a common situation and becoming conscious of their exploitative situation. This consciousness does not derive from norm introjection during their childhood, but emerges as a product of their common fate (Portes 1998). The common situation acts as an incentive to achieve a common goal which then functions as a strong source of motivation. This mechanism of motivation becomes 'zeal' and Coleman (1994a) identifies it as an effective antidote to free-riding by others in collective movements. Examples such as the IRA hunger strikers in Northern Ireland and the PLO activists in the Middle East are cited to support the notion that actors can bear extreme costs, including the risk of losing their lives.

#### **4.1.2. Instrumental motivation: reciprocity exchange and enforcement trust**

Instrumental motivation is also described as having two main aspects: reciprocity exchange and enforcement trust. Reciprocity exchange is found in the theory of social integration and the sanctioning capacity of group rituals as described by Durkheim (1984). This has been further linked with Mauss' (1954) work on gift exchange. The socially mediated gift is instrumental but the repayment does not come directly from recipients. The donor may be motivated to invest in gifts which are then repaid in the form of honour, status and collective approval. This reflects Bourdieu's notion of 'symbolic capital' mentioned above.

The second instrumental source of social capital resources (enforcement trust) ensures the repayment of obligatory debts. Obligations are enforceable through law, violence and community sanction. Portes (1998:9) says that : "trust exists ... precisely because obligations are enforceable, not through recourse to law or violence but through the power of the community". This is admittedly a rather vague or partial observation because community power may be exercised, in many cases, through violence. My field works suggests that *mastaan* structures ensure approval, status and honour through the exercise of violence. However, since enforceable trust provides benefit for both the donor and recipients this is accepted as a condition of the transactions environment in which the structure of relationships of donors and recipients operates. For example, *bustee* dwellers, as members of the *bustee* community, receive different forms of guarantee required for getting jobs or access to the informal credit market from the *mastaan* structure, and so experience them as maintaining trustworthy relationships with them.



## **4.2. Sources of Social Capital Resources : Structural Factors**

In the previous section I have highlighted the value of actors' motivation in translating relationships into resources. The structure of relationships in general terms refers to 'simplex relations' (Gluckman 1967) that may constitute social networks. The question may arise then, do all sorts of networks or structures of relationships provide benefit to the actors who belong to it? I will look at how relationships provide benefit to the members who belong to the networks.

### **4.2.1 Closure of social networks: effective norms and trustworthiness**

The literature on social networks regards social networks as an effective means of gaining access to services. Yet there is a strong debate on the use of networks. First, it may be questionable whether it is a necessary condition to be a member of a certain network in order to get things done. Examples from the literature show that people can make use of certain networks as outsiders through contacts and connections or simply knowing someone who belongs to it (Boissevain 1974). This would suggest that people may make use of this resource without being member. Second, it is not clear whether an actor possesses or can store resources as a member of a certain network. According to Coleman (1988), membership of a certain network does not necessarily mean a person owns social capital resources, rather it depends upon the nature of the structural arrangement of relationships, which creates effective norms, and trustworthiness. Coleman calls this structural arrangement of the relationships 'closure of networks'. The 'closure of networks' refers to structures of networks which generate benefit to the members of them.

The arrangement of a structure of networks provides two elements that translate it into social capital resources. Firstly, there is the element of effective norms. This refers to the possibility of imposing positive and negative externalities on others. In an open closure network, one may get the opportunity to impose negative externalities on others and others can do the same. For example, A1 has direct relations both with A2 and A3, but A2 and A3 are not linked. In this situation, A1 can influence both A2 and A3, but A2 and A3 cannot impose combined sanction on A1. If all three have relations with each other instead, any two can join as a combined force on the others. Thus, the ability to impose sanctions affects actors' behaviour. A set of effective sanctions that can guide the behav-

behaviour of the people belongs to the community. For example, as I observed in my field-work, in the *bustee* context *mastaans* have the right to impose effective sanctions on others and this constructs a culture that influences the behaviour of the *bustee* dwellers.




Figure 4.2 : Closure of networks Coleman (1993)

A lack of closure in networks has consequences for reputation and collective sanction. Reputation which is generated through personal transactions is important to reduce the risk of fraud and cheating. The undersocialised concept of reputation sees it as a generalised commodity, constituting an incentive not to cheat others at the cost of losing one's reputation. In reality, this issue largely depends upon good information which one can obtain through trusted informants who have dealt with particular individual and have found them to be reliable through personal experience. This then encourages future transactions because: i) it is cheap; ii) it is known to be accurate; iii) those in established relationships have an economic motivation to be trustworthy, iv) continuing economic relations become overlaid with social content that creates a strong expectation of trust. Such multi-period games which actors act through repetitive transactions generate personal experience and abstention from opportunism. In this way, "social relations, rather than institutional arrangements or generalised morality, are mainly responsible for the production of trust" (Granovetter 1985:491) and trusted relations enhance reputation among people who know each other and who belong to the same structure of relationships. In the case of *mastaan* relations that I observed in the *bustees* in Dhaka, common *bustee* dwellers trust the *mastaans* although they are generally members of criminal gangs. This is because from the personal experience of the *bustee* migrants and personal experience of others, the reputation of the *mastaans* becomes known and is developed on the basis of regular and multi-period transactions.

The structure of relationships with closure can combine to provide a collective sanction or can reward others for sanctioning someone in the community. Imposing sanctions encourages trustworthiness in the social structure and helps monitor and guide community behaviour.

#### **4.2.1 Appropriate organisations: focused interaction and multiplex relationships**

Appropriate organisations are another structural source of social capital resources. It is possible to gain insights into the benefits gained through organisation by looking at two concepts: 'focused interaction' and 'multiplex relations'. 'Focused interaction' helps us understand the formation of organisations which help provide immediate advantages, while 'multiplex relations' focus upon the actor's practical use of resources.

Coleman (1988) cites as an example a housing project in United States during the second world war where there were many problems in the construction. The residents organised and confronted the builders and finally won the case through their organisational strength. In this case, the residents organised under a certain 'focused interest'. When the housing project was finished, they continued organising themselves and later their organisation was used as a tool for solving other community problems. The general point of organisational resources is that "organisation, once brought into existence for one set of purposes, can also aid others, thus constituting social capital available for use" (Coleman 1988 : S108).

Such activity has been viewed as the focused organisation of social ties: "a simply focused situation is an ideal type in which there are multiple foci, but each individual is related to a single focus" (Feld 1981:1021). When an organisation is brought into existence based on a single focus, it can nevertheless be used in many ways with different sets of relationships and structures.

### **4.3 Stock of Weak and Strong Social Capital: Institutional and Relational**

The previous section suggests that social capital resources come from two different but interrelated sources i.e. motivational and structural. These interrelated sources, can not be separated in practice but only conceptually. At the conceptual level, one source

may produce social capital resources but in a non-applicable form. For example, motivational sources cannot produce applicable or practical forms of social capital resources as they do not exist without structure. Therefore, practically applicable or usable social capital exists in combinations of motivational and structural forms.

Interesting and useful efforts have also been made to understand the intensity of social capital resources. When considering the sources and nature of motivation for collective action, Berman (1997) classifies two forms of capital: institutional and relational. These are presented in matrix 4.2. Citing Cook (1990), Krisna (1999:77) says:

“ Institutional capital is structured. Rules and procedures exist to guide individuals’ behaviour, supervised by people acting out well-organised roles. Relational Capital is more amorphous and also more diffuse. This distinction parallels that which is made between specific and generalized patterns of exchange”.

**Matrix: 4:2 Two Forms of Social Capital**

	<b>Institutional</b>	<b>Relational</b>
Basis of collective action	Transactions	Relations
Source of motivation	Roles Rules and procedures Sanction	Beliefs Values Ideology
Nature of motivations	Maximizing behaviour	Appropriate behaviour
Examples	Markets, legal frameworks	Family, ethnicity, religion

Institutional capital is guided by formal institutional regulation, while relational capital is guided by norms, goodwill and trust. However, taken independently, these two forms of capital can not be effective and efficient in terms of translating individual behaviour into coordinated and goal oriented attitudes. This is because, for example, translating people’s feelings, mutual trust and reputation requires structures or roles of some form or another. Equally institutional capital which has formal rules, procedures and sanctions is not enough by itself and requires additional norms of reciprocity to secure collective outcomes.

According to Berman (1997) cooperative behaviour flows from the combination of both institutional (networks) and relational (norms) capital. Given the insufficiency of each form alone to facilitate cooperative action, Krishna (1999) attempts to present an optimum combination through a classificatory scheme (matrix 4.3). She proposes a matrix in both ideal and empirical situations. Boxes 4.1 (1) and (4) are ideal types but are not valid empirical categories, while boxes (2) and (3) are empirically suggestive.

**Matrix: 4.3 A Classificatory Scheme**

<b>Relational capital</b>		
	<i>Strong</i>	<i>Weak</i>
<b>Institutional capital</b>	<i>Strong</i>	(1) High social capital Task: extend scope of activities
	<i>Weak</i>	(2) “Strong” organisations Task: legitimisation, intensification
		(3) “Traditional” associations Task: introduce rules, procedures, and skills
		(4) Anomic, atomistic, or “amoral” Task: assist development of structure and norms

Source: Krishna (1999:79)

## **5. Social Capital Resources: Effects and Uses**

Most approaches to conceptualising and understanding social capital focus on its character as a social resource. This resource enhances the ability of the poor to allocate available resources efficiently and increases their resilience to hazards. Although in general, research emphasises the positive consequences of social capital, many studies have also shown its less desirable and sometimes negative consequences. These differing consequences - desirable and undesirable - make the notion of 'social capital resources' even more complex. This means that social capital resources need to be viewed from a variety of perspectives. In order to explore this I present here, a) the both positive and negative effects of social capital resources, and b) the ways that social capital resources feature in Latin American urban studies. The focus on Latin American urban literature has one of the richest and detailed traditions of urban research.

### **5.1 Effects of Social Capital Resource**

As mentioned above, social capital resources can be possessed by individuals, groups, organisations, communities and nations, with many different consequences, both positive and negative. In this section I will look at these beginning with the positive effects of social capital resources.

#### **5.1.1 Positive effects**

Social capital research mostly emphasises the positive outcomes of social capital resources. The empirical literature uses social capital to analyse and predict a variety of issues ranging from school attrition and academic performance to good governance. The application to such a wide range of issues creates difficulties in understanding the character and meaning of the expected consequence. A survey of the empirical literature on social capital suggests that those who possess social capital resources achieve three positive outcomes: i) social control, ii) family support, and iii) networks mediated benefits (Portes 1998). However, as noted above, persons who do not belong to the same structure of relationships or do not have the same social capital resource, may also gain in either direct or indirect ways. I will present the positive consequences in terms of the effects of different structural constructions - horizontal structure of relationships and hierarchical structure of relationships - of 'social capital resource' that benefit individuals, groups and certain communities.

The horizontal structure of relationships that produces 'social capital resources' contributes a range of positive outcomes. Many studies on schools highlight the role of both bounded solidarity and enforceable trust. They found a tight community is useful for enforcing discipline (Portes 1998). Coleman (1988) also considers the importance of inter-generational networks in enhancing school performance. His approach is to consider social capital mostly as an individual resource which may promote human capital. In developing the human capital, the family plays the most important role (Coleman 1988, 1994a). So, the primary beneficiaries of social capital resources are the children whose education and personality development are enriched accordingly. Bourdieu (1977) considers parental support to children's development a means to develop cultural capital.

In development discourse, the most common positive results of social capital resource are network mediated benefits. The research on network mediation reflects various issues and arenas where actors may acquire direct benefits. The most discussed areas are: access to resources and services; social mobility; ethnic business; ensuring accountability; reduction of urban crime; and the every day survival of the urban poor. Although various network studies directly refers social capital resources, many do not. For example, Coleman (1988) considers Lin *et al*'s (1981) work *Social Resources and Strength of Ties* to be a noteworthy contribution to social capital although there is no mention of social capital in their original writing. A range of literature on networks similarly highlights the importance of social capital resources in securing employment. Granovetter (1974, 1995) for example puts forward the value of weak ties in getting jobs. He shows how friends outside the family and kin circle play an important role in circulating trusted information and serve as an informal referral system.

In contrast Lin *et al* (1981) move in the opposite direction, emphasising the 'strength of strong ties'. The 'strength of strong ties' is shown to be important in the case of ethnic business where the family circle plays the most important role in business transactions and where strong ties produce obligatory trust, a pre-requisite to gain access to information and physical capital. This is common in the USA among Jewish and Chinese immigrants (Wong *et.al* 1998). It is equally applicable in Pakistan in the surgery equipment business (Nadvi 1998). Stack (1974) in his research showed the value of kin and close circle networks in the every day survival of urban poor. The urban poor need to depend on

their kin groups in almost every aspect of their vulnerable livelihood in the urban economy.

A good example showing the advantage of mediating networks is provided in case studies of ROSCA. Here weak ties but a strong sense of trust have enabled members to acquire significant financial benefits (Putnam 1993, Ratherford 1997). Moser (1996) in her cross-country study has also shown how community networks reduce significantly the level of crime and violence.

Whereas horizontal relationships or networks are often used in the social capital literature, the potential role of hierarchical relations are generally overlooked.

However, studies of rural Bangladesh show that patron-client relationships constitute important strategies to ensure survival, reduce and spread risks and secure livelihoods (Wood 1994, McGregor 1991, Devine 2000). A similar argument is made by Watts (1983) in the African context. He shows that moral entitlements allow food to be given to poor people during famine thus considerably reducing food insecurity. In my own fieldwork, as mentioned earlier, the *mastaan* structure was found to occupy this 'patronage' role in the *bustee*.

Finally, there are also indirect effects of social capital resources that benefit people. In Bangladesh, NGOs organise and develop different levels of networks among the poor which bring them a range of benefits such as access to micro credit and even land (Wood 1994, McGregor 1991, Devine 2000).

### 5.1.2 Negative effects

As mentioned earlier social capital research mostly concentrates on the positive rather than negative consequences. Portes (1998:15) comments on this:

"It is our sociological bias to see good things emerging out of sociability; bad things are commonly associated with the behavior of *homo economics*. However, the same mechanisms appropriable by individuals and groups as social capital can have other, less desirable consequences. It is important to emphasize them for two reasons: first, to avoid the trap of presenting community networks, social control and collective sanctions as unmixed blessings; second, to keep the analysis within the bounds of serious sociological analysis rather than moralizing statements".



He identifies four negative consequences of social capital resources: i) restricted access to opportunities, ii) restrictions on individual freedom, iii) excessive claims on group members and iv) downward levelling norms. It is worthwhile noting that these negative consequences have not been fully explored in the empirical studies of social capital.

Firstly, restricted access to opportunities can be identified in many studies like social exclusion studies, market studies, and development literature particularly on co-operatives and NGO organised groups and in urban studies. In Bangladesh while NGOs facilitate mobilisation activities which include many people the same process actually constrains others. Both the poorest of the poor and tomorrow's poor are excluded from the process of NGO mobilisation (Rahman 1997). In studying market participation among the ethnic migrants Waldinger (1995:557) additionally observes that "the same process of social relations...[that]....enhance the ease and efficiency of economic exchanges among community members implicitly restrict outsiders."

Secondly, the negative effect of social capital on excessive claims can be observed in networks-mobility literature. Most networks-mobility studies argue in favour of the 'strength of weak ties' for two main reasons: a) weak ties channel more trusted information and b) actors are not constrained by obligation. Many studies show how strong ties constrain actor mobility. For example Amin (1993) in his Dhaka study finds that one of the reasons why enterprises do not flourish is people feel obliged to employ kinsmen. This restricts potential employers from recruiting skilled and efficient staff. Geertz (1963) also observes that entrepreneurs lose out in fulfilling obligation to job-seeking kinsmen.

Thirdly, restrictions on individuals. The dilemma between community solidarity and individual freedom is a classic general debate. Development tends to laud the collective, but this can be criticised for its conservative and populists outlook (Levi 1996).

Fourthly, downward levelling norms are considered a negative effect of social capital because in many situations individual success stories undermine group cohesion. In many situations group solidarity is cemented by a common experience of adversity and opposition to mainstream society. Citing African examples Portes (1998:17) makes the remark that: "the emergence of downward levelling norms has been preceded by lengthy periods, often lasting generations, in which the mobility of a particular group has been blocked by outside discrimination. That historical experience underlines the emergence

of an oppositional stance toward the mainstream and a solidarity ground in a common experience of subordination”.

From the negative effects perspective of social capital resources, many social groups like Mafia and gambling rings are considered ‘public bads’ (Portes 1998). My next step is to explore the ‘public goods’ and ‘public bads’ aspect of social capital.

## **5.2. Social Capital Resources in Latin American Urban Literature**

While the urban poor have long been the subject of study in the Western context, the founding studies in the developing world have mainly been undertaken in Latin America. Researchers such as Lewis (1966), Robert (1978, 1995), and Perlman (1976) have generated the debates which have brought urban poverty issues to the attention of the academics, planners and development practitioners. While these may be seen as an associated body of literature, the studies of course differ from one another in methodological perspective and theoretical interpretation. In addition, there are a number of studies conducted subsequently in Latin American cities which seek to analyse the changing situation of the 1980s. The 1980s are considered a ‘lost decade’ for Latin America due to severe political and economic crises. Thus Alvarez and Escobar (1992:317) comment:

“Latin American persistent economic crisis and the collapse of ‘real existing socialism’, lead many to the premature conclusion that the continent is doomed. Structure would appear to have overwhelmed human agency once and for all.”

The issues of structure and agency are reflected through many studies conducted on the survival of the urban poor in different cities of Latin America. The purpose of this sub-section is to show how this literature discusses social capital resources, and their use by the urban poor during this ‘lost decade’.

As mentioned earlier, social capital is a potential and effective resource for livelihoods maintenance which enhances the ability of the poor to allocate available resources efficiently and enhances their resilience to hazards. It is important to note that the Latin American urban literature reviewed here, may not use the notion of social capital directly but nevertheless refers by proxy to the major elements which comprise it. The major components of social capital resources may be grouped under two headings: a) social capital for increasing options and b) social capital for articulating strategies.

### **5.2.1. Social capital for increasing survival options**

In order to understand the processes of increased impoverishment, household responses to crisis as well as opportunities, and policy interventions, the analysis of poverty and well-being has to move out from a limited focus on income-consumption measures to explore wider of livelihood strategies (Rakodi 1999). This shift is reflected in the Latin American urban poverty literature. For example, Moser (1996, 1998) carried out a number of comparative studies among different communities of urban poor living in different cities including some in Latin America. These studies directly refers to social capital. Moser (1998) presents a conceptual framework known as 'asset vulnerable framework', which has been discussed in chapter 1. Chant (1991) studied women's responses and survival strategies to different cities in Mexican cities. She considers social capital in a proxy manner while reviewing the significance accorded by women to kinship and culture in getting, securing and maintaining jobs.

Moser (1998) highlights informal support among households as another category of network, distinct from the reciprocal networks generated by credit transactions. She implies that networks of reciprocity contain a higher level of trust than other kinds of network when she states that: "When households are coping, they support others. But when their assets are desolated, they cease to support the community" (1998: 13). This indicates that households need to have a certain level of resources in order to be able to generate benefit from social capital, in another words it does not function in every and all situations. Chant (1991) examines the survival strategies of low-income urban poor households in Mexican cities during the economic recession in 1982-3. She places the micro analysis of the household level in the wider environment of gender relations, culture, kinship, and class. The study shows that the participation of women in the labour market does not only depend on the simple logic of demand and supply, but on the nature of households, culture, and the working environment choices of employees. Within this wider perspective, Chant considers that kinship and culture are particularly significant factors in getting, securing and maintaining jobs. Although she does not use the term social capital, she implicitly acknowledges importance in creating survival options.

Both of the above authors value structure and agency in creating opportunities for survival. In her conceptual framework, Moser (1998) considers the poor to be efficient managers of complex portfolios in which assets owned are inter-related, complementary and/or substitutable. In particular she identifies three main benefits which the urban poor may obtain from their social capital assets. These are: a) informal credit arrange-

ments, b) informal support networks among households and c) community level activities.

The urban poor receive substantial benefits from informal credit arrangements. Informal credit operates within the domain of networks of weak ties, which often occurs between friends and neighbours, benefitting them in reciprocal way. Such weak ties entail a strong sense of trust. As Moser (1998) observed, informal credit arrangements in cities occur when people need to borrow money on a short-term basis from their relatives, friends and neighbours in order to meet their daily consumption needs. She also shows how networks of reciprocity extend beyond the locality, increasing the benefits they bring to the urban poor. In her study, Moser considered credit as an asset in its own right, because of its significance in generating networks.

Chant (1991) places considerable emphasis on the issues related to households and human labour and relates this to the conventional explanations in terms of supply and demand. Female labour may be used in order to combat household crisis, but that also depends on the demands of the labour market which is itself structured by gender. For example, cultural barriers bar women from certain work. In addition, Chant (1991) notes that women preferred not to do certain types of work. For example, they avoided work in bars for fear that customers would consider them to be prostitutes. While kinship and culture were considered in terms of the environment within which people make decisions, Chant considers such social capital resources mainly in relation to the household. She does not consider in any detail how such resources figure at the level of the market as a whole, besides recognising its gendered character.

Thirdly, community level social capital extends survival options for the urban poor. Moser (1996, 1998) particularly refers to the role of community-based organisations (CBOs) in increasing stocks of people's social capital. She found that in Guayaquil, Ecuador, social capital resources consolidated "through long processes of conflictual negotiation with political parties and government, have developed horizontally structured CBOs capable of negotiating for improved services, supplied by the government agencies or non-government organisations (NGOs)" (Moser 1998:13). Community participation, built on stocks of social capital resources, provides quality services like school repairs, latrines, and pre-school equipment. This perspective on social capital leads us to consid-

er the possibility of extending beyond the 'local'. To articulate and engage with macro level realities.

### **5.2.2 Social capital resources for articulating strategies**

Latin American evidence shows that social movements may articulate survival strategies. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the 1980s was a 'lost decade' for Latin American countries due to economic and political instability. As a result of this, massive social movements took place throughout the Latin American region. These social movements provoked a strong and often violent response from the then governments. It has been argued that these social movements helped articulate strategies for survival (Escobar and Alvarez 1992). The question thus arises as to what are the links between social movements and social capital in terms of generating benefits for the poor. Below I will attempt to understand how these social movements are embedded in social capital resources, and then show how they generate benefits for survival.

#### ***Social movements and social capital***

In order to understand the link between social capital and social movements with respect to survival options, it is first necessary to understand the concept of social movement. The social movements which took place in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s constitute a kind of collective action (Bennett 1992, Schneider 1992 Cardoso 1992). Tournaine (1984) identifies three kinds of collective action: conflictual (defensive collective action); social struggle (actions that modify decisions); and social movements (collective actions that are explicitly intended to change relations of power in key areas of society).

In considering the nature of organisation involved in social movements, Calderon (1986) categorises four types of collective actions: a) small groups which create their own forms of organisations; b) collective action for decentralisation of urban politics and neighbourhood democracy; c) action for transformation of socio-cultural relations; and d) urban movements that create communication between different groups. The movements created in Latin American cities to build connections between groups, associations and alliances are considered to be urban social movements (Bennett 1992).

An overview of how these urban movements were organised reveals their relationship with social capital resources. Social movements are forms of collective action which

create wider and stronger networks with other actors and agencies, and generate mutual trust and solidarity among the members who participate in them. The combination of these ingredients of social capital resources enables the collective action to achieve goals of social change.

The strength of the collective action determines the level of achievement or outputs of the social movement. Tilly (2000) measured the strength of social movements according to the degree to which they display certain core symbolic elements, which he summarised with the acronym WUNC. The strength of social movements thus becomes a function of  $W \times U \times N \times C$ , with each element running from 1 to 0.

WUNC refers to the following characteristics:

**“Worthiness:** sobriety, propriety of dress, incorporation of priests and other dignitaries, endorsement of moral authorities, evidence of undeserved previous suffering.

**Unity:** uniforms, marching or dancing in unison, chanting of slogans, singing, cheering, linking of arms, wearing or bearing of common symbols, direct affirmation of common program or identity.

**Numbers:** filling of public space, presentation of petitions, representations of multiple units (e.g. neighborhood associations), direct claims of numerical support by means of pools, membership subscriptions, and financial contributions.

**Commitment:** persistence in costly or risky activity, declarations of readiness to persevere, resistance to attack” (*ibid* 2000:2).

From a social capital perspective, it may be said that ‘WUNC’ reflects the quality and quantity of resources required to facilitate collective action for social change. However, the Latin American urban literature does not directly label social movements as social capital. This may be because the reference points of social capital for this literature are mainly taken from developed countries. However, it would seem useful to relate the strength of different social movements to the social capital resources they can draw on, in terms of the degree of trust between members and norms of solidarity. Taking this view the generation of benefit to the actors depends on the strength of social movements which in turn corresponds to the quality and quantity of social capital resources.

### **Effects of social movements for creating survival option**

As mentioned earlier social movements in Latin America did not necessarily achieve their initial objectives. They did however generated different levels of benefits for the urban poor. These benefits may be categorised into two types, first those which relate to policy and service provision, and second those concerned with citizenship rights and political participation.

Firstly, Mexico offers an example of highly significant achievements with regards to policy and service delivery. Urban social movements were evident in many Latin American countries like Chile (Schneider 1992), and Uruguay (Canel 1992) but without bringing such benefits to the urban poor. There is a long tradition of social movements among the urban poor in Mexico, with organising around housing and public services dating from the 1950s, with major social movements occurring in the early 1970s, between 1979 and 1983, and between 1985 and 1988.

In Mexico multiple social movements facilitated by an organisation called the Urban Popular Movement (UPM) forced the government to create a pro-poor policy with regards to land tenure stopping mass evictions and providing public services such as water, transportation and education (Bennett 1991). They also resulted in the government creating a 'Ministry of Settlement and Public Works' and passing a 'Law of Human Settlements'. This represented the first initiative in Mexico to make systematic regulation and planning for urban areas.

The scope and strength of this and other similar social movements were remarkable. In the early 1970s, for example, the UPM organised various kinds of associations such as neighbourhood groups, tenant groups, collective firms, vendors, street photographers and various working class sub-groups comprising between 50,000 and 350,000 people. By offering support to these groups, the UPM generated a high level of solidarity. The strength of these social movements is reflected in their capacity to articulate the demands of the poor. For example, a massive social movement occurred in 1980 when the government decided to remove 125,000 low-income residents to promote tourism development. The movement articulated four demands: a) no eviction and relocation; b) improved urbanisation of the threatened neighbourhoods; c) a halt to repression within those neighbourhoods; and d) the regulation of land tenancy. One year later another coalition articulated six concerns: land tenure; public services; pollution; excessively high property taxes; mass evictions; and the right of independent popular organisations to exist (Bennett 1992). The result of such action was the generation of various pro-urban poor policies.

The second type of social movement mentioned above was those oriented towards citizenship rights and political participation. The 'marginalisation thesis' was developed to highlight the lack of political rights of the Latin American urban poor (Robert 1975, 1995). This also inspired many mass social movements in Latin America. While the character of these varies, many were directed by political parties. For example, the urban movement in Chile in the early 1970s was led by the Communist Party. When the elected socialist government was uprooted by the military, many people in the shantytowns were tortured and killed. Nevertheless, social movements in these same communities played a vital role in bringing back democracy to Chile in 1990 (Scheinder 1992). Chile is not an isolated example. The urban poor in Mexico and Uruguay similarly won voting and po-



litical participation rights through social movements (Bennett 1992). The democratization process initiated through the urban social movement in Brazil is also considered to have been of major significance in facilitating the return to (Cardoso 1992).

To sum up, it may be said that social movements as collective a form of action are intimately connected to social capital resources. This connection has not been appreciated mainly because of divisions between the literatures which deal with these two subjects. Social movements have mainly been discussed in political science, with the West as the major point of reference. Social capital has come to the fore in development studies, and has been applied mainly in relation to developing countries. Evidence from Latin America however show that a) the achievements of urban social movements depend on the quality and quantity of social capital resources and b) the movements themselves produce social capital resources for their participants in that they construct collective identity, and strong communities of mutual trust and reciprocity (see for example Alvarez and Escobar, 1992).

### **5.3 *Mastaan* Structure: Public Goods or Public Bads?**

As noted earlier 'social capital resources' can be possessed by individuals, groups, organisations, communities and nations, with many different consequences, both the positive and negative. At the community level, positive consequences can be conceptualised as 'public goods', while negative ones as 'public bads'. Here I consider both of these in relation to the *mastaan* structure.

There exist two overlapping phenomena within the 'public goods' aspect of social capital: a) it is less attractive as an area of investment; b) it is a by-product of other action. Firstly, the public goods aspect of social capital differentiates social capital resources from other kinds of capital like physical capital. Physical capital has its private goods aspect which encourages actors to invest optimally since they expect to obtain a direct return. Investing in social capital resources does not ensure an equal return because "the kinds of social structures that make possible social norms and sanctions that enforce them do not benefit primarily the person or persons whose efforts would be necessary to bring them about, but benefit all those who are part of such a structure" Coleman (1988:S116). This means that actors have less incentive to invest.

Secondly, when social capital resources are created through associations and relationships this can produce positive externalities which could be internalised particularly in terms of increased quality of life. The public goods quality of most social capital in most cases emerges as a by-product of other activities. Coleman (1988) cites examples of parents who do not have full-time jobs outside of the home, but who create and acquire benefits from the sets of association created around the school. The most important benefit is the quality of education provided to their children. The network that develops among the parents that extends their children's education does not develop intentionally rather it develops as bi-product of the fact that this bring their children to the school.

The public goods aspects of social capital contains a strong property that brings social capital from individual accounts to public ones. In this sense it can be, in a narrow sense, compared with Putnam's sense of public civiness through which everybody in the civic community can obtain the benefits. From this point of view, as we have mentioned earlier the correlation between effects of social capital resources with public goods aspects is positive. As mentioned above, this is the aspect of social capital that has received most attention in the development context.

The negative effects of social capital have not yet been seriously analysed. Those writers who have noted it have tended to employ ambivalent or judgemental terms, such as 'negative social capital', 'dark side of social capital' and 'adverse incorporation' (Portes 1998, Putzel 1997, Wood 1999). Testify a widely cited organisation in this regard the Mafia which has been labelled as a 'public bad' by (Portes 1998). Most of the literature focuses on Mafia organisations as agents of crime (Blok 1974, Sterling 1990). However, despite their overall negative image, some studies also recognize the role of the Mafia as intermediary agents that facilitate market organisation (Gambetta 1988, 1993, Steinberg 1983, Walston 1988). There are obvious parallels here with the *mastaan* structure in Bangladesh. Despite its negative image in the urban landscape the *mastaan* structure in the Dhaka *bustee* plays a vital role in facilitating the *bustee* economy. This is further discussed in relation to changing and creating relationships in the urban context. The function of *mastaan* structure is twofold and contradictory. On the one hand they are violent gangs; on the other they produce trust and security. This leads us to the question: how can 'public bads, be bad when the survival of others depends on them?

## 6. Conclusion

In this chapter an attempt has been made to conceptualise social capital as a social resource encompassing social relationships which influence both actors' action and the environment in which action takes place. The notion of social capital is enjoying great popularity both as a theoretical concept and in attempts to address social problems. However it is also a highly contested notion and this makes its application problematic. Social capital has been conceptualised in many ways: some have focused on its structural arrangements of relationships (i.e. horizontal or hierarchical relationships among the actors); others have distinguished its positive and negative effects. When it is taken as a social resource which encompasses social relationships, it is again conceptualised differently. It may be considered a resource for individuals, groups, communities and for nations. One common characteristic to social capital approaches is that they all stress positive outcomes. Social capital is equated with civicness, trust, cooperation, mutual benefit and 'public goods'. Such qualities are also the characteristics of social movements, even if little attention has been given to the ways that these are intimately connected.

My observation in the Dhaka *bustee* suggests that the *mastaan* structure is a means of generating social capital resources through different relationships (this will be discussed chapter six) and that these relationships are important for the livelihood of others. In this situation, the emphasis on the positive aspects of social capital resources seems to be limited in two ways. Firstly, it does not consider how power permeates the structure of relationships facilitating actors' action and generating benefit. Secondly, the 'public civicness' or 'public goods' aspects only contain such social organisations that encourage cooperation and mutual benefit for everyone in the community. This notion therefore does not permit us to address the 'public bads' functions which facilitate action and generate benefits. In order to overcome these limitations, I would argue that the ability of hierarchical structures of relationships that may create 'public bads' to create benefits for others should not be ignored. In subsequent chapters of this thesis, I will consider the range of social relationships that constitute social capital resources for the urban poor in Bangladesh and how they are used to secure better livelihoods.



## COMING TO THE TOWN: MOBILISING KIN-NETWORKS

### 1. Introduction

I once asked Kuddus, a 17 year old man, to explain why he migrated to Dhaka. He replied by saying “*Dhaka shohore taka ure berai, dharte shikle borolok howa jai*” – “In Dhaka town money flies round in the air. If you learn to catch it you can get rich there.” To the rural poor, Dhaka is a rich place where every one has good job. It is this idea that draws people to move there. The contrast with the realities of life in the *bustee* is sharp. As Afsar (1995) says: in the *bustee*, people “suffer all kinds of deprivations in terms of physical amenities, utilities and insecurity.” Not only do they live with an almost total absence of city services, they also have to live under the threat of the demolition of their homes<sup>7</sup>. In addition, as mentioned in chapter two, the *bustee* is dominated by a ‘culture of violence’. This raises the question as to how the migrants settle down in the *bustee*, construct their livelihoods and bring up their families in the urban setting.

Migration can be considered an important livelihood option from two perspectives. The first perspective is related to material issues. Most of the literature on migration considers it from an economic perspective and examines the ability of migrants to send remittances back home. The second perspective focuses on migration as an exit option from an exploitative social structure. The purpose of this chapter is to look at both perspectives. In particular, I intend examining the relationships between rural-urban migration and social capital resources, a relationship which in my argument constitutes the foundation of livelihood in the urban economy. In so doing, I will examine two phenomena: a) the exit from the rural sector, and b) the entry into the urban sector. This will be organised under two sub-headings; a) why the poor come to the town; b) how the poor settle in the town.

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<sup>7</sup> In August 1997, panic spread at a rumour that beribadh *bustee* would be evicted to make room for a road to be built on

## 2. Why do the Poor come to the Town?

Existing migration literature is dominated by a particular framework which argues that 'push' and 'pull' factors are responsible for poor people's movement to urban areas. Recent studies of migration in Bangladesh have adopted and endorsed this framework. A variety of factors have been identified in this literature. Thus Hussain (1996) stresses economic factors, Majumder (1996) socio-psychological factors while Alamgir (1993) argues that the decline in land-people ratio encourages rural to urban migration. What is common however to all the approaches is that they tend to emphasize either 'push' or pull factors.

I found that there were indeed many elements, which push the poor to move from rural areas, as there were also elements, which attract the poor to come to town. My argument, however, is that 'push' or 'pull' alone cannot fully explain migration patterns. Instead both 'push' and 'pull' factors create opportunities for migration. My observation in BBB2 confirmed that both push and pull factors were responsible for migration (table 5.1). This finding is based on interviews with 20 key informants who had migrated to Dhaka before my study started and 32 temporary migrants who had arrived during my fieldwork. Temporary migrants refer to those who engage in seasonal or circular migration as a supplement to livelihoods in the rural areas. Permanent migrants instead refer to those who are settled permanently with their families in the *bustee*. The distinction is important for my analysis. There was a significant difference in the reason for migration between permanent migrants and temporary migrants. While 'pull' factors ensured the migration of the temporary migrants, it was not the case for permanent migrants.

**Table 5.1**

**Reason Behind Migration**

Cate- gories	Rural Push (%)				Total (%)	Urban Pull(%)		Total (%)
	Lack of income oppor- tunity	Family Con- flict	Mar- riage Break down	River Ero- sion		Better Income oppor- tunity	Mar- riage	
Perma- nent Mi- grants	08 (40)	05 (25)	01 (5)	02 (10)	16 (80)	03 (15)	01 (5)	04 (20)
Tempo- rary Mi- grants	03 (9.5)		02 (6.25)	-	05 (15.75)	25 (78)	02 (6.25)	27 (84.25)

Table 5.1 is based on responses to the QPS (quantitative panel survey) questionnaire. These showed that 80% of permanent migrants came to the *bustee* for the reasons which could be classified as ‘push’ factors while 84.25% of temporary migrants migrated because of ‘pull’ factors.

When the people narrated their journey to Dhaka, the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors became more clearly distinguishable. For example, when permanent migrants stated that a ‘rural push’ played an important role in their migration, they did not talk of urban pull factors such as employment opportunities. Whereas when temporary migrants emphasised ‘pull’ as the main factor leading to migration, they meant that better information helped them to reach a decision. It seems the permanent migrants, in a sense were ‘forced’, while new migrants were ‘motivated’ to move to the town.

This highlights the problem of understanding the relation between factors responsible for migration and migrants’ response to these factors. For example, if someone becomes a victim of river erosion in a particular village and is forced to leave that place, does this force him or her to migrate to the city? In other words, s/he may migrate elsewhere but

not necessarily to the city. Below, I will first show how rural push factors make migration an option, and secondly, how urban pull factors are associated with social capital resources and this facilitates migration.

### **2.1. Creating Options for Migration to the City: Push Factors**

My argument here is that rural push factors may produce migration options but they do not necessarily force migration. I will explain this statement by examining the responses collected from those who identified rural push factors as the causes behind their migration. Table 5.1 offered four different sets of responses: lack of income opportunity, conflict with family and community, dissolution of marriage and river erosion (natural disaster).

Firstly, the lack of opportunity to earn income – or poverty – pushed many people (37.5% of permanent and 12.5% of temporary migrants) from their place of origin to the *bustee*. The lack of employment opportunities in the rural areas, particularly during both pre and post-harvest periods means that many rural wage labourers, face an extreme income deficit. People then migrate to minimise such income deficits and may try to find alternative livelihoods options in the rural area. This creates patterns of circular migration (Toufique 2000). In this situation, the decision to migrate is the result of calculated behaviour.

Secondly, amongst the permanent migrants, 20.8% reported that they migrated because of some family conflict. Resource-oriented conflicts and contradictions are known to be common in rural Bangladesh, particularly in the context of scarcity (Datta 1991, Arens and Beurden 1977, Jansen, 1987). Conflict also follows from the abuse of power, when for example powerful family members or rural elite take possession of others' land or other resources. Such experiences often facilitate the migration of the poor and weak to the urban area as the following example illustrates.



### **Example 5.1**

*Haron Hawlader migrated to Dhaka six years ago at the age of 23. After a quarrel over the share of paternal property with his elder brother, he stole his brother's money and migrated to Dhaka. He started living in a mess (dormitory) with his friend who helped him learn how to pull a rickshaw. He spent a few months in Dhaka and realised that the income opportunity for him was great. He found the address of a cousin who had migrated a long time before and went to live with him. He became a rickshaw puller and soon after his migration he married his cousin and settled in the bustee.*

### **Example 5.2**

*Shahnaz, aged 33, was separated from her husband and lived with her parents in Bhola. After the death of her father, she became a burden on her brother and continuous pressure was put on her to find her own way. Except for a piece of land measuring 20 decimals that her father left for her, she did not own any tangible resources. After selling her land for a low price (as she had to sell it to her brother) she lost her meagre income source. Searching for an alternative source of income she found one of her fictive kin who lives in Dhaka and was told that there were employment opportunities there. Without any further delay Shahnaz made up her mind to leave her brother's house. She shared her decision with her younger unmarried sister, Momtaz, aged 13, who was also interested in migrating Dhaka to find a job in the garments factory. They both migrated to BBB2 in June 1996. They rented a house for TK.200.00. Shahnaz started working as a daily labourer with a road construction contractor in a mixed group of male and female workers. Her sister got a job in a garments factory as a casual labourer. Both now have to work for more than 12 hours a day, leaving Shahnaz's children at home without anyone to take care of them. Momtaz was however eventually forced to leave the BBB2 as she was assaulted by the rangbaj<sup>s</sup> living in the BBB2.*

Thirdly, a few women (4.2%) reported that the reason for their migration that their marriages had broken up. The collapse of a marriage is strongly related to economic impoverishment since when a woman is divorced, she loses both her economic and social position (Jesmin 1998). In the agrarian context where land is the only means of produc-

tion, and purdah restrictions on women's activities are strong, women are unable to earn sufficient money to support themselves. For divorced women who are not taken care of by their natal families, the only option open to them is to move to the city. The following examples illustrate this.

**Example -5.3**

*Saleha, aged 43, along with her daughter and son migrated to BBB2 from Rangpur. Saleha was divorced 15 years ago and since then had been living alone close to her parental family. In August 1996, Saleha met one of her neighbours who lives in BBB2. Knowing from her neighbour that there are employment opportunities in Dhaka, she made up her mind to migrate with her children. She migrated to Dhaka to join her neighbour, rented a house and was introduced to mastaans living in the BBB2. The mastaans helped her find employment as a maid. Her daughter-Nazma Khatun, aged 13, with the help of the mastaans received a job in a garment factory as a casual labourer.*

These cases can be considered examples of 'distress migration' since the people are forced to migrate for lack of alternative options. However, the women migrants involved also considered their migration to offer an opportunity to escape from the cultural constraints prevalent in rural areas. In the *bustee* context, they enjoy a certain freedom in that they are more mobile and can earn, keep and use their own resources. From this perspective, 'distress migration' actually offers a positive exit option to women.

Fourthly, 12.5% of permanent BBB2 migrants move to Dhaka after some form of natural disaster. This is a low percentage since the BBB2 migrants, as mentioned in chapter two, are mostly from Southern districts which are renowned for hazardous flooding and river erosion. Natural disaster is generally considered one of the most common causes of rural-push migration. A case of river erosion-led migration is illustrated in example 5.4.

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<sup>8</sup> Young muscle man known as *rangbaj* who are guided by the *masstan* (Muscle man).

**Example 5.4**

*Kadir migrated from a village in Bhola after his cultivable land, including his homestead, was inundated in 1987. Together with his family members he migrated from his village to the nearest town - Bhola. After one year he contacted his uncle who had been living in Dhaka for a long time. With his family, he migrated to Dhaka, rented a house and secured employment as a wage labourer with help from his uncle. From 1987 to 1990, Kadir has moved his place of residence five different times. In 1990 he moved to BBB2 and became a rickshaw- puller.*

This example shows that even in the case of an extreme push like a natural disaster people do not take the risk of moving to big cities like Dhaka immediately. They first seek proper information and support to get a job and temporary shelter. More commonly 'push' leads towards seasonal migration, which in many cases turns into circular migration. It was observed that most of the seasonal migrants had two major objectives for migration: a) to get employment in rural slack seasons and, b) to find a way to acquire skills which would help them secure better employment.

All these examples, as mentioned at the beginning, are drawn from those who identified rural push as the main cause of their migration. These examples suggest that the 'push factor' framework is not sufficient in explaining migration. People do not take the option to move from one uncertainty to another level of uncertainty, rather people's migration decision depends upon reliable information in order to ensure a level of security of livelihoods. Migration is not automatic or mechanical rather it is deeply rooted in information exchange, contacts and connection.

To sum up, it may be said that while rural push creates a situation when people are forced to make some move or seek some exit option from the rural society, migration also depends on the 'entry' option to the new destination. This is discussed further in the following section.

## 2.2 Facilitating Migration Options through Social Capital : Pull Factors

The migration literature which highlights ‘pull’ factors to explain rural-urban migration tends to use several generic terms such as ‘labour demand’ and ‘city glamour’. These terms reflect the attraction of the city or its capacity to accommodate newcomers and absorb labour. As mentioned in chapter two, accessing the informal sector does not depend simply on labour supply-demand relations, but on peoples’ networks and connections. In the previous chapter (chapter four) I have described how from a theoretical perspective such factors are conceived as social capital resources. Here I pursue in more practical terms the role of social capital resources in migration, describing the different sources of information and initial supports required by new labour migrants those who identified urban pull factors as the causes behind their migration (see table 5.1).

The main objective of rural labour migrants in moving to urban areas was to diversify their livelihood options. Therefore, before migrating, they collect information on the level of income, mode of payment and housing possibilities through informal but reliable connections. Direct visits, work experience, physical communication and household networks are all used to collect information on the urban context. The structure of information flow operates through several channels, which are presented in matrix 5.1. This matrix arose out of a PRA exercise with the temporary migrants migrated in BBB2.

**Matrix: 5.1: Information channels**

Channels	Ranks
Through kin, friends and neighbour visit to rural area	05
Through direct visit to <i>bustee</i>	03
Through employee	01

*Note: Highest score is 5 while lowest is 1.*

The informational channel considered primary by the migrants was their kin living in the *bustee*. The most reliable information source are kin members, particularly household members, who can provide accurate information regarding the urban labour market. Most of the households living in the *bustee* act as strong motivators to members of the family living in the rural area. Kin play three important roles in this respect: a) reliable

and timely information supply, b) arrangement of initial shelter and c) support to help migrants secure a job. The role of kin in providing information and helping new migrants settle into the *bustee* is illustrated in the following example 5.5.

**Example 5.5**

*Bassu Mia, aged 33, migrated 3 years ago after receiving positive information from his cousin who lives close to BBB2. Bassu had become unemployed during the rural slack season and was tempted by his cousin's that "Dhakai din geli eksho taka" – "In Dhaka a day's labour brings you 100 taka." His cousin could provide a known source of employment. Comparing this wage to his local wage of 15 taka per day, Bassu decided to migrate to join his cousin. He borrowed Tk. 350 from one of his relatives for a period of three months. He started living in a bustee dormitory. After 11 p.m. when Manik Mia Avenue (a major, broad road in Dhaka) became quiet and almost deserted, he was taught how to pull a rickshaw and in four days he had mastered the art. He did not have any difficulty getting a rickshaw since his cousin introduced him to the rickshaw owner from whom he rented his own. His average daily income is more than one hundred taka. Regularly he has been sending money to his wife who is still living in his rural home.*

The above example can be read as showing the moral obligations of the cousin who lives in the *bustee* to supply information and support to his kin living in the rural area. However, in the *bustee* context, many migrants bring their relatives to town in order to increase their power. As mentioned in chapter two, a new form of social structure operates in the *bustee*, constituted through different levels of *netha*, and *mastaans*. The *netha* and *mastaans* are self-designated but also need *bustee* migrants' support. Bringing in your own close kin is one of the surest means to extend your 'client' group, so whenever the *nethas* get an opportunity, they are ready to provide all sorts of help to secure this.

As mentioned in the earlier section, distress migration often occurs when women lose their social and economic options. This does not happen, however, without social capital support. For women, securing shelter is a major consideration in migration. Many single garment workers join the urban labour market after getting assistance from their kin group. The example of Rebeca (5.6) illustrates this.

**Example 5.6**

*Rebeca, aged 20, migrated alone to BBB2 in June 1996 from Barisal, leaving her three year old daughter with her parents. She made up her mind to migrate when she met her aunt on a visit to the village from Dhaka. Rebeca's husband was in prison, serving his term for murder. Rebeca realised that there was no way of securing her husband's release from jail and she had to earn money for her survival. She came to Dhaka and started living with her aunt. She works as wage labourer for a road contractor.*

A second effective way to secure information is to visit the *bustee*. Most of the *bustee* migrants keep contacts with their rural family, kin and friends. Just as they visit their rural homes they also receive guests from their places of origin. These visits allow rural dwellers to explore the idea of migration. People then make occasional visits to their relatives living in Dhaka and get acquainted with the job market and local networks. Their physical presence in the urban area helps them see the comparative advantages of living in the city and gauge the level of support their kin may be able to offer. Example 5.7 illustrates the importance of visits.

**Example 5.7**

*Rahim visited his brother-in-law Mokter Mias last year. His nephew, Babul, is a rickshaw puller who taught him rickshaw pulling. Rahim stayed with them almost one month and pulled rickshaws. Returning home from Dhaka, he compared the local wages with those of Dhaka and made up his mind to migrate to Dhaka. He migrated to BBB2 and has been living as a paying guest with his uncle since July 1996. He looks forward to a better economic future.*

Like Rahim, many wage labourers decide to migrate after they become acquainted with the informal labour market through casual visits. However, the existence of work opportunities is not the only form of information that people need. They also need to know the structural character of the community, and the terms on which it operates. Af-sar Ali's story offers insights into this (example 5.8).

**Example 5.8**

*Afser Ali, first came to Dhaka as a member of an earth cutting labour team in March 1996. At that time a number of real estates were being developed by private owners around BBB2. They needed professional earth cutters who were not in sufficient supply in Dhaka. So, contractors brought in outside teams managed by traditional labour leaders called sardars. The contractors erected temporary shelters close to BBB2. This gave the labourers a chance to interact with the bustee dwellers and make friends with some of them. Afser Ali was able to learn about the process through which one finds work in the informal labour market. He came to know that one needs recommendations to get a job or to rent a rickshaw. He also realised that it would be difficult to stay in the bustee without a protector. Returning to his rural home, Afser Ali prepared to migrate to Dhaka. In July 1996 he returned to BBB2 and has been living as a paying guest with a bustee leader whom he came to know during his time there as an earth cutter. Afser Ali has started pulling rickshaw..*

The third way rural labourers migrate is through direct recruitment. The most common case is that of maidservants. Many middle class people living in the cities bring a maid from their own rural areas. There are also some enterprises that have developed in recognition of the demand for such domestic labour. Although the commercialization of domestic servants is not big business, a few people who have links with the rural areas have learnt how to cash in on the demand. The following example (5.9) shows this clearly.

**Example 5.9**

*Mollica, aged 19, is a divorcee who got acquainted with a woman who lives in BBB2 and frequently visits Barisal to sell secondhand clothes. At the insistence of the woman cloth seller, Mollica made up her mind to migrate to Dhaka. She stole Tk.100 and came to BBB2 with the woman. The cloth-seller arranged a job for Mollica as a housemaid, in return for a fee for herself.*

On a very different scale, this commercialization of domestic servants has allowed an established commercial firm in the Farmgate area of Dhaka to set up a 'maid trade' supplying domestic maids for a service charge. Example 5.10 illustrates one case of a 'maid trader,' Rahima Khatun.

**Example 5.10**

*Rahima Khatun, a 50 year old woman from north-western district of Jessore, is a trader in maids from the rural areas. She has earned a reputation in this business amongst both her clients and maids. Every month she makes three visits to the city and brings at least 50 maids. During each of her visits to Dhaka she sees all the households where she has supplied maids. If someone wishes to change their maid, he/she can do so during her visit. At the same time she also carries messages to and from the maids' family, maintaining a diary to manage it all efficiently.*

The 'maid trade' has also become an attractive business in the international labour market. So many *bustee* migrants want to send their female family members abroad, particularly those who have gathered experience working as house maids. There are some who have left their villages for the *bustee*, precisely in the hope of gaining opportunities to go abroad. Many manpower agencies act as recruiting agencies to send labourers to different countries for a service charge. Although they charge a very high rate, many people are ready to pay whatever is necessary even if it means selling all their assets or taking loans. This is illustrated by example 5.11 below.

**Example 5.11**

*Karim Majhi, a rickshaw puller, has three daughters and one son. His son, Allauddin, is also a rickshaw puller. One of his three daughters is married. With the aim of sending the eldest daughter abroad he brings her to Dhaka. He sells his rickshaw-van to collect the required money. He sells his only means of earning as an investment in his daughter.*



A few women in BBB2 themselves take an active role in seeking to join the international labour market. Example 5.12 illustrates this well.

***Example 5.12***

*Selina had been in Malaysia for a period of three years, working for a fish processing company. She received Tk. 5,000 per month. Returning home, she was not able to do anything with her savings. Finally she decided that she would go abroad again and came to the bustee with the hope of finding further work abroad . Almost every day she visits the airport, 40 km away from her bustee to see if there are any opportunities.*

All the examples cited above are different, but one aspect is common. People move to Dhaka for its economic attraction as reflected through the flow of information they receive. The existence of a demand for labour example is circulated through information channels which in turn operate through social networks. This observation confirms the observations of Granovatter's (1965), made almost 35 years ago in the American social context.

To sum up, it may be said that rural push factor alone do not 'cause' rural to urban migration. Rural push factor only create the opportunity to consider the option to migrate, but the real decision to migrate depends on social networks through which information about the urban situation, and particularly the labour market are channeled. This information flows primarily through kin networks. Other forms of support can influence the decision to migrate, but the role of kin networks is critical.

Recent migration literature in Bangladesh shows that the dominant form of migration is rural to urban, and predominantly permanent in nature. It can be argued that labour migration following a chain or circular migration is a step or phase towards permanent migration. My observations suggest that migration is determined by a complex process discerned by calculating actors. In the following section I want to look at the process leading migration to become permanent.

### 3. How Do the Poor Settle in the Town?

As already described above, once arrived in town, new migrants have to face a range of difficulties besides securing employment. The literature uses a number of terms to refer to the process whereby migrants adjust to new places. These include: adaptation, adjustment, acculturation, assimilation, integration and inclusion. Although they appear similar these terms carry different meanings and are widely contested and debated. Alden Speare Jr. (1984), for example, describes adjustment as “a process by which a migrant responds to a change from one place to another in the physical, economic and social environment” (in Huq-Hussain 1996:52). Germani (1964), on the other hand, considers ‘adjustment’ as one of the three stages of assimilation. Taft (1988) urges further that to understand the adaptation process we need to look at “the history of the individual’s aspirations, expectations, learning and coping strategies, and attitude changes, and structurally ... (analyse)... the internal and external status of the migrant” (in Huq-Hussain 1996:52). These different terminologies are conceptually difficult to unpack and even more difficult to capture empirically. Rather than seeking to enter these debates, my main objective here is to look at the process through which migrants settle down in the *bustee* and manage to organise themselves using their social capital resources.

#### 3.1. Mapping Migration

I began this chapter by citing a common saying: *Dhaka shohore taka ure berai, dharte shikle borolok howa jai* - “In Dhaka town money flies round in the air. If you learn to catch it you can get rich there.” This describes the predominant image which attracts young migrants to the city. However, when migrants have to bring their family to the *bustee*, a variety of processes emerge and different mechanisms are followed. These are the subject of the following sections.

In order to understand the migration process and mechanisms, I followed two procedures. First I identified two different processes of migration through a PRA matrix exercise with *bustee* dwellers (matrix 5.2). These: a) repetitive and b) non-repetitive. ‘Repetitive migration’ refers to seasonal and circular migration which is guided normally by pull factors. ‘Non-repetitive migration’ refers to a permanent shifting and is normally guided by both pull and push factors.

**Matrix 5.2: Different Processes of Migration Leading to BBB2**

Processes and Types of Migrant	Migratory factors	Ranks
<u>Repetitive</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Single and married after arrival in <i>bustee</i></li> <li>• Single during migration, married and taking family to the <i>bustee</i></li> <li>• Married taking family later</li> <li>• Family migrants</li> </ul>	Urban Pull	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 02</li> <li>• 04</li> <li>• 02</li> <li>• 01</li> </ul>
<u>Non-repetitive</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Single and married after arrival to the <i>bustee</i></li> <li>• Family migrants experienced reverse migration after arrival to the <i>bustee</i></li> <li>• Family migrants followed staggered strategy</li> </ul>	Rural push	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 01</li> <li>• 01</li> </ul>

*Note: Highest score was 5 and lowest was 1*




Figure 5.1: A mapping of repetitive and non-repetitive mechanisms

The second procedure was to draw maps on migration mechanisms followed by different types of *bustee* migrants. The first map (figure 5.1) shows how the two mechanisms, repetitive and non-repetitive expand to become three, as the non-repetitive subdivides into two, ‘staggered’ and ‘reverse’. This procedure thus identified three mechanisms whereby migrants manage and organise themselves to settle in the *bustee*. In the following sections I discuss how social capital resources affect and influence these mechanisms.

### 3.2 Social networks and migration mechanisms

Social networks affect decisions about major changes in life events such as the decision to migrate (Wong and Janet 1998). As mentioned above, different factors facilitate migration but it is managed through social capital resources, particularly through kin networks. In order to understand this better, I will present here in turn both the repetitive and non-repetitive process of migration to settle in the *bustee*.

### 3.2.1. Repetitive *mechanism*

As mentioned above, the repetitive process refers to seasonal or circular migration. In this process, rural people migrate seasonally or occasionally but in a continuous manner following their set networks of information channels. This repetitive visiting provides further opportunities to widen their networks and acquaintance with the urban setting. New networks, familiarity and new friendships influence migrants to settle in the *bustee*. In our PRA exercise, four groups of migrants were identified who adopted repetitive migration (see matrix 5.2). Amongst these there were three broad mechanisms through which migrants settle in the *bustee*. These comprise those male migrants who: a) were single labourers during their arrival and married girls from *bustee*; b) brought family members to the *bustee* after some time and c) brought their family members with them during their temporary migration to the *bustee*.




Figure 5.2: Repetitive Migration Mechanism.

The first group settled in the *bustee* marrying a girl from the *bustee*. The migrants became acquainted with other *bustee* migrants and with various social organisations during their seasonal or occasional migration. As most of the single migrants moved with the assistance of their kin, in many cases, they ended up marrying some one from the same kin circle.

The second group went through a complex process of gradually shifting family members as they settled in the *bustee*. The common factor within this group is that they were not initially willing to bring their wives to the *bustee*. They preferred instead to keep their family members in their rural homes together with other relatives. There are two reasons for this. First, young unmarried wage labourers sent their remittance to their parents who did not want their sons to migrate permanently. Secondly, young married migrants were reluctant to bring their wives mainly due to the socio-cultural environment. Most of the temporary migrants living in BBB2 said that they did not want permanently to migrate to Dhaka, rather they want to improve their families' situation by sending them money. *Bustee* permanent migrants had the same desire when they first migrated. Over a period of time however they changed their mind and moved completely into the *bustee*. There are again two reasons for this. First, over time they gradually created wider networks in the urban setting. Second, sending remittances back home became complex.

When *bustee* migrants start sending remittances to their family members, some problems arise. The proper management of the money sent by the migrants becomes quite problematic. This is particularly so in the context of a family that has little cash flow besides the money sent. In the context of joint or extended family structures where a large number of people live together, it was found that in most cases the major portion of the money was used to fulfil immediate subsistence needs. So, as there were little or no savings, when the migrants returned home they found their families in the same situation as before. Thus, they had simply to migrate again, thus gaining greater familiarity with the urban settings and other employment options there.

At the same time, the overall management of the household became difficult as two different interest groups formed. One group centered on the migrant's wife and children and the other of the other family members. The first group looked for betterment for themselves, while the second group looked for the betterment of the family as a whole.

Thus, two different types of expectations and aspirations created significant pressure on intra-family relations.

In addition, the migrant family was also affected by the changing relationships beyond the household. Urban influences in the behaviour of returning migrants made them relate differently to those around them. The comparison between Dhaka and village market prices made some local commodities seem cheap to migrants, and their greater purchasing capacity enabled them to display themselves in ways that caused resentment. Also, their newly found wealth and urban exposure meant that many migrants were invited to the *shalish* (village court), to speak on behalf of the poor community. Such adverse relationships often ended in conflict. This situation was a positive disincentive to the generation of any tangible resources or to investment in the rural area.

Over a period of time, therefore, the social capital of the *bustee* migrants in rural areas degraded through intra and inter household conflicts. Crises in intra-household management and a failure to save, forced *bustee* migrants back into the urban labour market. While this process, as mentioned above, cumulatively degraded migrants' social capital in the rural area, it at the same time increased their social capital in the town. This encouraged the migrants to bring their families to the *bustee* after all. As mentioned in the second chapter, divisions within the *bustee* (*bustee angsho*) developed on the basis of regionalism. This is again evidence of the significance of social capital. The *bustee angsho* is thus both the output and input of social capital resources. On the one hand, such regionally defined neighbourhoods are forged through existing social ties, and on the other hand, this sense of community generates a basis of trust within which migrants seek to establish homes and livelihoods. This point will be dealt with in more detail in the following sections.

### Non-repetitive mechanism

There are three different types of *bustee* migrants who followed a non-repetitive process. The first group comprises those who migrated and settled in the *bustee* through marriage. The second group are those who initially migrated due to rural push factors, but could not survive and so returned home or elsewhere. This is known as reverse migration. The third group consists of people who finally reached the *bustee*, following a short migration to smaller towns. All of these groups developed urban social capital through mobilising their kin to the *bustee*.

The first group migrated through contracts with friends and acquaintances. A large number of young boys who mostly became street children belong to this category. Many very young boys migrated through various connecting transports like railways and water ways. In Sadar Ghat, a river port in Dhaka, many such young boys live under the control of an organised gang (Daily Star 1998). Working first as *kolis* (labourers), they maintained good networks through which they managed to reach the *bustee*. Many of them became *mastaans* as they had good connections and contacts, while others settled in the *bustee* through marriage. Their own networks and the networks of their wives' natal families enabled them to become members of the *bustee* communities.

Another non-repetitive strategy is to make use of their contacts and social networks with the *bustee angsho*. On the one hand distress migrants, and on the other people with strong networks of acquaintances, both migrated together with their family members. For example, most of the people living in the Shahider Tek Bustee<sup>9</sup> migrated together with their family members and settled. This was because in this *bustee* a large number of people migrated from the same locality and developed into a village-like community, thus expanding their household networks. In addition, local affinities allowed people to adhere more to the values they were accustomed to and to keep strong relations with the rural setting. Thus people of the same rural area who have strong networks find no problem in migrating together with family members (example 5.13 ).

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<sup>9</sup> The Shahider Tek **Bustee** (STB), which was developed on government land, was one of the **busteess** chosen for qualitative study in the ULS.



**Exaple 5.13**

Together with his wife and two children, Rahim Hawlader, aged 37, migrated to BBB2 in July 1996. Before his migration he made a couple of visits to Dhaka to meet other members of his family. His brother has been living in BBB2 since 1993. During his last visit to his brother Rahim realised that he could earn a better income in Dhaka. He returned from Dhaka and within a month he brought all his family members to BBB2 and started working as a rickshaw puller.




Figure:5.3 Non-Repetitive Mechanism with Reverse Migration

The second group of non-repetitive *bustee* migrants experienced reverse migration. Extreme rural push factors force many people to migrate to Dhaka, particularly from places with good transport communication. They were attracted to the city, but they were also

forced to leave their place of origin. In such a situation migrants took a high risk. They managed to find shelter and a job but many of them were harassed, even beaten mainly for failing to pay toll money. Young wives and girls were humiliated and raped. Many could not cope with the *bustee's* culture of violence. Failing, or refusing to adapt to the urban economy and culture they decided to leave the *bustee*. In some cases the poor situation at home forced them to return to the *bustee* nonetheless.

Most reverse migrants moved towards the peri-urban areas rather than returning home. In the peri-urban areas, the environment of the community is better. So, people think it is better to join the urban informal market, living in the peri-urban area. This arrangement helps them reap the economic benefits of the informal labour market and yet avoid urban cultural hazards. Example 5.14 illustrates this.

**Example 5.14**

*Karim, together with his family members migrated to Dhaka from Faridpur and started living in BeriBadh Bustee. His family did not want to stay there since they faced difficulties in coping with the urban culture. Finally one of his colleagues, who rented a rickshaw from the same garage as Karim and lived in the peri-urban area - Savar, 20 kilometers from Dhaka, helped him to find a house there. Karim now travels to Dhaka from Savar early in the morning and returns home in the afternoon.*

Day-migrants, both men and women, travel to Dhaka for employment in the informal market mainly as wage labourers. Amongst these, those who preferred to live in the peri-urban area gradually moved towards Dhaka. They managed to move for two reasons: a) their acquaintance with urban culture and b) their development of networks. The case of Rashid narrated below illustrates this (example 5.15).

**Example 5.15**

*Karim had been living in Savar for a couple of years with his family of four members. He has been working as a rickshaw puller in Dhaka. Following divorce, his sister-in-law together with her child also became members of Karim's household. But all the family members started feeling that it would be rather difficult to maintain the family on just one person's income. They decided to migrate to Dhaka to find work for all the household members in the urban market. Karim and his household have been living in BBB2 since June 1996 and all except two children have become income earners.*

The third non-repetitive *bustee* migrants are those who were pushed to migrate but managed to get only as far as the nearest town to find employment and better wages. Working near the urban centre provided them with new opportunities to develop social networks, which in turn helped them find suitable routes to Dhaka. It was observed that initially people did not have any intention to migrate to Dhaka. Better knowledge of the urban labour market in Dhaka and linkages with nearest urban centre, inspired people to migrate on. As the case of Siddique Mia (5.16) below indicates, this process may also be preceded by a rural to rural move, which doesn't yield the hoped for new economic opportunities, but may build up the social capital through which an urban move becomes thinkable.

**Example 5.16**

*Siddique Mia's family had been living in a coastal village in Bhola district. In 1987 due to river erosion, they lost their village and had to migrate to Bhola district town as wage labourers. They lived there for three years. During their stay in Bhola they developed social networks with a number of people working in the informal labour market in Dhaka. Finally, in late 1990 Siddique migrated together with his family to BBB2. Now, he is self-employed as a rickshaw puller.*




Figure:5.3 Non-Repetitive Mechanism with Staggered

In summary I would say that the various temporary labour migration situations offer migrants opportunities to develop wider networks in the urban areas, while at the same time it can undermine their existing social networks in the rural areas. The shift from rural to urban takes place through a tension in which decision making becomes more complex than labour migration only. This tension is mediated through the social capital developed by the *bustee* migrants through the migratory process they follow. Therefore, a combination of migratory factors and migrants' personal structure of networks determine their decision to move from rural area to urban areas.

#### 4. Conclusion

Migration is considered one of the most important survival strategies commonly used by the *bustee* dwellers to maintain livelihood in the rural areas. People living in the *bustee* have migrated either directly from the rural areas and peri-urban areas or from other *bustees* in the city if the threat of *bustee* demolition is marked. The most important feature of *bustee* life is the continuous flow of an unskilled labour force from the rural area, who take shelter in the *bustee* and over a period of time become *bustee* dwellers.

Rural labour migration to the *bustee* not only means a change of geographical location but also refers to access to the community, urban labour market and urban culture. However, participation in the labour market as a single labourer and participation in the community as a member of a family is different. Most of the single labourers are young and predominantly male who take shelter in the *bustee* as guests of relatives, or paying guests of another household. Single migrants, due to the 'pull-back factor' of strong family ties in the rural area, need to return home. Thus they follow a circulatory pattern of migration which provides rural residents with contacts in the urban labour market and inspires chain migration. Economic factors influence the decision of single labour migrants more than they do family migrants. By contrast, the cultural setting of the living place is an issue of concern for those who migrate together with family members. The contradiction between economic pull and urban structural push also forces some *bustee* migrant families to take the route of reverse migration. A point in common is that both repetitive and non-repetitive strategies in some way involve keeping links with the rural areas and do not or cannot start living in the *bustee* with the members of their families from their initial arrival.

The process followed for migrating to the urban setting also helps build links there. These links act as resources or enable to other resources. Access to different urban resources (networks, organizations) ensures the maximisation of the labour put in. Thus, the migration process operates with the aid of the network and in turn contributes to an effective network for maintaining different types of livelihoods in the urban setting. This connects the rural and urban labour forces in terms of information sharing. Information sharing is a form of investment for both parties'. With circular migration the single labourers become acquainted with the urban institutions and bring back information about

the labour market to the job seekers in the rural community. The migration of the latter to the city further increases the range of their formers' networks.

In the case of *bustee* migrants, economic factors influence most the decision to migrate. Repetitive (occasional and seasonal migration, following a circular process) and non-repetitive arrangements create space for migrants to access the wider networks which mediate participation in the community and market. This, in a sense, reduces dependence on rural kin based networks. For example, the migrants who follow the circulatory type of migration, come in touch with different institutions operating in the community and in the market, or in the both. Labourers, for example, go through a process of interaction with the *sardar* and gangs who are familiar with and have some control over the migration route. As information providers who live in the *bustee* prove to be significant resources for other people, the status of bringing people to the city in turn helps them either to develop new network or to extend an existing one in both the *bustee* community and in the market. The opening of new networks which are founded through the migration process will be presented in the following chapter.

## Chapter Six

# SETTLING DOWN: REMAKING AND EXTENDING SOCIAL CAPITAL RESOURCES

### 1.Introduction

The main point I have focused on in the previous chapter is that the migration process is embedded in social networks. Migration takes place through social networks and the migration process itself creates new social networks for the migrants. Both networks are kin-based. The migration process extends lineage centered kin networks to non-lineage kin networks. Migrants move to the *bustee* by using lineage-based and non-lineage based (fictive) kin, but get involved with different associations through friendship after their arrival.

As mentioned in chapter two, the *bustee* is place where heterogeneous people with various social, economic and cultural experiences live together. *Bustee* migrants live amongst strangers. This makes trust a problematic issue. In the rural area, the roots of trust are embedded primarily in the kin based structural relationships. People thus develop trust there through long-term acquaintance and multi-period game dealing with a known person in repetitive interaction (Lewis, Wood and Gregory 1996, Wood 1999).

The establishment of new relationships in the *bustee* involves a process of shifting social ties from the kin to the non-kin sphere i.e. from fictive kin relations to friendship. Through friendships *bustee* migrants become involved with new coalitions and associations. These associational engagements create new structural arrangements which produce new trustworthy environments through what Coleman (1988) has termed 'closures of networks'. These together form different types and levels of social capital resources in the urban context. I will focus in this chapter on how *bustee* migrants remake and extend social capital resources by creating structural arrangements, mobilising non-kin ties, to create new trustworthy environments.

## 2. Making Non-Kin Ties Into Social Closures

As mentioned above, rural people migrate and establish their livelihoods in the *bustee* through mobilising their kin-networks. The migration process itself creates an opportunity to extend their kin based networks through new connections and contacts in the *bustee*. Repetitive migration in particular helps *bustee* migrants diversify their ties through friendships and new links. In this context, 'ties' refers to simple connections among people and does not necessarily refer to trustworthy relationships, while closures of networks refers to trustworthy relationships among the actors (see Coleman 1988 and chapter four).

Although all the people living in the BBB2 are migrants, they have not migrated from the same area at the same time and do not have the same experiences. Personal qualifications and abilities also differ. These decide how the migrants connect or not with the actors and organisations existing in the urban areas. New social capital resources are made and extended in terms of structure through two broad ways. Firstly, kin-ties are extended to friends and closures of networks assume a new shape through these social groupings. These may be categorized as 'simplex' relationships (see section 4.2.1). Secondly, closures of networks extend to and link different socio-economic and political organisations which again extend closures produce diverse and diversified multiplex relationships.

### 2.1. Widening Closures through Coalitions and Associations

As mentioned in chapter two, two levels of social organisation are missing in the *bustee* compared to the rural social organisation. Lineage based kin-ties are limited compared to rural situation, even if the mobilisation of kin is the main means for migration to the *bustee*. Thus, the moral institutions founded on the identities of kinship, descent and family obligations which are present in village are no longer applicable in the urban context. The migration process, as mentioned earlier, creates opportunities to diversify the migrants' ties and extend networks. In order to maintain livelihoods in a new community which is heterogeneous, full of strangers and where the environment has a 'culture of violence', migrants try to make and extend closures of networks to create a trustworthy environment. The most obvious way to extend the closure of networks is to be-



come involved in other social groupings, coalitions and associations. Thus, BBB2 migrants form alternative associations extending closures of networks from kin-ties to non-kin ties in order to survive in the urban economy under a new structural set up of 'shared but separate interests'. In the following sections I consider two contrasting forms of this: a) simplex coalition based arrangements and b) multiplex *mastaan* centered structures.

### 2.1.1 Coalition as a source of social capital resources

In the *bustee*, there are different types of coalitions. The most simple way to classify these would be to refer to the various local names used. Unfortunately, I found that local terminology did not distinguish consistently between different types of grouping. The same terms are sometimes used to refer to social groupings which are functionally quite distinct. '*Dalbal*' or '*pal*' refer to a gang, particularly when it refers to the leader. The gang leader is known as '*paler goda*.' '*Dal*', which is commonly translated as 'faction' in political anthropology on Bangladesh, may be used for simple groups, gangs and factions although the structure and functions of these are quite different. This is consistent with the many different local names associated with *mastaans*, which was mentioned in chapter two. Not only can the same name cover different groupings, but different names sometimes refer to the same social groupings. '*Manikgor*' literally refers to peer groups, but in practice it is often used for a clique, while a clique is also known as '*addabagider dal*'. In such a situation where different names are used in a confusing way, I follow the lead of Blok (1974:6) in his study of the Mafia in a Sicilian village:

"The study of native categories of thought is essential for any understanding of social reality. But in the end the anthropologist must translate the idiom of the culture he investigates into his own conceptual framework"

My primary concern was to understand different coalitions in terms of their closure of networks. This led me to an understanding of how *bustee* migrants extend their ties to the fabric of social networks in the *bustee* context. In this respect, I will present here three types of coalition: cliques, gangs and factions.

### **Cliques as a source of extended closure of networks**

The first source of making and extending closure of network in the *bustee* context is cliques. Cliques are informal social groups with a loose structure of relationships based mainly on familiarity and friendship. Two different types of cliques were observed in the BBB2. These two cliques are different from each other in terms of age of participants, regular meeting place and size of their membership. The first type of clique is composed of teenagers and the second type of labourers.

The teenage cliques include child labourers who are members neither of gangs or factions. They meet each other in a specific place, public or private, but do not go far from their own locality. Normally all the members gather in street corners or under trees situated close to the *bustee*. The maximum size of each teenage clique is eight persons. Their common topics of discussion are cinema and different occurrences in the *bustee* and city. The clique is a good instrument for spreading rumours.

Labour based cliques include the members of other coalitions like gangs or factions. They involve men between the ages of twenty and forty. The size of each clique is rather small, with a maximum of 4. These men spend their day time in their workplace and then they get together in the evening and play cards and gamble. As gambling is the main activity, they do not meet openly in the *bustee*. They meet in backyards, dormitories, houses or in open areas outside the *bustee*. Although, such cliques are informal, they are also leader centred. The leader is responsible for paying regular tolls to the police to be allowed to gamble.

The common feature of these two types of cliques give some impression of their capacity to extend closures of networks. For example, the teenage clique does not have any specific goal other than conversation and the sharing of emotional experiences among its members. Similarly, the clique formed amongst the labourers does not have any specific goal, but the networks developed through close association are commonly used to enhance their livelihoods. Thus though they do not have any specific goal, familiarity with each other creates relations of obligation and trust.

Cliques extend closure of networks in two different ways. The first way is related to trustworthiness and obligation to each other and the second way is to extend familiarity and networks with other clique members. In the first way, the members of cliques, par-

ticularly the cliques which are composed of teenage boys are more emotionally attached and feel more obligation towards each other particularly in times of crisis. The members of the clique develop norms of behaviour because that is how they show their loyalty to the clique. This is illustrated in the following example (6.1).

**Example 6.1**

*Alauddin and his six friends get together regularly on the bank of the marsh in the afternoon after completion of their work outside the bustee. The other six members are Kaleque, Nazrul, Jamal, Moinna, Sahid and Jalil. The main purpose of their association is to gossip. They can be considered a source of rumours. As they share a lot of their own feelings and experience they never disclose the theme of their discussion to others even though they can be closely associated with them. The following episode indicates the strength of solidarity amongst them. Monna works as minthi (labour) with Amin in a vegetable market in Mohammadpur. As a friend of Monna, Amin is also trusted in the cliques where Monna is a member and Amin is also allowed to join them from time to time. The group members are very close. For instance, all the members will share one cigarette if cigarettes are scarce. Another example of the group's closeness is that when Alauddin was arrested by the police while going to other bustee, all the members went to the leader of the bustee to have him freed by mobilising protection money for him. The clique members also took him to the doctor and arranged treatment for him, while his parents became simply on-lookers.*

Similarly, as a member of a labour based clique, *bustee* migrants get reciprocal or favoured benefits. Such cliques provide an opportunity for *bustee* migrants to become familiar with *mastaans* as common members of the same 'club'. This closeness with *mastaans* through being members of the same clique can bring important benefits. For example, it may offer *bustee* migrants some security for their wives and daughters during periods of their own absence.

The second way to extend the closure is extension of networks. The non-violent and flexible characteristics of the clique help to develop more horizontal and reciprocal bonds among its own members and members of other cliques. It is also flexible in terms of exit and entry because it allows its members to maintain relations with other cliques. For example, a member of a clique may lose his membership due to long absence, but after his return he can re-join that clique or another of his choice since he is known to the mem-

bers of the clique. This suggests that there is little competition among the cliques and members who belong to other cliques are trusted by the clique members if they have friends in this clique. The trust produced by the loose closures of networks and the temporary nature of membership nevertheless contains a strong sense of obligation and mutual affection.

### ***Gang as source of extended closure of networks***

A clique takes on a different form when it becomes leader-focused. Many associations or cliques amongst young men are linked with each other and find themselves under a single leader. This clique is known as a gang. The gang is another source of extended closure of networks.

The gang is considered a source for making and extending social capital for two reasons. The first one is its own characteristic of enforcing trust among its members, and the second is that it offers an opportunity for others to generate social capital. In the first instance, the gang's very structure, leadership and goal creates 'closure of networks options'. A gang is primarily oriented towards conflict in that it has rivals for its territory. They fight for honour, control over territory, women and criminal enterprises since their prime motive is to maximise their income through establishing monopoly rights of control over *bustee* activities. In order to ensure these, the gang maintains strong bonds of solidarity among members, mobilising its structure of networks and enforcing trust. The overall structure of gang spreads its relations and networks over different urban actors and organisations. The gang leader always offers protection against the members of other gangs, police or any other external attack. This norm of protection helps develop interdependency and a relationship of trust among members. The only condition one needs to fulfil to receive this protection is that one should be an assertive and trusted member of this gang. The penalty for members who break this trust or who are mistrusted by the leader can be serious and may even include death. Furthermore, exit options for gang members are limited. They either challenge leaders through fighting them or leave the territory. This is illustrated in example 6.2.

***Example 6.2.***

*In BBB2, Raja, Samsu, Lablu, Monu, Shahaalam belonged to a mastaan gang under the leadership of Hamid. This is the only violent gang in this bustee. Hamid, due to his strong and assertive personality, was unchallenged, not only in this bustee but also in other bustees developed around BBB2. In 1994, a new group of police increased the rate of toll money which the police usually receive from the gang. The gang refused to oblige because they thought the police were demanding a higher rate than other areas. Moreover, it being the rainy season, the bustee migrants' income was low. In this situation the gang refused to charge bustee migrants higher protection money. Thus, they told the police to accept the same amount they had received earlier. Because of this, the police- gang relationship turned sour. To avoid conflict Raja requested Hamid to negotiate with the police. But Hamid was determined not to change his decision. Lablu, one of the gang, was arrested. Raja was blamed for this situation by the leader Hamid. Since Raja had good relations with other gang members, he then challenged Hamid's leadership. He was not only supported by his fellow gang members but also by other coalitions like factions and rangbaj. Finally, after three days of battles, Raja took control of the bustee and Hamid along with his few remaining followers left the bustee. Raja remains the leader of the gang.*

There are also non-violent gangs. In this case the gang offers the opportunity to develop social capital resources to others. A non-violent gang emerges through different associations like labour gangs and functions under the leadership of a *sardar* (traditional labour leader). But in the *bustee* context, there is no association that can exist without getting support from the type of violent gang mentioned above. The labour gangs are directly controlled by violent gangs either through their members or through their trustworthy nominees. The non-violent gang is looser in terms of structure and more flexible in terms of exit options, but it also requires members to observe informal norms and generates obligatory relations and wider connections.

### **Factions as source of extended closure of networks**

Factions in the *bustee* offer a source of extending closure of networks due to their goal oriented and leader centered characteristics. The goal-orientation motivates the faction to develop strategic relations with other urban actors and the leader centeredness ensures trustworthy behaviour. These general features of factions motivate *bustee* migrants to join in order to extend their closures of networks.

The faction is a coalition which arises from conflicts between or among actors who were formerly united. They emerge when the question of control over various resources

which either exist or are being created in the *bustees* arises. Men join factions to access *bustee* resources. As emphasised in chapter two, the establishment of a *bustee* itself indicates control over a set of resources achieved by groups of people working together. After getting possession of resources, the leader needs support from his followers. To control the resources, the faction leaders develop two strategies to extend the closures of networks: a) bringing people from their own area of origin and b) developing alliances with other coalitions, particularly with the gang in order to achieve their goals.

The characteristics of a faction, thus, are it is leader-centred, goal-oriented and creates trustworthy behaviour. The leader has to take the challenge to manage the faction in order to achieve the goal of controlling resources. The responsibility of the leader is to manage and lead the faction in the right direction. Thus the leader exercises strategic options to create closures of networks. Accordingly the leader seeks to mobilize politically symbols of solidarity that will promote trust and cooperation. All the faction leaders thus use having come from the same place of origin as a means to create identity through regionalism. This inspires an atmosphere of solidarity amongst members which is especially important in conflict situations. Secondly, the faction leader develops a very bureaucratic arrangement within the faction. The leader delegates some of his authority to his close followers and thus creates sub-leaders. For example, in the Barisal faction there are five sub-leaders active in the BBB2. These ensure two levels of trust and networks. The first level consists of a vertical relationship between the leader(s) and the followers. This arrangement indicates patron-client types of relationship and clientelism. The second level involves a horizontal relationship among the subleaders. Most of the faction leaders who deal with bigger groups of followers delegate the authority among different sub-leaders, which creates a sort of sub-faction within a faction. The sub-faction then contains both the vertical relationship within its followers and a horizontal relationship with other sub-factions. This gives the followers more security in their search for trusted actors.

### **2.1.2. Associations as sources of social capital**

In order to minimise risk and insecurity in the *bustee* context, the migrants organise themselves into or get involved with different associations. However, *bustee* migrants not only need to follow a learning process on the basis of trial and error in order to construct useful social relationships, they also face difficulties in establishing durable *economic* relations in the informal economy. This is because the informal economy is operated without

legal regulations and survives on local technology and low skilled labour. These points lead immediately on to two important aspects of the informal economy: a) the uncertainty of jobs and b) crimes associated with enterprises. In order to adapt to such new economic situations, the migrants need to develop or be linked to various types of associations which create certain forms of solidarity. Based on the primary occupation, many associations have been formed with the aim of tightening networks from a 'knowing you, knowing me' sort of relationship. These create 'free-floating' social relationships by choice and mutual expectation. The mutual expectations of the actors encourages them to get together under networks of association.

Several different types of associations exist in the *bustee* context. First, there are a number of different committees such as the mosque committee. Relief committees are commonly formed after evictions, and *bustee* protection committees are formed when there is threat of eviction. All such committees function like associations. The existence of different associations and *bustee* migrants' participation through a set of overlapping memberships with different associations make *bustee* life fundamentally different from the rural one. Associations are particularly essential for economic solidarity. The forms of *bustee* economic solidarity emerge from actors' 'familiarity' as friends and colleagues. To demonstrate this I will focus mainly on labour based associations which are deliberately created by *bustee* migrants in order to achieve certain economic goals. In the next sections, therefore, I consider those associations formed by sellers of labour and sellers of goods living in BBB2.

### Employment (job) based associations

As mentioned in chapter two, there are four broad categories of labour sellers in BBB2. Most of the labourers are linked to the different associations in BBB2. The primary association normally reflects the main occupation. For example, wage labourers are associated under the leadership of the labour *sarder*. These groups may even develop into normal trade unions. The importance of such associations in *bustee* life is reflected in the intensity or number of associations. For example, as Table 6.1. shows, there exist twelve associations based on *rickshaws* alone.

**Table 6.1:Rickshaw-Based Associations**

Sl. No.	Basis of Associations	Associations/Organisations
01	<i>Rickshaw</i> Garage	i. Garage Owners + <i>Rickshaw</i> Owners ii. Garage Owner + <i>Rickshaw</i> owners + Pullers
02	<i>Rickshaw</i>	i. Only Owners ii. Owners + Pullers
03	<i>Rickshaw</i> License	i. Only Licence Holders ii. Licence Holders + <i>Rickshaw</i> Owners
04	<i>Rickshaw</i> Puller	i. Licence Holder Pullers ii. Non-Licence Holder Pullers iii. Owner cum Pullers
05	<i>Somity</i> (NGO fostered)	i. Garage based ROSCA/Lottery ii. Shop based ROSCA/Lottery iii. NGO <i>Somity</i>

Table 6.1 also shows that there are two major categories of association which create closures of horizontal and hierarchical networks. Firstly, there are associations which produce simple and wider networks. These associations can be considered as alliances of different clients who are related by employment and who want to organise on the basis of friendship. The friendship indicates a different type of trust relationship associated



with a particular type of relationship developed through associational closures of networks. In the *rickshaw* pullers' networks, relationships are more friendly and horizontal and this produces a stock of social capital resource. By contrast to the horizontal relationships of employment-based associations, there are also associations founded in hierarchical relationships. The one may also develop into the other. For example, the ROSCA which is formed and operated by *rickshaw* owners leads to the creation of a more informal type of *rickshaw* puller's association which is based on an extended network of closer friends. This means that the new association is formed not only by the participants of ROSCA, but also by others who may belong to a garage-based ROSCA or who may not be members of any association.

The simple but wider networks developed through informal association especially among women are strong and extremely functional. For example, the garments workers develop their own solidarity on the basis of their workplace. This association is informal, developed among friends who share their pains and pleasure. Migrant women get shelter both physically and psychologically through this association. For example, if women fail to negotiate for their own interests with the factory owner, they use friends to find jobs elsewhere with higher salaries. They continue to move from one factory to another, a move made possible with the help of friends who belong to the same working community.

There are also associations which produce multiple sets of relationships through networks of networks through overlapping memberships with different associations. This results in wider networks and produces other forms of social capital. For example, a central association connects all the different associations developed by local *rickshaw* pullers in Dhaka city. This wider network of association particularly directs its attentions towards the informal *rickshaw* puller community where solidarity of all the *rickshaw*-pullers is central. Most of the trade unions have wider networks in the city and such types of networks are composed mainly of transport based associations.

### **Economic co-operation**

Like labour sellers, sellers of goods also create closures of networks engaged with associational activities. The most common organisation active in the *bustee* economy which helps to produce both social and financial capital is the ROSCA. The ROSCAs are organ-

ised mainly by sellers of goods. Even the garage owners organise ROSCA. This means that while ROSCAs are organised mainly by the sellers of goods they create closures of networks among both labour sellers and sellers of goods.

The primary basis of the ROSCA is an association developed by the goods sellers involved with labour sellers which ends with their indebtedness and obligation. For example, as participants in a shop-based ROSCA, a *rickshaw* puller may develop a credit relation with the shopkeeper by buying goods on credit. Goods sellers thereby mobilise financial capital and monopoly profit making opportunities. Firstly, this produces closure of networks based on the other associations in which ROSCA members are linked. Although the ROSCA has its own system developed through enforced trust (this will be discussed end of this chapter) its main basis is the closures of networks developed from other associations. For example, the labour sellers associated with *sardar*, can easily become members of a shop based ROSCA. This may be clarified through example 6.3.

**Example 6.3**

*Both Salam and Abul migrated from Barisal district. Salam was a sardar and Abul was the owner of a shop and four rickshaws. Abul organises a ROSCA on a regular basis. Most of the members of his ROSCA are the tenants of Salam. While asking Abul why all of his ROSCA members are the tenants of Salam. He responded: 'for security?' Abul explains that all the members take goods from him as baki. He takes a risk in transacting baki with strangers who are new in the bus-tee but Salam knows them and they are his tenants. The labourers trust Abul in depositing money because Salam is his friend. When I give them baki, the cost is normally higher but do not care since they are living in Salam's house.*

As the example illustrates, experience with actors and associations make the migrants trustworthy. The experience is gathered through a process of direct human interaction in which obligation is a key factor. Such obligation helps to conduct economic transactions. When migrants get involved with ROSCA and ASCA, types of economic associations, both the parties involved put value on their common benefit - the circulation of savings. It is clearly observed that in the case of ROSCA or ASCA, the organiser depends on an intermediary who is reputable and trustworthy. This reputation is based on previous knowledge of the people. Apart from personal experience, in many cases, the migrants

also attach value to the word of people who are established in the *bustee*. Therefore, although the ROSCA is a loose closure of networks, it produces a sense of trust among participants. Secondly, the ROSCA also produces financial capital for the organisers and participants. The internal relations and economic character of ROSCAs are discussed further in chapter seven, section three.

## **2. 2. Focused Interaction and Multiplex Relationships in *Mastaan* Structure**

As shown in the previous section, *bustee* migrants get an opportunity to make and extend their closure of networks through *bustee* coalitions. The common characteristic of *bustee* life which is fundamentally different from rural life is its high level of associational engagements. *Bustee* migrants link themselves to a number of coalitions and associations. In addition, there are organisations which constitute social capital available for use both to members and non-members. According to Coleman (1988) such organisations serve their set purposes, and can aid others to use their social capital. The organisation can provide such wider advantages for different people when its formation takes place through actors' 'focused interaction' and facilitates 'multiplex relationships'.


A 'focus interaction' oriented organisation provides unique options to extend effective social capital and in the *bustee* context the *mastaan* structure is such an organisation. In the *bustee* context a group of calculative actors collectively develop a *mastaan* structure by creating and extending closures of networks thus linking a wide range of urban actors. This helps to establish their monopoly rights and maximise their profits. To ensure the maximisation of profit, the *mastaan* structure also offers advantages in the form of services to others through a set of multiplex relationships.

The members of the *mastaan* structure have become an essential part of relatively stable *bustee* communities. They may be either intermediaries, leaders or *mastaans*. The basic characteristics of the *mastaan* structure have been conceptualised in chapter four. There I argued against the judgemental and normative way *mastaans* are labelled as 'public bads'. Here I will focus on the 'focused interaction' of the *mastaan* structure which helps understand the formation of the structure as a source of social capital resources for others.

### **2.2.1 *Mastaan* structure as a source of social capital resources for its members**

The *mastaan* structure in the *bustee* context is a very 'focus interaction' oriented organisation. A group of people develop it in a collective and calculated manner in order to maximise profit. The main feature of the *mastaan* structure is capacity to diversify ties and produce closures of networks. The *mastaan* structure connects a wide range of urban actors across the urban landscape. The networks of BBB2 *mastaan* structure are presented in figure 6.1 below.

As presented above, there are two different types of relations among the actors of the *mastaan* structure. These are ties and closures of networks. Ties, as mentioned earlier, are simple connections among people which do not infer trustworthy relationships. Closures of networks instead refers to trustworthy relationships among actors. The nature of contacts and concentration of contacts determine the shape of the organisation and the actors' position in it. The nature of contacts and concentration of contacts of *mastaan* structure of BBB2 is presented in figure 6.1.



**Figure 6.1** *Mastaan* structure and multiplex relationships

The above figure 6.1 shows two distinct features: a) the networks of the *bustee mastaan* structure go beyond the *bustee* boundary; and b) it contains two types of connection (ties and closures of networks) through which the networks are developed. These two features indicate the range of breadth and quality of the *mastaan* structure in terms of the

ownership of social capital resources. At the same time, the concentration of connections in particular determines the main power players.

First, I want to look at the nature of contact which indicates the stock of social capital resources. Figure 6.1 shows that there are wider networks among the actors connected through ties and closures of networks. It clearly shows that the closure of networks is especially dense among different categories of *mastaan* gangs. Other actors within the *bustee* are connected through ties. Similarly, important urban actors beyond the *bustee* are connected through closures of networks in the *mastaan* structure. The connection through closure of networks refers to the trustworthy relationships which act as insurance against cheating, moral hazards and opportunistic behaviour. The opportunism is diminished through mutual orientation among the actors. The opportunism is minimised by the sanction of reciprocity. All this leads to the creation of strong solidarity across the diverse range of actors belonging to the *mastaan* structure. Therefore, the *mastaan* structure which because of its wide range of closure of networks produces solidarity among its members, contains quality social capital resources.

Secondly, having emphasised here the main actors' settings within the organisation, I now want to focus on the concentration of closure of networks. Figure 6.1 shows that *mastaan* gangs are connected through closures of networks which refer to trustworthy relationships. Furthermore, the highest concentration of connections both through ties and closures of networks is linked with former and present *mastaan* leaders and both are again connected through closures of networks. To talk of a '*mastaan* structure' refers to two things: a) their cooperative relations and b) the main actors involved. The *mastaan* gang established the structure in order to monopolise control over the *bustee* and maximise their own profit. For example, the *mastaan* gang gets access to public goods, like electricity, through their connections, and illegally connect up the *bustee* migrants in exchange for money. Therefore, the *mastaan* gang primarily using its social capital resource to generate benefit for itself. The next section will discuss how the social capital generated also benefits others who are either loosely connected or not connected at all.

### 2.2.2 .The *Maastan* structure as source of social capital resources for others

As shown in figure 6.1, the network of the *mastaan* structure is wide and goes beyond the *bustee* boundary connecting a number of actors in different ways. They differ because the social ties and closures of networks are multiple and varied. A variety of associations are formed around notions of regionalism, politics, coalitions, and corporate background. As mentioned in the previous section, a gang is one such coalition. As a simple focus an organised gang seeks to maximise profit. The gang as a main actor of the *mastaan* structure uses different ways with different sets of relationships and structure. For example, the supply of illegal goods like electricity to the *bustee* migrants is made possible because of the *mastaan's* closures of networks with political, government and law enforcing authorities. These connections help distinguish the *mastaan* structure from simple gangsters. Their role as intermediaries provides connections between suppliers and users. However, the *mastaans* are distinguished from other intermediaries in two other ways. First, they make use of the gaps in communication between *bustee* migrants and mainstream urban society. Second, they ensure and support their intermediate position through threats and the practice of physical violence. Such multiplex relationships are reflected in the social fabric of *bustee* migrants' life.

The multiplex relationships of the *mastaan* structure are reflected through three broader sets of relationships: a) the relationship within the *mastaan* gang; b) the relationship among *bustee* actors; and c) the relationship between *bustee* actors and non-*bustee* city actors. I have already dealt with the first set of relationships in the previous section. Here I will look at the relationships among *bustee* actors and the relationship between *bustee* actors and non-*bustee* city actors to demonstrate how a single focus (the *mastaan* gang's profit maximisation) based organisation becomes multiplex and so offers a source of social capital resources for others.

Firstly, the *mastaan* structure connects different actors, both individuals and organisations. As mentioned earlier, non-violent gangs like *sardar* centered labour gangs or ROSCA are examples of multiplex relationships of the *mastaan* structure. The *mastaan* gang extends their relationships to other organisations in the *bustee* and makes it possible for them to operate and generate benefit. As mentioned in chapter two under the cash economy section, the ROSCA is a means of *baki* (credit) transaction which operates under

the *mastaan* structure and generates benefit to a number of actors. An organisation like a ROSCA is created through enforced trust and operated through rights which are informally established.

Secondly, non-*bustee* city actors, both individuals and organisations, are networked through multiple and varied ties and closures of networks as shown in figure 6.1. As mentioned in the previous section, connections through the closures of networks and the actors' power position creates both mutual support and the sanction of reciprocity. This complex of relationships offers a counter-balance to the opportunistic behaviour which is commonly considered typical of the urban poor. Trust and solidarity focused relationships extend social capital resources for non-*bustee* actors. This generates resources from which they in turn derive benefit. For example, the police consider *mastaans* to be reliable sources to collect regular toll (protection money) from different spheres of the city, including the *bustees*.

To sum up, it can be said that the use of violence or the threat of violence gives the *mastaan* structure an edge over other competitors in the race for public goods. On the other hand, the *mastaan* structure exhibits public goods characteristics of social capital as it becomes a resource for others. Their involvement in criminal activities ensures both high profit and the delivery of quality services. Their ability to deliver quality services is strongly related to their illegal access to public goods. They ensure their illegal access by manipulating social capital resources and in turn provide quality services in order to give their business a better chance of making a profit. In order to ensure the maximisation of profit, the actors belonging to the *mastaan* structure do not hesitate to use different measures, including violence and even killing. There is no denying the fact that the *mastaans* have a negative image in the urban landscape because they are generally criminals. Nevertheless, the members of the *mastaan* structure have become an essential part of the relatively stable *bustee* community due mainly to their own social capital resources which then produce social capital resources for others.



### **3. *Mastaan* Structure and its Motivational Inputs**

I have highlighted two major points in the previous section. Firstly, common *bustee* migrants invest in making and extending their social capital resources by getting involved in various coalitions, associations and organisations. Secondly, the *mastaan* structure produces social capital resources both for its initiators and for others. Most importantly, the *mastaan* structure basically incorporates all actors, both individuals and organizations, with itself in the pivotal position.

Social capital resources bring benefits to actors when they get an effective response from others belonging to the same structure of relationships. Therefore, besides the structure, motivation is equally important to make social capital functional. As mentioned in the discussion of social capital resources in chapter four, the motivation of donors and recipients is produced through the trustworthiness of social environments and the extension of obligation. These two elements of social capital resources guide actors' responses. The notion of social capital resources at the community level is considered positively in that mutual reciprocal benefit sharing implies notions of 'civicness' (Putnam 1993). But, as mentioned in chapters one and two, and in the previous section, *bustees* are dominated and operated by *mastaan* structures which contain 'dark sides of social capital resources' and are often termed 'public bads'. However, I will present here how the *mastaan* structure produces community level social capital resources in the *bustee* context, facilitates trust and extends obligations.

#### **3.1. Trustworthiness in Social Environment Created by *Mastaan* Structure**

As shown in chapter two, the *bustee* contains two contradictory elements: a) 'culture of violence' and b) social integrity. The first element implies mutual distrust. Migrants constantly face violence in the *bustee*. The main cause of this is, as I stated in chapter two, that the *bustee* has a 'social structural hole' which creates problems of social sanctions both at the family and community levels. This leads towards mutual distrust. The second element of social integrity infers solidarity among *bustee* migrants as they distinguish their social identity from mainstream urban society as *bustee* dwellers and they become suspicious of outsiders. This contradiction is internalised by two consummatory motiva-

tions i.e. value introjection and bounded solidarity. I will present here how the *mastaan* structure influences bounded solidarity by cultivating distrust and value introjections by imposing sanction.

### **3.1.1 Bounded solidarity through cultivation of distrust**

Bounded solidarity emerges when actors face common situations and learn from this experience. This leads actors towards altruistic dispositions and action. As mentioned earlier, *bustee* migrants are suspicious of non-*bustee* dwellers. For the *bustee* migrants, 'outsiders' means a group of urban dwellers including the urban middle class and government officials (Chakraborty and Rana 1993). The notion of 'suspicion' refers to distrust. Therefore, 'suspicious' in a wider sense refers to state and market institutions which contain elements which evoke distrust.

Firstly, the state is primarily responsible for producing distrust because it labels *bustee* migrants criminals and holds them responsible for the city's social hazards. This is translated into a numbers of policies which are not favourable to migrants such as evictions and excluding *bustee* dwellers from city services.

As governments hold *bustee* migrants responsible for city social disorder, state policy is directed towards evicting *bustee* migrants from the city. The *bustee* migrants have never been considered legitimate urban dwellers by any government since the country's independence in 1971. All governments have followed the same policy of dismantling *bustees* and throwing their inhabitants out of the city. In so doing the governments have adopted different inhuman methods. Often everything constructed by the poor migrants in these *bustees* gets destroyed and in some cases there is even loss of life. Example 6.4 illustrates one of strategies adopted by the government.

**Example 6.4**

*In February 1998, the law enforcement agency evicted migrants from a bustee called Noan Tek, developed on the government land. A battalion of 500 police men along with government officials came to the bustee and started setting it on fire. The police incited more panic by beating everyone coming out of the bustee. The bustee migrants were helpless and distraught. They tried to save themselves as best they could. As the attack took place early in the morning, most of the young men had left for work and only the women and children were in the bustee. They could not save any of their property.*

Many non-bustee people joined the law enforcement authorities in their assault. The occasion offered them the opportunity to loot the bustee. This ill treatment of the bustee migrants by the authorities was a clear indication of the negative attitude towards bustee migrants who have no legal right to stay in the city. The whole process of eviction not only damaged bustee migrants' material resources, it also affected human and social capital resources. When people are forced to move from one location to another, it does not only mean they lose a dwelling but they also lose their networks which are of essential importance. State promoted violence makes the bustee migrants distrust the state. In such situations, the only option open to the bustee migrants is to make use of the *mastaan* structure in order to find new shelter and employment.

Moreover, the exclusion of the bustees from city facilities also generates distrust of the state. It only requires the perpetuation of this sense of distrust towards the administrative organs in order to prove the usefulness of the structure developed by a group of dominating people. Therefore, the *mastaan* structure not only provides the services deemed essential for bustee migrants but also enhances the process of distrust. For example, when the bustee migrants fail to gain access to city services, they feel themselves excluded, and consider the state agencies hostile to their interests. The *mastaans* deliberately manipulate this distrust in their own interests. Thus, the *mastaan* groups provision of illegal services on the one hand maintains distrust of the state and wider society and on the other proves their own reliability. I will illustrate this situation with example 6.5.

**Example 6.5**

*In the Agargaon bustee most of the houses have illegal access to electricity. A gang of bustee leaders arrange this by giving a huge amount of money to the employees of the power board. The money was collected from the bustee migrants. As the electricity supplier the gang members charge more than four times the official rate. In BBBI, the rate is as much as ten times higher. This is, therefore, a good source of income for the mastaans. When the power development employees disconnect the line and demand money for its replacement, the mastaans act as intermediaries and organise payment.*

The market is a second source which produces distrust. In uncertain economic contexts, (see chapter two) where the reluctance for impersonal and extensive forms of co-operation is high, actors often end up distrusting each other. This distrust affects labour participation and self-employed labour mobilisation.

i) Distrust constrains labourers from accessing the labour market directly. The sense of distrust limits access to the *bustee*. The *bustee* is a temporary residence both in terms of the *bustee's* sustainability as a whole and for individual migrant households. Employers thus need guarantees before offering employment. This encourages third party intervention or a form of referral system. The function and operation of this system ensures the maintenance of distrust on the one hand and produces reliance on the *mastaan* structure on the other. Market oriented distrust compels the migrant labour force to access information and seek protection from intermediaries. Such protection makes the *mastaan* structure appear trustworthy and dependable.

ii) Due to market distrust, the success of the labourer depends on kin. For example, the kin-based businesses run by the *bustee* migrants are found to be more successful in Agargaon *bustee* where most of the migrants are either from Comilla or Mymensingh district.. People who have strong networks developed on the basis of kin, can set up and run their business without financial capital (Opel 1999). Such kin-based enterprises, however, cannot run without physical protection and the provision of illegal services. For example, the enterprises developed in Agargaon *bustee*, receive illegal electricity supply from the *mastaans*.. Similarly, all sorts of protection even from police harassment are only guaran-

ted by the *mastaan* structure. As mentioned in chapter two, even beggars cannot beg without police harassment. All of this implies that the form of market participation demand the intervention of a third party like the *mastaan* structure.

Therefore, distrust created by the state and market force the *bustee* migrants to develop more solidarity and create a trustworthy environment. These objectives are in part fulfilled through the vertical integration of *bustee* migrants within the *mastaan* structure.

### **3.1.2 Value introjection through the imposition of sanction**

Value introjection emerges from actors' internalised norms which enhance their collective action. Effective sanctions also influence actors' collective behaviour, as discussed in chapter four. Moreover, the trustworthiness of an environment to a great extent depends on the ability to impose social sanctions. Social sanctions diminish opportunism and so lead to the development of goodwill, reciprocity and reputation on which wider trust takes shape (Nadvi 1999). I will now describe how the imposition of sanctions is internalised by *bustee* migrants.

Social sanctions are imposed in the *bustee* context through the *samaj*. The same process is found in rural context (Rahman 1998). As in the rural areas, the *samaj* in the *bustee* enforces a moral code of behaviour on its members through the imposition of sanctions. But the composition of the *samaj* and the methods of imposing sanctions are very different in the two contexts. In the *bustee samaj*, *mastaans* are mainly responsible for enforcing the code of behaviour and presiding over the *shalish* (normally known in the rural context as a village court). Ultimately, *mastaans* can enforce codes of behaviour through violence.

The authority of the *mastaans* and its acceptance as legitimate by the *bustee* migrants is unquestionable since the *bustee* itself is established, maintained and controlled by the *mastaan* structure. Thereafter they establish their right to impose sanction through the *shalish*. Their power is accepted because the *bustee* cannot be controlled like the rural *samaj*. Three reasons explain the authority of the *mastaans*. One reason is that the *mastaans* establish customary rights to take possession primarily on government land. The establishment of the *bustee* itself means that they enjoy the right to control it. The second reason is that formal rights in the *bustee* context are absent. The *bustee samaj* is accorded that right due to absence or dysfunctioning of both state laws and local government in the

*bustee*. The third reason is the *mastaans'* possession of social capital resources. Subordination allows other actors access to and use of their social capital resources.

The authority to impose sanction is acceptable to the migrants as they are culturally accustomed to the rural culture of *takdir* (fortune). In the *bustee* context this *takdir* is directly linked with *mastaans tadbir* (negotiation for favour). When the *bustee* migrants move to the town in order to look for new opportunities (*takdir*) as mentioned in chapter five, the *bustee* migrants desperately seek *tadbir*. In the *bustee* context the *mastaan* structure owns such resources (public goods) which others can also use. In order to construct *takdir* (opportunity), migrants adopt the strategic option of inclusion. Therefore, the imposition of sanction introduces a value of obligatory trustworthiness between the *mastaan* structure and the *bustee* migrants.

#### 4. Conclusion

This chapter shows two interrelated points associated with the process of settling down in the *bustee*. Firstly it shows that in order to settle down in the town, *bustee* migrants need to extend their networks from kin to non-kin actors. In rural society kin-networks extend through fictive relations while in the town they extend through friends and associations. This fundamental difference influences the *bustee* migrants' closures of networks and structure of relationships.

Developing new structural relationships, *bustee* migrants remake and extend their social capital resources. Two structural sources with simplex and multiplex relationships produce two levels of social capital resources. *Mastaans* produce social capital resources in two dimensions since they can manipulate the sources of motivational inputs of social capital. Manipulating the distrust produced by the state and market along with their power to impose sanctions, the *mastaan* structure translates their social capital resources into 'public goods'. Although, due to their involvement with criminal activities, this source of social capital is often termed as 'public goods' it is essential for the *bustee* migrants to stay in town. The following chapter will show how the remade and extended social capital resources are used for staying in town.

## Chapter Seven

# STAYING IN TOWN: MOBILISING SOCIAL CAPITAL RESOURCES

### 1. Introduction

As shown in the previous ethnography chapters, *bustee* migrants make a continuous effort to develop different types of closures of networks in order to develop social capital resources which are functional in the *bustee* settings. To make a living in the urban setting, the migrants, who are often unskilled, illiterate, and have no capital in cash or kind, make continuous efforts to increase their stock of social capital resources. These in turn form the basis on which other migrants come to and make a living in town. The quality and quantity of social capital resources differs according to the ability of *bustee* migrants.

As shown in chapters five and six, there are two processes that enhance the stock of social capital resources. The first is kin-based and is produced through migration. The migration process itself creates an opportunity to construct social capital. The migration process extends social capital resources in two ways. In the first place this occurs by meeting family obligations and bringing non-lineage kin into closures of networks. To meet family obligations, *bustee* migrants bring their family members and kin to the *bustee*. Non-lineage kin are brought into the closures of networks through fictive kin relations. For example, as mentioned in chapter two and chapter five, paying guest arrangements in the *bustee* context are a source of widening closures of networks. Both these make social capital more active and functional in the *bustee* context. The second kind of social capital resource is non-kin based and is produced through associational engagements. Two levels of social capital are generated through associational engagement. Firstly, simplex relationships through closures of networks, linking friends and colleagues are produced. Secondly, associational engagements involve multiplex relationships, linking different coalitions and associations with wider urban networks like the *mastaan* structure.

In this chapter, I consider how the migrants' survival and creation of livelihoods in the *bustee* again depends upon the cultivation of social capital resources. This occurs

through the combinations of two options: 'continuum of exchange' and 'enforced trust'. The former operates more at the community level while the latter functions in wider urban spheres including the market. In the following sections I discuss each of these in turn.

## **2. Survival Option: 'Continuum of Exchange'**

As mentioned above, migration itself develops social capital resources in the *bustee* context by cementing kin-based closures of networks. These kin-based networks produce a 'continuum of exchange' such as generally functions in the rural context. 'Continuum of exchange' refers to the social insurance system developed on the basis of the 'moral economy'. The moral economy refers to a system which is embedded in the social and moral fabric of the community which enshrines rights to make a claim on others and obliges a transfer of basic necessities in situations of hardship (Scott 1976). However, the continuum of exchange emphasises the "degree of tolerance for material imbalance indicated by the time allowed to reciprocate" (Sahlins, in Adams 1993:44). Adams (1993) shows further how non-market transfers are associated with four categories of transfers, namely ritual homage and alms, gifts, exchange and credit. According to Moser (1997:4) "the system is sustained largely by the long-term self-interest of households in search of mutual insurance against livelihoods insecurity. The social capital, which meets family obligation and facilitates reciprocal benefit sharing, is developed on the basis of strong ties of family, kin group and neighborhoods". *Bustee* migrants also make use of this stock of social capital resources and this contributes to livelihoods in different ways. I will present here two types of benefit that *bustee* people generate through this system of social insurance which though weak, still exists in the *bustee* context.

### **2.1. Obligatory Benefit**

Although people mobilise social capital resources in coming to town, arrival in the *bustee* also represents a significant devaluation in the stock of social capital at both household and community levels. There exist obligatory repayment system, although both the processes of making and breaking social capital resources in *bustee* context. Firstly, it is a fact that the stock of social capital gets reduced to a great extent in the *bustee*. As mentioned in chapter two, this occurs because the absence of a domestic hierarchy i.e. family lineage



in the *bustee* context means the moral institutions founded on the identities of kinship, decent and family obligations back in the villages are no longer applicable. The effects of this are seen in household relationships and structure. *Bustee* households have been found to be fragile, marked by a high rate of divorce, re-partnering and serial monogamy. This situation is aggravated by very early marriage, especially for girls, which then breaks down, often leading to at least a period as a female headed household. However as migrants of BBB2 are the first generation migrants, still they have closures of networks with their rural households. These are sustained by various forms of exchange between rural and *bustee* households, such as visits, gifts and remittances. In these ways *bustee* migrants seek to 'store', or preserve, their existing social capital resources. For their part, *Bustee* households honour their kin obligations by extending help to their rural kin. This takes many forms, such as training in *rickshaw* pulling, helping them get to know the roads and so on. But the critical thing is that without a reference it is almost impossible to enter the *bustees*. This applies equally to newcomers from the rural areas and to *bustees* dwellers themselves, for not only entry to the *bustee*, but also gaining access to basic needs like housing rely in the *bustee* on a system of personal references.

It is important to understand this reference system and how it relates to kin obligations. Whatever the aspirations of new migrants, they require the development and use of networks with different actors living in the *bustee*. For example, new migrants who wish to buy a piece of land to construct a house will need to contact those with land for sale, while people wanting to rent a house will need to contact those with land to let. But this process is not as simple as it seems in the *bustee*. For those contacts can only be made through the mediation of diverse linkages of *bustee* social networks.

Entry to the *bustee* depends mainly upon the migrant household's relationship with two sets of actors; the so-called *bustee* owners and the landlords. The *bustee* owners are the people who initiated the establishment of the *bustee* on government land. Having established the *bustee*, they establish their customary right to construct houses within it and to sell land to others. They are the dominant group in the *bustee* community and normally belong to the *mastaan* structure. As the actors belonging to the *mastaan* structure are characterised by rent-seeking behaviour, they receive protection money in order to protect, operate, manage and control the *bustee* community. Therefore, *mastaans* become, in one way or another, the owners of the *bustee* community (see chapter one and two).

Apart from overarching ownership claims which are mainly associated with the *mastaan* structure, many bustee dwellers also rent out small houses which they have constructed on land bought from the customary owners. Thus, both these landlords and the *mastaans* are gatekeepers for entry to the *bustee*, and both rely on a strong referral system to protect their interests. By making trust and personal networks essential to life in the *bustee*, this referral system sustains the multi-actor system of mutual trust. The main actors appear here as intermediaries, 'ghost' third parties in a whole range of dyadic transactions and inter-personal relationships.

The role of intermediary can also be taken on by established *bustee* inhabitants who have multi period transactions. Referees are important because they act as a guarantor to landlords, both of new migrants' ability to pay and their general reliability. However, the majority of *bustee* migrants are migrating for the first time from the rural areas and are not acquainted with the actors belonging to the *mastaan* structure. Therefore, at first these new migrants can only get assistance from kin in finding shelter. This means that in most cases new migrants take shelter with relatives or friends for the first few days before it is possible to make a more permanent arrangement elsewhere (see chapters two and five).

Landlords with houses to rent in particular recommendations made by people in the *mastaan* structure, such as labour *sardars* or patrons. Thus, in most cases a kin member is not able to act directly as a referee for the new migrants. Instead, the kin 'cash in' their own reputation and relationship with one of the leaders belonging to the *mastaan* structure. This at once introduces them both to the landlords and to the *mastaans*.

To sum up, it can be said that the rural people make a claim on their kin to get help to establish themselves in the *bustee*. Such help is founded in traditionally based relationships of obligation, and in turn always results in association with wider networks in the *bustee*.

## **2.2 Mutual Benefit Sharing**

While as mentioned above, the move to the *bustee* represents a threat to the stock of social capital at both household and community level, there are also dynamics within the

*bustee* which serve to increase the stock of social capital. Paradoxically, this positive outcome is often the result of what are basically negative characteristics of *bustee* life. Firstly, there is the *bustee* faction which itself has contradictory implications for the *bustee* context. There is no doubt that factions break wider *bustee* solidarity due to their conflictual character and are deeply implicated in the culture of violence. However, *internally* the factions also create trust and a level of solidarity among their members. As mentioned in chapter two, the *bustee angsho* is basically an outcome of regionalism which is mobilized into factionalism, with the shared regional background symbolising internal unity.

Fragile household structures similarly have these two contradictory aspects. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, when households break up this fragments the social capital and so reduces the new household's capacity to store or reproduce social capital resources. But at the same time a form of social capital resources is being reproduced even within such a negative 'making and breaking' situation of marriage, separating and re-partnering. For example, in the *bustee* context a new, if fragmentary, form of social structure emerges. Some claim that this even amounts to matri-focal or matriarchal forms (Islam and Zeitlyn 1987). While this may be putting it too strongly, it is clear that this new form of social structure creates more space for women-centred options. There are several reasons that contribute to this. First of all, when women are separated or divorced, they establish women headed households resettling close to their natal houses. This simple process leads to more women-centred arrangements. For example, it is but not unusual in the *bustee* context for two or more sisters to stay together after separation or divorce. Alternatively, when an older sister gets divorced she brings her unmarried sister to the *bustee* and sets up a new household. Similarly, a number of arrangements are related to the female-worker-based factories like garments. Garment workers stay with women headed households as paying guests, or in women's dormitories. All such examples show that a different if not alternative form of mini- community exists in the *bustee* context which either reproduces or can store social capital resources. Indeed, in the *bustee* context, communities are formed in various ways. As mentioned above, regionalism, the breakdown of patriarchal arrangements, cultural closeness, occupations and so on can all create communities and facilitate reciprocity. In the next section, citing various examples, I will look at the community level of social capital resources which generates benefit through a 'continuum of exchange' that *bustee* migrants share through reciprocity.

### Reduction of transactions costs

As mentioned in the previous chapter, *bustee* migrants are engaged in two different types of *bustee* association : simplex and multiplex , which generate multiple benefits. This will be looked at in the following section. Here I will look at, very personalised relationships that are embedded within the extended kin (lineage and non-lineage such as fictive kin) relationships that generate benefits. In particular I focus on the free access to employment information.

A significant proportion of *bustee* labourers get access to information on employment or employment itself through personalised relationships based in kinship links (both lineage and non- lineage). The case of garment workers is an ideal example in this regard. The workers develop personal networks among themselves for sharing information relating to employment access. Most of the garment industries are big employers but the production structure is quite simple. Therefore, a simple system of job advertisement has emerged, which is dominated by personal recommendation (example 7.1). Thus, job-seekers develop their information collecting networks based on indigenous methods such as maintaining contacts with relatives, friends, neighbours and other labourers. Such personalised networks develop mainly either through working together or living in the same place. In the *bustee*, migrants prefer to live in a cluster, mostly based on the origin of the place of migration, which in turns develops a regional feeling and may become a faction within the *bustee* community.

#### **Example 7.1**

*A garment factory which we visited early in December 1996 has 300 casual labourers including helpers, operators, a cutting master and so on. According to the accountant of the factory 280 workers out of 300 had left over a period of one year. Information of vacancies was posted every day with the gate man and all the workers were informed accordingly. At the end of the day the general manager had kept all the workers informed regarding vacancies. So, job seekers always kept contact with people in the factory. In this way 280 casual workers were replaced over a period of one year through informal advertisement without hampering the production level.*

As mentioned in chapter two, workers in the informal sector find it easy to take the option of exiting a job. It is often more profitable to leave a job if they are ensured of alternative entry elsewhere. In this sense, getting access to information and entry to employment results in higher profit. Therefore, one of the strategies followed by the *bustee* migrants is to frequently change their jobs in order to maximise their income levels. At the same time, factories like those producing garments are also seeking to maximise their profits. This means that the labour turnover rate in the garments industry is extremely high, as example 7.1 indicates.

The turnover rate and the production level of the factory are balanced by the demand and supply of the labour force in the labour market. There are two reasons for factories' preference for a continuous new labour force in the garments factories. Firstly, continual replacement of workers prevents the labourers from getting organised in a trade union which could empower them to bargain for benefits, perhaps hampering the production system or threatening the factory owner's profits. Secondly, the salary system provides profit if the labourers leave the factory. The salary system allows no payment if a full month's work is not completed. Common payment practice in the garment industry is to pay at the end of the following month, which means that the factory can always hold one month's salary as security. Therefore, if a worker leaves the factory, the factory does not have to pay one month's salary. If 280 workers leave, the factory saves a huge amount of money. On the other hand, the labourers keep moving continuously or changing their job frequently as they always get higher wages on the strength of their work experience in the old factory. So, getting a higher salaried job at the cost of one month's salary is more beneficial for them as they get access to employment through the reciprocal information system which cost nothing in monetary terms.

### **Minimising Costs**

There are number of ways that *bustee* migrants minimise their costs in the *bustee* context. Due to the closeness of neighbourhoods, they share many things in common among them selves. As mentioned in the chapter two, physical conditions are extremely poor and dwellings are barely separated from each other. By force of circumstance there are therefore high levels of cooperation in many neighbourhoods. For example, in BBB2 a systematic practice has developed to manage the toilets among the neighbourhoods. The

internal roads and drainage are often managed at neighbourhood level so reducing individual costs.

### **Shared cooperation.**

A further important form of co-operation is found over child-care. Child-care is extremely problematic in the *bustee* context for a number of reasons. Firstly, as the households tend to be nuclear, there is no one in the household apart from the parents who can take care of the children. This problem is even more acute in the case of women headed households. In the prevailing cash economy culture, it is difficult to survive. This means that everybody has to work for cash leaving no one at home to take care of the children. The only remaining option is mutual help among the neighbourhoods. Whoever stays at home during the working day take care of the children of neighbours.

### **Reciprocal labour exchange.**

Certain forms of traditional labour exchange exist in the *bustee* context. As mentioned in chapter two, *bustee* houses are extremely fragile and of poor construction making them vulnerable to wind and rain. The *bustee* migrants need to repair their houses throughout the year. It is common to get help with this from neighbours. Another form of reciprocal benefit is the '*bodli*' (replacement) system. This applies to those with regular jobs, such as non-residential maids who do not stay in the employer's house. If for any reason the maid is unable to come to work, she risks losing her job. Thus in order to ensure the job security, their friends, kin or anybody will go to work there as '*bodli*' in their place until the original labourer gets back.

To sum up, it can be said that *bustee* economy which is characterised by cash exchange contains a further 'continuum of exchange' which *bustee* migrants make use of to maximise benefit and manage insecurity. It is also found that although both households and communities have problems, they can store social capital resources and use it to manage insecurity.

## **3. Survival Option: Enforced Trust**

To adapt to the shift in form of integration from 'reciprocity' to 'exchange' through the market and urban organisations, *bustee* migrants make use of closures of

networks with the *mastaan* structure. As mentioned in chapter two the *bustee* economy is characterised by cash and this is the dominant medium of transactions there. By contrast, rural exchange takes place to a significant extent in kind, as well as cash. In the *bustee* all forms of credit transactions (see chapter two) are maintained through cash. This change in the form of the economy with which they must deal creates tension between *bustee* migrants' networks and economic activities, their obligations and expectations. To be functional and active in the urban economy which is full of risks combined with manipulation, corruption and exploitation, *bustee* migrants enter into new forms of trust labelled 'enforced trust' developed by the *mastaan* structure. Survival of the *bustee* migrants depends on inclusion within these enforced trust relations which reduce risk and insecurity and produce security and opportunity.

Security refers to the systems operated, such as the referral or guarantee system which satisfy both parties involved and build trust between them through the mediation of a third party. The *mastaan* structure also offers the opportunity to achieve economic success. For example, as mentioned in chapter two, the *mastaan* structure helps to maximize profit by preventing the entry of potential competitors. In this section I will present how sellers of labour and sellers of goods manage their risks using the closures of networks of the *mastaan* structure.

### **3.1. Associational Benefit for Sellers of Goods**

*Bustee* migrants make use of the closures of networks by getting involved with different associations which are directly or indirectly operated and controlled by the *mastaan* structure. Many such associations directly produce opportunities for the parties who are involved. The ROSCA and ASCA, are such associations which create multi-party benefits. A combination of wider network and mutual trust turns social resources into social capital which in turn creates new opportunities for economic ventures. Involvement in associational activities further creates an opportunity for them to transform and accumulate financial capital and thereafter plays four roles.

Firstly, it provides security for the financial capital or assets. By getting involved with a *rickshaw* garage through a ROSCA or ASCA, a single *rickshaw* owner can protect his *rickshaw* from the gang of *rickshaw* thieves which is run and managed by the *rickshaw* garage in order to maintain monopoly control over the *rickshaw* business.

Secondly, it itself performs as financial capital. Self-employed labourers like street vendors and hawkers often do not require financial capital to start such a venture. They get their goods on credit from the shops where they are mainly associated with ROSCA and ASCA.

**Example 7.2**

*Sharif, aged 38 has been working with a wholesale vegetable shop as a van driver for seven years. Malek, aged 16, one of his sons, wishes to start hawking vegetables in the nearby non-bustee residences. The wholesale shop owner extended his hand to him as he has the same sort of business with other clients. They came to an agreement that Malek will be allowed to take vegetables on credit at market prices and pay back at night before the shop closes. Malek devised his own plan to manage the business. He takes a small amount of vegetables and tries to sell it before late morning and give the money back to the shop owner. He then takes a second lot in the afternoon and pays that back before the shop closes. After six months the shop keeper offered Malek the use of one of his three vans for hawking vegetables. Malek accepted. Later, he joined the ROSCA, putting in Tk. 10 per day as subscription.*

Thirdly, the ROSCAs can create a means of earning. The ROSCA which is organised by the rickshaw garage, for example, offers a rickshaw instead of cash to the winner of a rotating draw.

**Example 7.3.**

*Abdus Samad, aged 35, has been living in different bustees in Dhaka for 10 years. He has been living in BeriBadh for two years. After his arrival in BeriBadh he participated in a ROSCA organised by his garage owner. In its lottery he won Tk. 3500 and bought a rickshaw from the garage. Being the owner of a rickshaw, now, he also needs to hire a licence and pay protection money to the garage owner.*

Fourthly, the ROSCA acts as a catalyst to transform resources into capital. The capital accumulation system in the bustee context is accelerated by social capital. Furthermore, social capital is the means of entering the system of operation. Therefore, associations like ROSCA and ACSA play an important role in making social capital which produces many ingredients of necessity to livelihoods.



#### **Example 7.4**

*Ahad Mia is a shopkeeper with an estimated capital of Tk. 20,000 including the loan amounting to Tk. 4,000 taken by his wife as a member of ASD. He started a ROSCA by mobilizing 50 members (divided into two groups) from his friends and neighbours including three members of his family. Every member has to deposit Tk. 10.00 at the end of the day to him and at the end of each month they organise a draw. Ahad Mia does not receive any service charge.*

The contributions to their members mean that ROSCAs and ASCAs are frequently cited as examples of reciprocal associational cooperation and coordination. Thus Putman (1993) for example, interprets them within his rosy view of social capital, without considering their internal structure and the motivations of the different actors involved. It is, however, important to consider these, to look, for example, into the questions of where the ROSCA and ASCA are organised and by whom and with what motives. My findings lead me to argue that ROSCA and ASCA are highly hierarchical and profit-making organisations for the organisers. They do produce mutual trust but not necessarily 'norms of reciprocity'; rather such arrangements secure a high profit flow for the organisers and maintain the *bustee* migrants' distrust of the wider market. For example, by organising and managing ROSCA in the *bustee* economy, a shopkeeper such as Ahad Mia can make a number of benefits which are as follows:

- as a member he gets a sum of money from the rotating draw
- every evening he gets an amount on deposit from all the members that he uses as his required daily capital up to the date of draw
- he uses the money as security for *reen* and *baki* enabling him to charge either higher price or interest on loans
- apart from this, he gets honour and makes obligatory relations with the ROSCA participants which put him in a powerful position in the *bustee* community.

It has been found that the social capital resources, a product of such associational activities, contain both vertical and horizontal relationships which separate the two groups of people involved but facilitate action. However, the action so facilitated does not mean

that the *bustee* migrants have the same stock of social capital, as mentioned before, or gain an equal share of the benefits. The organisers by dint of having initiated the activities earn the right to enjoy a monopoly control over them, backed up if necessary by physical violence, criminal activities and so forth. Therefore, the trust associated with ROSCA and ASCA is enforced, but produces comparative benefits to its members which leads *bustee* migrants to make of this resources. But, it also provides opportunities for the organisers (most of the cases as mentioned are sellers of goods) in multiple ways.

### 3.2 Generating Benefit from Enforced Trust

In this section I will present how *bustee* migrants generate benefits through their engagement with enforced trust. To illustrate this, I will take the case of a *rickshaw* garage. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a variety of associations have emerged centering on *rickshaw* transport, comprising the full range of actors, from garage owners to pullers. In addition to this, however, the garage pulls together all the actors and develops wider networks among the associations. Thus, as a part of *mastaan* structure, the owner of a *rickshaw* garage can offer a number of benefits to those who are associated with his garage. The associations may start with entry as a *rickshaw* puller which also requires referral. But getting associated with *rickshaw* garage may lead on into a number of further associations like *rickshaw* pullers association, ROSCAs and so on.

This associational engagement, with its multiplex relationship embedded within the *mastaan* structure as mentioned in the previous chapter, generates multiple benefits. As seen earlier, a member can get a *rickshaw* through a ROSCA. But ownership is not enough to develop into a *rickshaw* based entrepreneur, further capital is needed to operate it. First, *rickshaws* need a licence but these are no longer issued by the city corporation. Many *rickshaw* owners do not have the legal licence without which *rickshaws* are not allowed to ply on the street, while at the same time there are many licence owners who do not have *rickshaws*. So, this issue is resolved by the garage owner arranging a rotation of existing licenses. Therefore, garage owners often have to take the role of co-ordinator by arranging an operating formula between these two groups. All the actors associated with *rickshaw* have to be in touch with the garage since it keeps the whole system functioning by negotiating, mediating and bargaining with the other actors.

Secondly, a *rickshaw* needs services to keep running, a space to keep it at night and to repair it. One of the main purposes of the *rickshaw* garage is to rent out space for other *rickshaw* owners. Aiming to make it into a monopoly the owners seek to bring together and supply all the services necessary for the *rickshaw* owners.

Thirdly, as *rickshaws* are frequently stolen in Dhaka, all *rickshaws* develop a protection mechanism through *rickshaw* garages. The garage uses their wider networks with the law enforcing authority and the *mastaan* networks and issues a plate which it fixes to the *rickshaw*. This establishes informal rights. Having the special name of a certain organisation

on the *rickshaw* number plate ensures protection from theft. It works well mainly because, *rickshaw* garages engage in theft to force small owners to be dependent on them.

The owner of a rickshaw garage provides multiple benefits to its members but the services is not free; the clients have to pay for all services used by them. The price of violations of trust by the clients is huge and includes physical violence or being forced to leave the area.

### **3.3 Associational Engagement as a Source of Information Exchange**

As we have seen, decision making for migration is highly correlated with the employment information on the urban labour market (see chapter 5). Before arrival, the main source of information for the *bustee* migrants was mostly their kin networks. The kin networks arrange the first job after arrival. As mentioned in the previous chapter, after arrival to the *bustee* the migrants get involved with a numbers of associations to develop their closures of network in the urban context, linking together their friends and colleagues. They also get access to the different types of associations which may provide a number of benefits. One benefit is employment information which is the most important for the sellers of labour. Here, I will mostly present the information that is circulated through enforced trust oriented associations rather than that which is circulated through simplex networks.

First of all, I want to discuss the major sources of information on the urban labour market as used by the *bustee* migrants. Matrix 6.1 presented below shows that different categories of labour sellers have different sources of information. This is due to differences in the referral or guarantee systems that exist for different employment categories.

**Matrix 7.1. Sources of information Access**

Category	Main Sources of information
Wage labourers	Labour <i>sardar</i>
Self-employed	Trade union, garage based associations
Employees in establishment	<i>Bustee netha</i> , Work-based association Personalised networks like friends and colleagues
Domestic	Personalised networks like friends and <i>bustee netha</i>

Recruitment in the labour market is very informal but is strongly associated with the guarantee arrangement. For the employers this fills the gap of longer term acquaintance with the worker. For the workers it offers a guarantee that they will receive payment. The reference system is embedded with the trust system which operates in the *bustee* context, facilitated by the *mastaan* structure, as explained in the previous chapter.

The informal labour market makes use of this trustworthy environment for recruiting its required labour. Thus, the information regarding employment vacancy is circulated through the channels that the closures of networks has developed. Thus, most of the *bustee* migrants can make use of their own closures of networks developed through their own associations. As matrix 7.1 shows the labour *sardar* is the main source of employment information; only the *bustee* migrants who are associated with such labour gangs can gain access to the information. This constraint reflects the surplus of labour relative to jobs available. In such a context, a 'multi-purpose' kin-based information system is not always sufficient. This then pushes the labourers to get more direct access to a wider information system to minimise the danger of not getting a job. To get access to such a system, most of the wage labourers go through intermediaries like the labour *sardar* or contractors. These intermediaries earn income by supplying the information. Access to the information is therefore restricted, since the *sardar* is paid on daily basis for the information by his associated labourers. The push-cart labourers, construction labourers and

labourers in establishments all work in an organised manner under a *sardar* whose main responsibility is to arrange employment for the labourers under him.

Amongst the self-employed transport workers, information is circulated and controlled by the garage based association. For example, the *rickshaw somity* may provide employment information to their members. Similarly, a scooter driver gets access to employment information through the trade union. But they have to repay the trade union. For example, scooter associations collect toll money from every scooter stand in the city. The members of the trade union have to give their extra time to collect such toll money and pay back the trade union leaders.

If the labourers wish to get jobs in establishments or work as domestic workers, they need to get information through the *bustee* coalitions associated with *mastaan* structure and personalised networks. In order to avoid repetition, here, only the coalition-based association will be discussed. Many establishments like brickfields and restaurants recruit their labour through *bustee* coalitions, like *angsho netha* (faction leader) and *bustee netha* (leader). Through the association either of the labourers themselves or their household members or friends with *bustee* coalitions like factions, labourers get access to the information and get references for jobs. Domestic workers in many cases depend on the *bustee netha*, when their own personalised networks do not work.

Because the informal labour market is operated through a system of references, labourers have little choice to use sources other than associational opportunities. As the labourers are unskilled and need to get various types of activities in order to maximise their cash, they want to link with different types of associations or make the closures of networks wider through linking with associations which produce multiplex relationships like the *mastaan* structure.

### **3.4 Apprenticeships: Outputs and Inputs of Associational Benefit**

As mentioned in chapter two, wage labourers are highly insecure compared to the other three categories of worker, as their income depends on the daily job availability in the market. One of the strategies adopted to escape this insecurity is to get access to jobs in the other categories where income flow is comparatively stable. Employment in establishments and/or self-employment is mostly conditioned by certain types of skill but is ranked higher in the labour market. Therefore, to earn more the labourers need to develop their skills and the only possible arrangement is apprenticeship.

A family who can afford to send their children as apprentices, will want to do so for number of reasons. Firstly, apprenticeship ensures employment since after completion appointees will get a reference. Secondly, it will ensure higher and more regular income. Thirdly, it will offer higher levels of networks. But, the question of how to get access to such opportunities depends on the stock of social capital resources developed through closures of networks. Apprenticeships are also structured by the referral system. Apprenticeships are offered by three different types of establishment:

- Many employers, particularly those who have factories with modern technology, depend on skilled and experienced labour. Due to the low supply of skilled labour in the labour market, small-scale industries or factories arrange for unskilled labourers get on-the-job training.
- House repairers also have a provision for on-the-job training.
- Construction sectors are highly dependent on the arrangement of apprenticeships for children because child labour reduces costs.
- Transport sectors normally offer apprenticeships. A low wage arrangement and the long time needed for acquiring skills generally discourages the main male income earner from getting involved with such a system so it absorbs a wide range of child labour.

The apprenticeship system is again embedded in the reference system which limits access to the prevailing opportunities. Other limits of access are age and gender. Firstly, apprenticeships are offered only for children. Thus, since this apprenticeship is age-

sensitive, to get access to the system of operation most of the apprentices start their career from their childhood in establishments like factories. As well as imparting skills the apprenticeship, this process also provides an opportunity for them to get access to the employment market which in turn helps them get a comparatively regular and higher income flow to the household in the near future. Generally, though, this apprenticeship-based production organisation is often criticised for its use of cheap child labourers, yet it does guarantee employment after successful completion of the apprenticeship. So, *bustee* migrants prefer to send their children for training under such apprenticeship arrangement. This is illustrated in example 7.5.

***Example 7.5***

*Kashem, aged 37, has six household members including himself. Since he and his wife are assured of the income required for their minimum needs, they decided to prepare their son to become a skilled labourer. Thus, their 13 year old son was sent to a leather factory to get on-the-job training. After four years of apprenticeship in the factory, he got employment there.*

The apprenticeship arrangement is also gender-sensitive. As the female labour force is mainly segmented into the 'feminine' establishment like garments factories and women parlours, it is generally female children who get training in such establishments. Though entry into these sections is not age-sensitive, ranging between 12 and 35 years, it is highly skewed to both the poles of the limit. This skewed age distribution is influenced by marriage of the female labour force. Most of the adolescent girls start their career as helpers in the garment factory but after marriage they stop working in the factory and take household activities as their main occupation either because they are forced to do so by the husband's family because of *purdah*, or out of choice. However since marital instability is common in the *bustee* context and the age for starting apprenticeship is relaxed in garments factories, many women who experience divorce also take apprenticeships or work in establishments like a garment factory. Garment factories offer apprenticeships for unskilled workers who are known as helpers. Most adolescent girls start their working life as apprenticees, learning about the technology from senior workers. This process also helps them to have access to the labour market with better prospects.



However, apprenticeship provides both forward and backward networks linkages in the urban labour market. To get access to an apprenticeship, people need to be in touch with the range of existing networks - both kin-based and non-kin-based and apprenticeship itself makes the network of the apprentices much wider linking it to different actors and organisations functioning in the urban setting. If we take the case of construction apprentices, we can see the network map where one network leads to another and so on, making the networks wider and linking them with others.

**Example 7.6**

*Rafiq, aged 24, has been living in the Southern part of BBB2 which is dominated by the Barisal faction for six years. He started his career as a construction worker as a helper after his arrival from his home in Barisal. His brother-in-law who has been living in the same place for five years introduced him to a mason. Rafiq has quickly become a mason and started working independently with other helpers associated with contractors to whom he was introduced by the contractors with whom he was associated during his apprenticeship.*

Example 7.6 shows that Rafiq gained access to the apprenticeship through his regional group organised in the *bustee* under a faction. Through access to the apprenticeship, he came across new networks existing in the market. This network helps Rafiq to get access to employment as a skilled labourer. He paid for his apprenticeship with four years' labour. Not only did he gain the skill as a construction worker, but he also acquired the knowledge of the labour market as he developed a wider network within it. Therefore, it seems that apprenticeship helps develop a vertically integrated structure of relationship - a resourceful social network. This vertically integrated structure includes different stages of relations developed at different steps. The structure starts from the faction where he lives and ends with the owner of the enterprise. Thus, on the one hand the financial investment in terms of labour cost makes someone skillful, while on the other, it brings him or her to the wider network through different actors associated with *mastaan* structure.

To sum up, it can be said that the interlocking system of market operation limits access to employment, while it offers a recruitment and information circulation system, having links with the trustworthy closures of networks like *mastaan* structure. The vertically integrated structure of relationships offers more benefit due to its multiplex relationships.

Therefore, to make a living in the urban settings the bustee migrants take the strategic option of the upward structure of network.

#### 4. Conclusion

As they settle down in town *bustee* migrants need to make use of the social capital resources which they achieve through engagement in different associations. As shown in the previous chapters, the *bustee* migrants continuously struggle to produce effective social capital resources to establish some measure of security in a context where no formal institutions are operative. Their living and livelihoods options depend only on informal rights. The social capital resources that the *bustee* migrants produce are co-opted by the dominant actors in the urban political economy, the *mastaan* structure. But when the stock of social capital resources produced within the kin sphere is not sufficient to establish and sustain livelihoods, the only option left is to enter the networks of 'enforced trust' which support and are supported by the *mastaan* structure. In the absence of any alternative the *bustee* migrants resort to the resources of the *mastaan* structure, they have no choice.

Although the *mastaan* structure may offer advantages in the short-term, in the long run it creates a vicious spiral of exploitation. The inclusion of the excluded does not necessarily take place on positive terms. Through their participation in different associations and organisations, the *bustee* migrants are marginalised, manipulated, exploited and co-opted. Their cultivation of associations reflects as such an adjustment to pervasive mistrust. The underlying logic of these relationships represents a process of adverse incorporation, within which poor *bustee* migrants can get an opportunity to pursue their livelihoods, but that opportunity itself reproduces the very structures of exploitation that undermine their security or advancement in the longer term.

## CONCLUSION

### 1. Introduction

I have mentioned in the introduction that my research process was rather unconventional. There are two aspects to this. First, as mentioned earlier, the research focus emerged during fieldwork, naturally and in a reflective way. It was in fact the *bustee* migrants themselves who identified both the main strategy that they adopt and the critical actors that influence and affect their lives. These then became the main focus of my thesis. The overall concern of the thesis is to understand the practical responses of *bustee* migrants to urban social transformation. In particular, the thesis explores the significance of the role of *mastaans* in influencing the survival strategies of the *bustee* migrants. The phrase '*line lagao*' (to make connections or contacts) offered the starting point for analysing these survival strategies. Since *bustee* migrants have few, if any, formal rights and since neither state nor market institutions offer them access to employment, welfare or other urban services, the strategy of '*line lagao*' highlights the importance of making and maintaining relationships with key actors who can provide the services needed. By looking at the strategy of '*line lagao*', the thesis places epistemological emphasis on 'what *bustee* migrants do' rather than on 'how they are constrained'.

The second unconventional aspect of this research is that the theoretical framework was selected after completion of my fieldwork and the Urban Livelihoods Study of which it was a part. The data came first, and reflecting on its significance led me finally to select the concept of social capital to assist me in interpreting it. There are two rationales for this. Firstly, the centrality of the notion of '*line lagao*' in my field data led me to seek a theoretical tool which would be equipped to analyse how relationships constitute an important resource to create opportunities and manage risk and insecurity. Secondly, my initial contact with the *bustee* and the employment to which I return in Bangladesh is as a development worker. This exposes me to development discourse, in which the concept of social capital and its notions of networks, trust and norms are currently much discussed. I was therefore interested to test out these ideas in the context of my own field observations. The remainder of this conclusion is divided into two parts. In the first I

offer a brief summary of the main points of the thesis. In the second I will reflect on these to suggest some implications that they may have for policy.

## **2. Summary and Arguments**

As stated in chapter one, the urbanisation process entails social transformation in that a large rural population shifts into cities. However, cities are rarely, if ever, capable of supplying adequate services. In such a contradictory situation, a continuous flow of migration further increases the urban population. *Bustee* migrants constitute one contributor to the increase in the urban population in Bangladesh. The *bustee* migrants are managing their life in the urban settings by making use of social capital resources. In analyzing the creation and use of social capital resources in the *bustee* context, the thesis makes its main points at two levels, theoretical and empirical. Although in practice these are inter-related, for the sake of clarity I present these separately here. In the sections below I therefore begin with three theoretical issues and follow these with four further empirical points.

### **2.1. Theory Focused Arguments**

As I sought to apply the theory of social capital to my research data it became obvious that the concept is highly contested, comprising a wide range of ideas, views and perceptions. One of the main reasons is that conceptually and analytically social capital is derived through both sociological and economic traditions. There are three major arguments that need to be highlighted here.

#### **Argument one: social capital is a value neutral resource with multi-dimensional features**

This thesis argues both theoretically (chapter 4) and empirically (chapters 5 and 6) that social capital should be conceptualised as a resource which can be produced and stored. Chapter five shows that migration process itself creates social capital and helps to increase it. As a resource social capital can, like 'endowments', be constructed and increased through deliberate action. It can also appreciate, as, for example, when people collect information and advice that reduce transaction costs. Similarly, networks of friendship which offer an emotional resource useful for sharing and caring (see chapter six), can also

be *converted* to secure economic or other forms of advantage. Moreover, social capital has 'public goods' characteristics which facilitates peoples' *access* to other resources. For example, as chapters six and seven show, the *mastaans* construct social capital primarily for their own monopoly benefit but it also provides the means to mediate benefits to others.

The significance of such benefits to the urban poor raises a question about the value judgements commonly made in relation to social capital. (Putzel (1998), for example, terms this the 'dark side' of social capital, while Wood (1998) describes it as 'adverse incorporation' and Portes (1999) refers to it as the 'public bads' of social capital resources. When the same resources produce benefits for both the *mastaans* and for the urban poor this calls for a differentiated analysis. The resources themselves are constant but used very differently by different actors with different backgrounds and purposes. Rather than designating the resource itself as 'bad' when used by criminals and 'good' when mediating benefits for the poor, it is clear that social capital itself is value neutral like any other resource. The uses – good or bad – depend on the users not on the resources.

**Argument two: the quality and quantity of the elements that constitute the social capital affect the level of benefits it produces. This composition can also be reorganised.**

The capacity of social capital resources to mediate benefits depends on the quality and quality of the elements that compose it. An example of this is the difference between ties which constitute simple connections and closures which are connections that ensure rights of claim. There is thus a qualitative difference both in the relationships that make up the social capital and the broader benefits (such as trust) that it sustains. The high level of benefits mediated through the social capital of the *mastaan* structure is due to its multiplex character.

**Argument three: more research on social capital is needed to explore its use in development contexts.**

While social capital is now a fashionable term in development studies there remains the limitation that the term was originally developed on the basis of observations in developed countries. Foundations have been provided by Putnam's work on Italy and followed up in the USA (Putnam 1993b, 1995, 1996) and Coleman's (1988, 1994) reflections on American schools. Subsequent research has similarly focused mainly on devel-

oped countries whether from an economic or sociological perspective. The lack of discussion of social capital is particularly evident in the urban sector, and particularly in Latin America (see chapter four). Some studies are now being undertaken to fill this gap, for example Narayan and Pritchett (1999) in Africa, Holland (1998) In Albania, Beall (1997) in India. The importance that this research has shown of social capital to the livelihoods of the poor indicates, however, suggests that much more research on social capital is justified, and particularly the contradictory role played by actors such as the *mastaans* in facilitating this.

## **2.2. Empirical Findings Based Arguments**

The following arguments have been put forward on the basis of the observations made in the Dhaka *bustee*. As mentioned earlier, the *bustee* dwellers consider social relationships to be their main resources. These arguments focus on how these resources are produced and used.

### **Argument one : *Bustee* migrations play a dual role of reducing and constructing social capital resources**

The migration process itself creates greater opportunities for the *bustee* migrants to develop social capital by widening their closure of networks and increasing their stock of social capital in the *bustee* (see chapter five). There is a continuous process of remaking household level social capital resources through chain migration (Tilly 1997), a form of migration whereby *bustee* migrants support and help other family members living in the rural areas. Household level social capital resources increase when new members from rural families join the original migrants in the *bustee*. Furthermore, the migration process itself widens the closure of networks from the lineage kin to non-lineage networks. This occurs primarily through the creation of fictive relations. Secondly, the migration process also reduces the social capital resources owned by the migrant household in the rural home. As mentioned in chapter two, a 'structural hole' is created when migrants move from villages to the *bustee* in that two important levels of social organization prevalent in the rural context (*gusti* and lineage based neighborhoods) do not exist or are not as strong in the urban *bustee* context. This has a number of consequences for those living in the *bustee*. One important consequence is that social sanctions and the support for which lin-

age based networks assume responsibility in rural contexts are effectively absent in the *bustee* context. This suggests that the migration process reduces social capital both at household and community levels on one hand, and constructs new forms of social capital resources on the other.

**Argument two : The *mastaan* structure enjoys the right to construct informal rights**

The *mastaan* structure enjoys the right to construct informal rights on the basis of the linking role it plays in both social and economic spheres. First of all, the *mastaan* structure connects two social levels situated at the two poles of the *bustee* social organisation. These levels are the *bustee shamaj* and the household members (*khana sadasha*). *Mastaans* take advantage of the 'structural hole' which exists in the *bustee* social organisation to carve out a niche for themselves (see chapter two). This confers on them significant power and the right to use or threaten violence in order to maintain their position. Thus the *bustee* social organisation assumes a different shape from the rural one in that it is based on non-lineage actors and networks. Violence or the threat of violence becomes the ordinary means for maintaining social control and order. In the rural area by contrast, the main means of control is family and kin-based pressure. The thesis also shows how this shift in the pattern of social organisation implies a concomitant shift in how trust is constructed. While respect, honour and prestige play a fundamental role in the construction of trust in the rural areas, trust is often enforced in *bustee* contexts.

In the absence of lineage based sanctions and an imposed code of behaviour, *bustee* migrants become relatively individualistic and opportunistic. This has the consequence of further reducing social capital resources at the level of the household. As mentioned in chapter two, serial monogamy has become a normal part of the *bustee* culture and this reflects a process of making and breaking family relations and bonds.

Just as *mastaans* help organise the life of the *bustee* socially, they also act as intermediaries between the more formal institutions and *bustee* dwellers. As shown in chapters one and two, the informal market, where migrants are involved in two main activities (the selling of labour and goods), is characterized by a cash economy. The urban cash economy in turn implies two main processes: a) exchange through cash and b) transactions.

The urban cash economy is an economy with a high level of risk in that it implies a shift from 'reciprocity' to 'exchange', in the context of a lack of any real formal rights. The

change from an economy based on 'reciprocity' to one based on 'exchange' demands new closures of networks since the 'moral economy' (a system that enshrines the rights to make a claim on others and obliges a transfer of basic necessities) (Scott 1977) is absent (see chapter two). The lack of formal rights in terms of law, legislation or regulation invites greater levels of manipulation, corruption and exploitation. This again creates space for intermediaries like *mastaans* to operate.

*Mastaans* therefore operate both as organisers of the social life of *bustees* and as brokers between formal institutions and people. To the extent that they provide services (always against payment), they induce a certain level of predictability in the *bustee*. This predictability is important for poor *bustee* dwellers seeking to create strategies for survival in the city. Predictability is important in the search for the reduction of risk and uncertainty in the hazardous lives of *bustee* migrants.

### **Argument three: Co-option of the social capital resources produced by *bustee* migrants**

In the urban context where lineage based organisations are not functionally effective, *bustee* migrants organise themselves in different forms of association and networks (see chapter six). In this way, they transform simple ties of 'knowing me, knowing you' to efficient closures of networks. As mentioned in chapter six, the importance of building closures of networks among friends and colleagues is that it enables the construction of trust. *Bustee* migrants therefore develop associations in order to make the environment where they conduct their transactions as predictable and trustworthy as possible. Such associations are predominantly in the structure of simplex relationships but may be characterised by overlapping membership (for example one can be a member of both a *rickshaw* association and a ROSCA). Again, it is *mastaans* who use their positional advantage to control and mobilise the different *bustee* coalitions and associations and in this way, they effectively control the urban political culture. To do this, they call upon their own closures of networks with other urban actors often from outside the *bustee*. The effective mobilization of networks and associations produces new social capital resources with a public goods character. In other words, it opens up multiple options which may help secure particular benefits. Although *bustee* migrants access social capital resources



through associational engagement, the actual structure of association is not controlled by them, but by the *mastaans*. In this sense, associations become entities of a 'public goods' nature (see chapter six).

#### **Argument four: The response of the *bustee* migrants is a strategic one**

To make a living in the urban setting, *bustee* migrants make use of the social capital resources available to them. They invest time and energy in developing social capital resources which will ensure a 'continuum of exchange'. This continuity signifies a form of insurance system. In the *bustee*, it is not possible to build such a strategy without resorting to resources, relationships and connections managed and controlled by the *mastaan* structure.

In a context where both state and markets operate imperfectly and do not offer effective formal rights, opportunities for intermediaries and brokers who can provide services abound. In the *bustee*, it is *mastaans* who assume the role of intermediaries or brokers. 'Mastanocracy' therefore offers access to services and a set of informal rights to poor urban dwellers. Through these informal rights, these dwellers manage risk, uncertainty and insecurity. This is the main insight summarised in the phrase '*line lagao*'

### **3. Policy Implications**

In the previous section I have highlighted two points regarding risk management. Firstly, *bustee* migrants are capable of producing social capital resources and secondly there are constraints on storing social capital resources. The former refers to strength and capacity and the latter refers to barriers to stock or weakness. As mentioned in the previous section, *bustee* migrants as actors are constructive and creative in building closure of networks. In order to construct a better life they migrate from the rural settings and enter the *bustee*. They take continuous initiatives in building relationships. The wider network building process starts with the migration process and then this is developed and extended in a calculative way. Calculative behaviour refers to the continuous struggle for survival. However, the *bustee* migrants cannot store social capital resources due to the lack of appropriate social organisation and the lack of adequate legal and formal rights.

*Bustee* social organisation is problematic due to the fact that its intermediate levels are missing, creating a gap into which the *mastaan* structure has stepped. This 'structural hole' causes problems for the establishment of social capital resources at both household and community level. Similarly problematic is that while *bustee* migrants produce social capital in the non-kin sphere, the *mastaan* structure is in a better position to control these. The activities of the *bustee* migrants themselves therefore help to reinforce the position of the *mastaan* structure as multiplex-relationship-oriented closures of networks.

The above suggests that the appropriate policy option would be mobilisation of the capacity of the *bustee* migrants and the removal of the barriers to storing social capital resources. However, it is important to consider what strategy could achieve this. In considering this I draw on Hirschman's (1970) framework of exit, voice, and loyalty. This framework is commonly used as a negotiation model by NGOs. But in the *bustee* context the option of 'voice' or direct confrontation is to be questioned. This is because the means of controlling the *bustee* is violence or the threat of violence. It needs to be acknowledged that the voice raising option, may propel the *bustee* migrants towards exit. But according to the Hirschman, the exit option is unproductive or less productive because it reduces or destroys the negotiating position.

The first option that needs to be considered is mobilisation and exit. In the *bustee* context, the option of partial exit would be the better strategy for the *bustee* migrants' mobilisation. The partial exit refers to increasing *bustee* migrants' strategic options for survival, through risk diversification, by building up alternative bases of social capital, while still retaining their engagement with the *mastaan* structure. This builds on the existing strategies of *bustee* migrants. While they cannot avoid involvement with the *mastaan* structure, they also extend their own contacts and closures of networks across the *bustee* boundary either through personalised or associational networks or both. Although they accept the legitimacy of the *mastaan* structure and show loyalty to it through the system of enforced trust, *bustee* migrants also belong to a mutual trust system where there exists a 'continuum of exchange' as mentioned in chapter seven. Thus, the 'strategic option' does not indicate that *bustee* migrants are only adversely incorporated within the enforced trust, but also that they are operating with a sense of 'parallel rationality' (see Wood, 1994) in which they seek to build up resources of their own, at the same time as having to rely on

the *mastaan* structure. The existence of parallel rationality in the *bustee* context indicates the possibility of 'partial exit'.

Use of such 'partial exit' is important because *bustee* migrants' survive fully in the informal sphere. In this sense migration to the *bustee* from rural settings challenges modernization assumptions that urbanisation represents social progress. In Weberian thought progress towards modernity will involve a move towards increasingly rational bureaucracy and governance through formal, impersonal institutions. In this thesis, however, we have seen that when rural people migrate to the *bustee* they may exit from the relatively secure formal and informal institutional rights prevailing in the rural contexts. They do not, however, subsequently enjoy the secure rights of modern citizenship when they settle in the *bustee* context. Rather they have to accept the informal rights operated through enforced trust which are created by the *mastaan* structure. The acceptance of such informal rights means getting benefit through subordination and loyalty where the option of voice is omitted, leaving partial exit as the only option.

By making use of partial exit options and their parallel rationality for institution building, *bustee* migrants may make use of the benefit of informal rights which derive from their loyalty to the *mastaan* structure. The value of thinking in terms of parallel rationalities lies in the importance of the multiplex relationships of the *mastaan* structure which provides multiple benefits in the urban economy. It is unlikely that the traditional model of mobilisation through raising voice which is generally used in the mobilisation of the rural poor, would be effective in challenging the *mastaan* structure in the *bustee* context.

The second point is to consider the appropriate policy option for removing the 'barrier' to the *bustee* migrants' ability to store social capital resources i.e. possible replacements of the *mastaan* structure. Since it is deeply rooted in wider economic and political culture, only a long term strategy can overcome it. Before indicating a policy option in this regard, we need to look back again to why this *mastaan* structure is so powerful. It is powerful from two perspectives: their ability to use the threat of violence, and most importantly, their acceptance as legitimate by the *bustee* migrants. The root causes of such acceptance are the *mastaans'* ability to provide services, and their structural strength to

produce 'informal rights. Without creating an alternative to these, no strategy can be effective.

In this situation a dual policy option may be considered. Firstly, we need the allocation of formal rights of citizenship to the *bustee* dwellers. This would weaken the *mastaans'* capacity to impose and produce informal rights. The means to achieve formal rights is 'voice'. Raising voice may be complemented by advocacy with policy makers.

Secondly, the gap in intermediary social structure needs to be addressed. At present, the *mastaan* structure, due to its multiplex relationships and closures of networks, enjoys monopoly rights to control the *bustees*. In order to deal with the *mastaans'* 'enforced trust' an alternative institution with multiplex relational characteristics should be produced. In this relation, NGO organised federal coalitions can be cited as an example which could work. As mentioned above, the created institutions must have the ability of multiplexity which means the ability to provide a wide range of required services. Therefore, strong institution building activities may not be sufficient if the *bustee* migrants remain fully dependent on the *mastaans* for access to all required necessities.

To sum up, it can be said that a two-pronged policy option should be considered. At the micro level, policy should be directed towards mobilisation on the basis of a 'partial exit option' to build alternative institutions with the capacity to produce, increase and store social capital resources. At the macro level, policy should be directed towards raising 'voice' for the allocation of full formal citizenship rights to all *bustee* dwellers.

## APPENDIX-1

### KEY INFORMANT HOUSEHOLDS

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Household (HH) No</li><li>Category</li><li>Name of Household Head (HHH)</li><li>Demographic Feature</li></ul>	:	01	Declining				Harun Howlader				
Name of Household Member		Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age Yrs	Marital Status	Occupation	Education				
Hamid Howlader		Household Head	Male	35	Married	Rickshaw Puller	-				
Piara Begum		Wife	Female	28	Married	Earth Cutter	-				
Fatima		Daughter	Female	11	Unmarried	-	II				
Rosina		Daughter	Female	09	Unmarried	-	-				
Roma		Daughter	Female	07	Unmarried	-	-				
Soma		Daughter	Female	04	Unmarried	-	-				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Income Sources</li><li>District of origin of HHH</li><li>Length of migration to Dhaka city</li><li>Household structure</li><li>Housing</li><li>Somity Member</li></ul>			:	Rickshaw Puller+Earth Cutter							
			:	Faridpur							
			:	15 Yrs							
			:	Nuclear							
			:	Rented							
			:	None							

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Household (HHH) No</li><li>Category</li><li>Name of Household Head</li><li>Demographic Feature</li></ul>		:	02 Declining Nila Begum				
		:					
Name of Household Member		Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age	Marital Status	Occupation	Edu- cation
Nazma Begum		Household Head	Female	30	Separated	Maid Serv- ant	-
Mamun		Son	Son	05	Unmarried	-	-
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Income Sources</li><li>District of origin of HHH</li><li>Length of migration to Dhaka city</li><li>Household structure</li><li>Housing</li><li>Somity Member</li></ul>		:	Maid Manikgonj 15 Yrs Nuclear Own NGO(ASD)				

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Household (HH) No</b> : 03</li> <li>• <b>Category</b> : Coping</li> <li>• <b>Name of Household Head (HHH)</b> : Sofiq Islam</li> <li>• <b>Demographic Feature</b> :</li> </ul>						
Name of Household Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Rafiqul Islam	HHH	Male	21	Married	Rickshaw puller	-
Sebina Akter	Wife	Female	15	Married	House Wife	-
Md. Alamin	Brother	Male	14	Unmarried	Skilled Labour	-
Halima	Daughter	Female	1	Unmarried	-	-
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Income Sources : Rickshaw pulling, Salary</li> <li>• District of origin of HHH : Bhola (Barishal)</li> <li>• Length of migration to Dhaka city : 2 Yrs</li> <li>• Household Structure : Joint</li> <li>• Housing : Won</li> <li>• Somity Member : ASD (NGO)</li> </ul>						

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Household (HH) No</b> : 04</li> <li>• <b>Category</b> : Declining</li> <li>• <b>Name of Household Head (HHH)</b> : Nurani Begum</li> <li>• <b>Demographic Feature</b> :</li> </ul>						
Name of Household Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Nurjahan Begum	Household Head	Female	30	Divorce	Earth Cutter	-
Rina	Daughter	Female	12	Unmarried	Earth Cutter	-
Rabiul Mollah	Son	Male	06	Unmarried	-	1
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Income Sources : Earth Cutter</li> <li>• District of origin of HHH : Manikgonj</li> <li>• Length of migration to Dhaka city : 20 Yrs</li> <li>• Household Structure : Nuclear</li> <li>• Housing : Rented</li> <li>• Somity Member : None</li> </ul>						

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Household (HH) No : 05</li> <li>Category : Declining</li> <li>Name of Household Head (HHH) : Badol Mia</li> <li>Demographic Feature :</li> </ul>						
Name of Household Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Badsha Mia	Household Head	Male	45	Married	Rickshaw Puller	-
Joitun Bibi	Wife	Female	35	Married	House wife, Artisan	-
Liton Mia	Son	Male	14	Unmarried	Hawker	IV
Abdul Malik	Son	Male	12	Unmarried	Hawker	III
Laiju Begum	Daughter	Female	07	Unmarried	Hawker	I
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Income Sources : Rickshaw Pulling, Hawker, Artisan</li> <li>District of origin of HHH : Barisal</li> <li>Length of migration to Dhaka city : 05 Yrs</li> <li>Household Structure : Nuclear</li> <li>Housing : Rented</li> <li>Society Member : NGO (ASD)</li> </ul>						

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Household (HH) No : 06</li> <li>Category : Declining</li> <li>Name of Household Head (HHH) : Munni Begum</li> <li>Demographic Feature :</li> </ul>						
Name of Household Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Monowara Begum	Household Head	Female	30	Divorce	Maid Servant	V
Jorna	Daughter	Female	12	Unmarried	Garments Worker	II
Sahin	Son	Male	10	Unmarried	-	I
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Income Sources : Maid , Garments</li> <li>District of origin of (HHH) : Barisal</li> <li>Length of migration to Dhaka city : 05 Yrs</li> <li>Household Structure : Nuclear</li> <li>Housing : Own</li> <li>Society Member : NGO (ASD)</li> </ul>						

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Household (HH) No</li><li>Category</li><li>Name of Household Head (HHH)</li><li>Demographic Feature</li></ul>	:	07				
	:	Improving				
	:	Abdul Ahad				
	:					
Name of Household Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Abdul Wohab	Household Head	Male	45	Married	Shop Keeper	-
Miful Begum	Wife	Female	40	Married	Shop Keeper	-
MosleUddin	Son	Male	21	Married	Rickshaw Puller	-
Bibi Fatima	Daughter	Female	16	Married	House wife	-
Yanoor Bibi	Daughter	Female	11	Unmarried	-	-
Noor Islam	Paying Gust	Male	17	Unmarried	Rickshaw Puller	-
Bushir	Paying Guist	Male	21	Unmarried	Rickshaw Puller	-
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Income Sources</li><li>District of origin of HHH</li><li>Length of migration to Dhaka city</li><li>Household Structure</li><li>Housing</li><li>Somity Member</li></ul>	:	Shop, Rickshaw pulling, maid House				
	:	Faridpur				
	:	10 Yrs				
	:	Joint				
	:	Own				
	:	NGO (ASD)				

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Household (HH) No</li><li>Category</li><li>Name of Household Head (HHH)</li><li>Demographic Feature</li></ul>	:	08				
	:	Improving				
	:	Monira Akter				
	:					
Name of House- hold Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Sta- tus	Occupation	Education
Mina Akter	Household Head	Female	40	Married	Drug Seller	-
Jabbar Ragol	Husband	Male	50	Married	Drug Seller	-
Amjad	Son	Male	08	Unmarried	Student	II
Hummai	Daughter	Female	06	Unmarried	-	-
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Income Sources</li><li>District of origin of (HHH)</li><li>Length of migration to Dhaka city</li><li>Household Structure</li><li>Housing</li><li>Somity Member</li></ul>	:	Drug Selling				
	:	Manikgonj				
	:	15 Yrs				
	:	Nuclear				
	:	Own				
	:	NGO (ASD)				



• <b>Household (HH) No</b>	:	<b>09</b>
• <b>Category</b>	:	<b>Coping</b>
• <b>Name of Household Head (HHH)</b>	:	<b>Nazrul Islam</b>
• <b>Demographic Feature</b>	:	

Name of Household Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Md. Nizam	Household Head	Male	38	Married	Begging	-
Kayli	Wife	Female	50	Married	Begging	-
Imran	Son	Male	03	Unmarried	-	-

• Income Sources	:	Begging
• District of origin of HHH	:	Bhola
• Length of migration to Dhaka City	:	04 Yrs
• Household Structure	:	Nuclear
• Housing	:	Rented
• Somity Member	:	None

• <b>Household (HH) No</b>	:	<b>10</b>
• <b>Category</b>	:	<b>Coping</b>
• <b>Name of Household Head (HHH)</b>	:	<b>Jan-E- Alam</b>
• <b>Demographic Feature</b>	:	

Name of Household Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Jahangir Alam	Household Head	Male	25	Married	Rickshaw owner & Pulling	-
Barium	Wife	Female	16	Married	House wife	-
Rachel	Son	Male	01	Unmarried	-	-

• Income Sources	:	Rickshaw, Rickshaw pulling
• District of origin of HHH	:	Barisal
• Length of migration to Dhaka city	:	05 Yrs
• Household Structure	:	Nuclear
• Housing	:	Own
• Somity Member	:	Nil

• <b>Household No (HH)</b>	:	<b>11</b>
• <b>Category</b>	:	<b>Coping</b>
• <b>Name of Household Head (HHH)</b>	:	<b>Mr. Shahansha</b>
• <b>Demographic Feature</b>	:	

Name of Household Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Mr. Shaha Alam	Household Head	Male	22	Married	Rickshaw Pulling	II
Perveen	Wife	Female	18	Married	Maid Servant	-
Monoara	Daughter	Female	06	Unmarried	-	-

• Income Sources	:	Rickshaw pulling, Maid servant
• District of origin of HHH	:	Bhola
• Length of migration to Dhaka city	:	05 Yrs
• Household Structure	:	Joint
• Housing	:	Rented
• Somity Member	:	None

• <b>Household (HH) No</b>	:	<b>12</b>
• <b>Category</b>	:	<b>Coping</b>
• <b>Name of Household Head (HHH)</b>	:	<b>Abdul Odud</b>
• <b>Demographic Feature</b>	:	

Name of Household Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Abdul Hamid	Household Head	Male	45	Married	Boat Man	IV
Fulmoti Begum	Wife	Female	25	Married	-	-
Luggita	Wife	Female	27	Married	-	-
Asma	Daughter	Female	12	Unmarried	-	III
Robin	Son	Male	10	Unmarried	-	-
Nazma	Daughter	Female	06	Unmarried	-	-
Farid Hossian	Son	Male	01	Unmarried	-	-

• Income Sources	:	Boat, House
• District of origin of HHH	:	Faridpur
• Length of migration to Dhaka city	:	15 Yrs
• Household Structure	:	Joint
• Housing	:	Own
• Somity Member	:	ASD (NGO)

• Household (HH) No	:	13
• Category	:	Coping
• Name of Household Head (HHH)	:	Basu Mia
• Demographic Feature	:	

Name of House- hold Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Md. Nosu	Household Head	Male	35	Married	<i>Rickshaw</i> Pulling	-
Nurjahan	Wife	Fe- male	25	Married	House wife	-
Kaber	Son	Male	10	Unmar- ried	Student	III
Somon	Son	Male	05	Unmar- ried	-	-

• Income Sources	:	<i>Rickshaw</i> pulling
• District of origin of HHH	:	Bhola
• Length of migration to Dhaka city	:	03 Yrs
• Household Structure	:	Nuclear
• Housing	:	Rented
• <i>Somity</i> Member	:	None

• <b>Household (HH) No</b>	:	<b>14</b>
• <b>Category</b>	:	<b>Improving</b>
• <b>Name of Household Head (HHH)</b>	:	<b>Shahid Mia</b>
• <b>Demographic Feature</b>	:	

Name of House- hold Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Sta- tus	Occupation	Education
Salauddin Mia	Household Head	Male	47	Married	Skilled la- bour	-
Rahima Khatun	Wife	Female	30	Married	House wife	-
md. ali hossain	Son	Male	04	Unmarried	-	-
Sufia Khatun	Daughter	Femalr	2.5	Unmarried	-	-

• Income Sources	:	Salary, House
• District of origin of HHH	:	Dhaka
• Length of migration to Dhaka city	:	40 Yrs
• Household Structure	:	Nuclear
• Housing	:	Own
• <i>Somity</i> Member	:	ASD (NGO)

• <b>Household (HH) No</b>	:	<b>15</b>
• <b>Category</b>	:	<b>Improving</b>
• <b>Name of Household Head (HHH)</b>	:	<b>Monir Ali</b>
• <b>Demographic Feature</b>	:	

Name of Household Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Mokter Ali Chair-man	Household Head	Male	40	Married	Service (Chairman)	II
Motijan Bibi	Wife	Female	35	Married	House wife	-
Shafi Bibi	Wife	Female	22	Married	Mail	-
Nunurnnahar	Daughter	Female	12	Unmarried	-	III
Shirina Begum	Grand Daughter	Female		Unmarried	-	-
Nirole	Son	Male	08	Unmarried	-	II
Bashir	Son	Male	05	Unmarried		

• Income Sources	:	Salary, Business (Duck Farm) Maid, House
• District of origin of HHH	:	Bhola
• Length of migration to Dhaka city	:	20 Yrs
• Household Structure	:	Joint
• Housing	:	Own
• Somity Member	:	ASD (NGO)

• <b>Household (HH) No</b>	:	<b>16</b>
• <b>Category</b>	:	<b>Improving</b>
• <b>Name of Household Head (HHH)</b>	:	<b>Md. Falu</b>
• <b>Demographic Feature</b>	:	

Name of Household Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Md. Faraque	Household Head	Male	30	Married	Ricshaw garage	III
Rena	Wife	Female	25	Married	House wife	-
Farzana	Daughter	Female	08	Unmarried	Student	I
Liza	Daughter	Female	05	Unmarried	-	III

• Income Sources	:	Ricshaw garage, House, cattle farm, Scooter
• District of origin of HHH	:	Bhola
• Length of migration to Dhaka city	:	15 Yrs
• Household Structure	:	Nuclear
• Housing	:	Own
• Somity Member	:	None

• <b>Household (HH) No</b>	:	<b>17</b>				
• <b>Category</b>	:	<b>Coping</b>				
• <b>Name of Household Head (HHH)</b>	:	<b>Md. Israfil Hossian</b>				
• <b>Demographic Feature</b>	:					
Name of Household Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Md. Abdus Samad	HHH	Male	35	Married	<i>Rickshaw</i> puller	-
Parul	Wife	Female	18	Married	Maid	-
• Income Sources	:	<i>Rickshaw</i> pulling, Maid				
• District of origin of HHH	:	Rangpur				
• Length of migration to Dhaka city	:	02 Yrs				
• Household Structure	:	Nuclear				
• Housing	:	Rented				
• <i>Somity</i> Member	:	None				

• <b>Household (HH) No</b>	:	<b>18</b>				
• <b>Category</b>	:	<b>Coping</b>				
• <b>Name of Household Head (HHH)</b>	:	<b>Abdur Rahim</b>				
• <b>Demographic Feature</b>	:					
Name of Household Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Abdur Rahman Haw-lader	HHH	Male	45	Married	<i>Rickshaw</i> la-bour (Maker	-
Anjuman Begum	Wife	Fe-male	35	Married	Wagelabour	-
Mohammad Hossain	Son	Male	11	Unmarried	Brick Break-ing	-
Bibi Siysha	Daughter	Femalr	8	Unmarried	-	-
Abul Hashem	Son	Male	7	Unmarried	-	-
Zahura Begum	Daughter	Fe-male		Unmarried	-	-
• Income Sources	:	Maker, Wage				
• District of origin of HHH	:	Faridpur				
• Length of migration to Dhaka city	:	15 Yrs				
• Household Structure	:	Nuclear				
• Housing	:	Own				
• <i>Somity</i> Member	:	None				

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Household (HH) No</li><li>Category</li><li>Name of Household Head (HHH)</li><li>Demographic Feature</li></ul>	:	19	Coping	Jainal Haq		
Name of Household Member	Relationship with Household Head	Sex	Age (Yrs)	Marital Status	Occupation	Education
Fazlul Haq	HHH	Male	35	Married	Rickshaw puller	-
Jarina Begum	Wife	Female	25	Married	House Wife	-
Fahi Mia	Son	Male	7	Unmarried	-	-
Fatima Begum	Daughter	Femalr	2.5	Unmarried	-	-
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Income Sources</li><li>District of origin of HHH</li><li>Length of migration to Dhaka city</li><li>Household Structure</li><li>Housing</li><li>Somity Member</li></ul>	:	Rickshaw pulling	Bhola (Barishal)	4 Yrs	Nuclear	Rented
	:					None

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Household (HH) No</li><li>Catagory</li><li>Name of Household Head (HHH)</li><li>Demographic Feature</li></ul>	:	20	Coping	Kuddus		
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## APENDIX -2

### Introduction The ULS

The Urban Livelihoods Study (ULS) is a collaborative project involving Proshika Manobik Unnayan Kendra, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the University of Bath. The study is funded by the UK Department for International Development (formerly the Overseas Development Administration). The ULS team comprises the following:

**ULS Steering Committee:** Dr. Qazi Faruque Ahmed (PROSHIKA, Co-chair), Dr. Jane Pryer (LSHTM, Co-chair) Mr. Mahbubul Karim, Mr. Md. Shahabuddin, Professor Geof Wood, Professor Nazrul Islam, Dr. Oona Campbell, Dr. Sarah Salway, Mr. Iqbal Alam Khan, Mr. Matthew Kiggins

**Proshika Team Members: Study Director:** Mr. Md. Shahabuddin

**Study Coordinator (Qualitative):** Mr. Iqbal Alam Khan

**Qualitative Researchers:** Ms. Sonia Jesmin, Mr. Azmal Kabir, Ms. Mottahera Nasrin, Mr. A.E.A. Opel

**Quantitative Research Officers:** Dr. Ataur Rahman, Ms. Shahana Rahman

**Database Manager:** Mr. Mostafa el Helal

**Supervisors:** Mr. S.M. Zubair Ali Khan, Mr. Akramul Islam

**Interviewers:** Mr. Shajahan Hossain, Ms. Rifat Ara, Mr. Md. Salim, Ms. Dilafroze, Ms. Rezina Khan Ratna, Ms. Rafeza Shaheen, Mr. Patrick Rozario, Ms. Afsari Begum, Mr. Tasbir-ul-Hasnain, Mr. Moniruzzaman, Mr. Md. Ataul Islam, Mr. Dayal Chandra Das, Mr. Golam Firoz, Ms. Nurun Nahar, Ms. Namita Chakravarti, Mr. Chandon Banik, Mr. Mustafiz Ali Khan, Ms. Shahina Chowdhury, Ms. Asma Begum, Mr. Mahbubul Alam

<b>Data entry operators:</b>	Mr. Md. Helaluddin Farid, Ms. Nargis Akhter, Mr. Md. Sohel Ahmed Tarafder
<b>Secretary:</b>	Ms. Monira Islam
<b>Mapping team:</b>	Ms. Rifat Ara, Mr. Md. Salim, Mr. Arif Hossain Khan, Mr. Md. Mainul Islam
<b>LSHTM team members: Team Leader:</b>	Dr. Jane Pryer
<b>Study Coordinator (Quantitative):</b>	Dr. Sarah Salway
<b>Study Coordinator (Epidemiology):</b>	Mr. Matthew Kiggins
<b>Epidemiology Adviser:</b>	Dr. Oona Campbell
<b>University of Bath team members:</b>	
<b>Qualitative Adviser:</b>	Professor Geof Wood
<b>Research Assistant:</b>	



## GLOSSARY

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<i>Addabagider Dal</i>	Cliques
<i>Amader lok</i>	One of us
<i>Astana</i>	Abode of a Muslim saint
<i>Baki</i>	A loan in kind normally taken from shops without interest
<i>Bari</i>	Homesteads
<i>Bara</i>	Woven bamboo sticks
<i>Bazar</i>	Market
<i>Bhai</i>	Brother
<i>Bodli</i>	Replacement
<i>Busteer aagsho</i>	Part of <i>Bustee</i>
<i>Bustee</i>	Slum (in Bangladesh and Calcutta, India)
<i>Chacha</i>	Uncle
<i>Chachi</i>	Aunt
<i>Chanda</i>	Subscription
<i>Cheris</i>	Slums (in Madras, India)
<i>Chowls</i>	Slums (in Bombay, India)
<i>Chouki</i>	Wooden bedstead
<i>Chula</i>	Stove
<i>Contractor</i>	Who provide work to labourer on behalf of employer
<i>Dal</i>	Faction
<i>Dalbal</i>	Gang
<i>Dhar</i>	A loan in the form of cash taken from relatives, friends, acquaintances without interest
<i>Eid</i>	The biggest religious festival of Muslims
<i>Gaja</i>	Drug
<i>Gram</i>	Village
<i>Gundha</i>	Muscleman
<i>Gusti</i>	Lineage
<i>Hawlat</i>	A small loan in the form of cash taken from relatives, friends acquaintances without interest
<i>Jalsha</i>	Ritual meeting

<i>Jamat-E-Islami</i>	A Muslim fundamentalist political parties
<i>Kartras</i>	Slum (in Dhelhi, India)
<i>Khana</i>	Household
<i>Khana Prodhan</i>	Household head
<i>Khana Shadasha</i>	Household member
<i>Kutchra</i>	Semi-permanent, non cemented (of building)
<i>Kaj</i>	Work
<i>Khoraki</i>	Partial payment of daily labourer for daily consumption
<i>Kolis</i>	Labourers
<i>Line lagao</i>	Make a connection
<i>Lungui</i>	A dress of Bangladeshi men
<i>Mastaan</i>	Strongman/Muscleman
<i>Mastani</i>	A package of activities performed by mastaan like collection of protection money
<i>Mastanocracy</i>	Urban political economic culture where informal rights are prevalent
<i>Madracha</i>	Religious school
<i>Manikgor</i>	Peer group
<i>Matubbar</i>	Village leader
<i>Mauza</i>	Land administrative unit
<i>Mess</i>	Boarding house/dormitory
<i>Minti</i>	Porter
<i>Mishuk</i>	Three-wheeled auto-rickshaw
<i>Mohajan</i>	Owner of rickshaw
<i>Muribbi</i>	Homestead leader
<i>Netha</i>	Leader
<i>Pal</i>	Gang
<i>Paler goda</i>	Gang leader
<i>Panca</i>	Mental
<i>Para</i>	Part of village, neighborhood
<i>Pathi-mastaan</i>	Trainee muscleman
<i>Pauna</i>	Unpaid money of labour cost
<i>Peer</i>	Muslim saint
<i>Pitha</i>	Cake
<i>Proshika</i>	One of the largest NGO in Bangladesh
<i>Pucca</i>	Permanent, solid construction, cemented (of building)

<i>Shalish</i>	Local informal judiciary system
<i>Sardar</i>	Traditional Labour leader
<i>Samaj</i>	Society
<i>Sharee</i>	A dress of Bangladeshi women
<i>Somity</i>	Cooperative
<i>Rangbaj</i>	Young muscleman
<i>Reen</i>	A loan taken on interest
<i>Rickshaw</i>	Three-wheeled cycle
<i>Tadbir</i>	Negotiation for fevour
<i>Tader lok</i>	One of them
<i>Taka</i>	The monetary unit of Bangladesh
<i>Takdir</i>	Fortune
<i>Tempoo</i>	Three-wheeled auto-rickshaw
<i>Thana</i>	Administrative unit of Bangladesh
<i>Upazila</i>	Sub-district
<i>Urus</i>	Annual gathering
<i>Ustad-sagred</i>	Mentor-apprenticeship
<i>Utthi-mastaan</i>	Trainee muscleman

### ABBREVIATIONS

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ASCA	Accumulating Savings and Credit Association
ASD	Assistance for Slum Dwellers - an NGO
BBB	Beri Badh <i>Bustee</i>
BBB1	Beri Badh <i>Bustee 1</i>
BBB2	Beri Badh <i>Bustee 2</i>
BBB3	Beri Badh <i>Bustee 3</i>
BBS	Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
BIDS	Bangladesh Institute for Development Studies
BPDB	Bangladesh Power Development Board
BWDB	Bangladesh Water Development Board
CUS	Centre for Urban Studies
HHH	Household Head
IDPAA	Institute for Policy Analysis and Advocacy at PROSHIKA
LFS	Labour Force Survey
LSHTM	London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
STD	Sexual Transmitted Disease
ROSCA	Rotating Credit and Savings Associations
TK.	Taka - Bangladeshi Currency
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PROSHIKA	One of the Largest NGO in Bangladesh
QPS	Quantitative Panel Survey
UIS	Urban Informal Sector
ULS	Urban Livelihoods Study
UN	United Nations
UPDP	Urban Poor Development Programme of PROSHIKA
UPM	Urban Popular Movements
WASA	Water and Sewerage Authority

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